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SUMMARY 
In recent years, Canadian governments and courts have 
increasingly responded positively to the demands of lesbian 
and gay communities for legal rights. As a result, in 
several instances, such rights have been extended, at both 
statutory and , constitutional 
levels. In this thesisr I 
consider the politics of struggles for lesbian and gay 
legal equality in Canada. Although I explore several 
developments in this area, I focus my analysis upon two key 
examples: the struggle, in 1986, to add a "sexual 
orientation" ground to Ontario's Human Rights Code; and a 
key legal rights case launched in the late 1980s, and still 
on-going as of this writing (Mossop). 
More specifically, I address three key questions: [1] how 
are lesbian and gay subjects and subjectivities constituted 
through human rights law and what forces produce these 
legal constructions? [2] how capable are liberal 
democracies of accommodating "-sexual pluralism', and what 
are the implications of this for other areas of social 
transformation? [3] what is the relationship between the 
lesbian and gay rights movement, its principal opponents 
the New Christian Right,, and "the state, ' - how do the 
struggles of social movements for interpretive authority 
shape the law-making process (and vice versa)? 
In responding to these questions, I draw upon diverse 
approaches in legal theory, sociology, feminism, and 
lesbian and gay studies. My analysis centres upon the role 
of law as a site of struggle. I explore the engagements 
between the lesbian and gay rights movement, and its key 
opponent the New Christian Right. I assess the effects of 
lesbian and gay rights campaigns in both the short and long 
terms, considering issues to do with social movement 
mobilisation, effective political communication, and the 
role of these struggles in shifting dominant frameworks of 
meaning. I offer a detailed discussion of the role of 
rights, as goal and rhetoric, within political action. And 
I consider the relationship between law, and other forms of 
knowledge. I argue that the effects of legal struggle are 
complex, contradictory, apd unpredictable. Lesbian and gay 
rights reforms have both entrenched and undermined dominant 
paradigms of sexuality, and the effects of legal struggle 
in this and other areas must be assessed in the long-term. 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in four key areas: 
critical rights theory; theories of law and social change; 
the sociology of social movements and religions; and 
lesbian and gay politics. I use a combination of legal, 
sociological, feminist, and historical methodologies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, HETHODS, AND RESEARCH ETHICS 
A. IntroductorV Comments 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
lesbian and gay movements, particularly those located 
within western democracies, diversified and deepened their 
political struggles. The rise of lesbian feminism, 
fragmentations resulting from 'identity politics I, AIDS and 
Queer Nation activism, and openly gay conservatives all 
contributed to the complex and often contradictory social 
analyses and strategies that exemplify modern lesbian and 
gay politics. ' 
Lesbian and gay movements have always contained, 
amidst a plethora of activities, individuals and 
organisations committed to achieving change through law 
ref orm. In most countries , this began with demands , mainly 
by gay men, for the de-criminalisation of "homosexual" 
(male) offences, and expanded to include other coercive 
practices of the state - police harassment, obscenity laws, 
and other similar issues. In many jurisdictions, criminal 
law reforms remain near the top of the agenda (eg: age of 
1 It is thus far more accurate to speak of lesbian 
and gay movements, then to assume any monolithic, 
homogenous entity. 
1 
consent in Britain; sodomy statutes in many American 
states . 
Perhaps somewhat later, alongside criminal law reform 
organisations, there emerged a law-oriented movement of a 
different sort - the modern lesbian and gay rights 
movement. 3 Reflecting a shift in politics from demands to 
"keep the state off our backs, (through de-criminalising 
same-sex sexual activity, ending prosecutions of gay 
publications and bookshops under obscenity laws, and so 
on), the rights movement demanded legal protection, 
primarily through inclusion within anti-discriminatory 
statutes and the extension of social benefits to lesbian 
and gay couples. Recently, lesbian and gay law reform 
politics has come full-circle with demands to criminalise 
homophobic abuse as 'hate crimes, (see Petersen, 1991). 
During this period, there have been many different 
kinds of lesbian and gay rights law reform initiatives 
2 Broad studies of lesbian and gay movements are found 
in Adam (1987); Altman (1982); D'Emilio (1983); Faderman 
(1991); Kinsman (1987); Weeks (1977; 1981; 1985). 
3 When using the phrase 'lesbian and gay rights 
movement'. I refer to a loose coalition of rights- 
campaigning groups and individuals. The lesbian and gay 
rights movement is, itself, part of a broader 'lesbian and 
gay movement'. In this thesis,, my concern is with the 
former. Much of the sociology of social movements 
literature is concerned with defining and delimiting the 
substance and activities of social movements themselves - 
such an inquiry is not the focus of my research. See,, 
generally, Zald and McCarthy (1987); Touraine (1985); 
Melucci (1989); Offe (1985). See Epstein (1990) and Plotke 
(1990) for a critique of 'new movementf theory. 
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entailing a variety of strategies and attendant 
mobilisations. These include political campaigns to amend 
existing anti-discriminatory legislation to include a 
'sexual orientationf ground, and individual law suits 
launched under these statutes and others to either protect 
jobs or housing, or to demand various social benefit 
currently restricted to heterosexual couples or families. 
The hoped for achievements through law reform are, on 
one level, obvious. A gay couple litigating against a 
state refusal to register their marriage seeks the legal 
recognition of their relationship as a marriage, with all 
the benefits (and burdens) that attend such an 
acknowledgment. A lesbian and gay organisation lobbying 
for statutory reform to legislative definitions of "spouse" 
hopes for the official recognition of lesbian and gay 
identity within state welfare, taxation, and other similar 
schemes. 
But the goals of law ref orm initiatives , in most 
cases, also go further. Lesbian and gay rights movements, 
f rom their inception, have engaged in legal struggle partly 
on the basis of what changes in legal provision signify 
more generally. Aside from the tangible benefits that are 
sought, organisations and individuals have proceeded on the 
"law front" with the belief that law reflects societal 
fears and prejudices. In keeping with the demands of other 
3 
marginalised groups, lesbians and gay men have argued that 
progressive law reform signals to bigots and to those who 
would discriminate, that such attitudes and behaviours are 
no longer acceptable. In so doing, legal fliberalisationf 
marginalises those who were formerly the 'moral majority', 
at the same time as encouraging lesbians and gay men to 
,, come out' with at least the official promise to maintain 
their security and safety. 
The acquisition of rights reforms encourages more than 
"coming out'; perhaps as significantly, the positive (as 
opposed to negative criminal law constructions) legal 
recognition of lesbian and gay sexuality promotes feelings 
of self-worth, citizenship, and community identity. 
Furthermore, the very struggle for these goals, whether or 
not they are achieved, is a politicising process 
facilitating mobilisation, identification, heightened 
public awareness, and the development of a lesbian and gay 
consciousness, practice, and theory. 
For lesbians, gay men, and their supporters, the 
efforts of rights campaigners have always been the subject 
of both unqualified praise and critical comment. There are 
those who advocate rights for lesbians and gay men without 
hesitation (Jefferson, 1985; Harvard Law Review, 1989; 
Mohr, 1988) . and those who, in contrast, question the goals 
and accompanying strategies of rights acquisition (Lynch, 
1982; Kinsman, 1987; Eaton, 1991). Many who fall into the 
4 
latter group articulate a politics, drawn from socialist 
and feminist traditions, which problematises the 
possibility of achieving substantial shifts in social 
relations through the reform of dominant legal ideologieS4 
and institutions. 
I 
Consequently, this thesis takes a somewhat different 
approach to those works by academics which tend to 
uncritically advocate and argue for the extension of legal 
equality to lesbians and gay men. And, yet, neither do I 
prophesy doom as a result of such developments; my 
intention is to present , lesbian and gay rights " as a 
"problematic" -a location from which questions arise (see 
D. Smith,, 1987: 89-91). 1 take as my problematic that 
rights movement with which I am most familiar - as 
participant and observer - the movement f or lesbian and gay 
rights in Canada. 
The thesis is focused around three central questions: 
[1] how are lesbian and gay subjects and subjectivities 
constituted through human rights law and what forces 
produce these legal constructions? (2] how open is legal 
discourse to receiving "new" constructions of 
homosexuality? [3] what is the relationship between the 
lesbian and gay rights movement, its principal opponents 
the New Christian Right, and 'the state" - how do the 
41 use the word 'ideology' to mean a framework of 
meaning within which social relations are understood. 
5 
struggles of social movements for interpretive authority 
shape the law-making process (and vice versa)? 
B. Key Argmments and Themes 
My analysis is informed by insights drawn from several 
theoretical approaches to the study of law and social 
change. These include marxist theories of law and ideology, 
feminist modifications of this approach, critical legal 
4 studies and its own internal critics, and the application 
of poststructuralist ideas to legal analysis. I also draw 
upon three other literatures: feminist and lesbian and gay 
studies, and research in the sociology of religion, and 
social movements. There are three key arguments and 
several subsidiary themes running through the text and 
note influential theoretical traditionsr and particular 
writers, in the pages which follow. 
rll The dominance of a liberal sexual politics 
My first argument is that, in lesbian and gay law 
reform battles in Canada, liberal and conservative sexual 
politics dominate public debate. Since the mid-1980s, a 
liberal 'minority rights paradigmf has been ascendant 
whilst radical sexual politics, of both the left and the 
right,, are not as visible within public discourse on rights 
and sexuality. The dominance of the liberal equality 
paradigm has contributed to the public presentation and 
6 
perception of lesbians and gay men as a discrete minority 
community, whose innate Idifferencef should not result in 
prejudice and discrimination. 
Many gay activists have found the idea that sexuality 
is neither a personal nor political choice appealing; 
immutability has provided a way out of medical is ation , 
experimentation, and behaviour modifications. 
Nevertheless, I argue that this idea may have outlived its 
usefulness, at least in the present political climate of 
western, capitalist democracies. I further show how the 
liberal equality paradigm, and the concept of immutability, 
is fundamentally at odds with those feminist theories of 
sexuality which deconstruct the 'naturalness' of 
heterosexuality and gender identities. I suggest that much 
lesbian and gay legal struggle obfuscates, rather than 
illuminates, such analyses. Having said this, however, 
also explore the extent to which dominant legal ideologies 
themselves shift and are re-constituted through social 
5 
struggle. I also examine human rights legal developments 
as regimes of regulation (Foucault, 1976; Bumiller, 1988), 
considering their somewhat different contribution to the 
construction of sexual subjects than that produced by 
previous criminal law. Dominant frameworks of meaning 
cannot be harnessed by social movements without those 
5 Analyses of law and ideology are found in Gavigan 
(1986,1987); Hirst (1979); Hunt (1985); Smart (1984); 
Sugarman (1983); and Sumner (1979), among others. 
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frameworks in turn shaping and re-constituting actors and 
communities, 
There are three subsidiary questions I address within 
this first argument. Why is the minority rights paradigm 
so hegemonic? When and why do liberal perspectives 
predominate over conservative ones? And what happens when 
radical sexual politics enter public arenas, particularly 
law-related ones? 
In using marxist analyses of law in responding to the 
first of these questions, I argue that the extension of 
formal equality rights to lesbians and gay men in 
capitalist democracies is not necessarily in conflict with 
a 'modern, application of traditional western liberal 
values. I go on to suggest that social policy decision- 
makers, including politicians, fmedia chiefs', and judges, 
are drawn predominantly from groups exemplifying dominant 
political ideologies (see Sumner, 1979; Mandel, 1989; 
Bakan,, 1990,1991) and their discourse and decisions on gay 
rights issues reflects this. I also use poststructural 
discourse analysis to shpw how law, as a regime of Truth 
and knowledge, admits some external knowledges but excludes 
others (see Smart,, 1989). And,, finally,, I argue that 
social movement activists, in deciding to enter any public 
sexuality debate whether legal or otherwise, engage in a 
process of self-censorship whereby the movement's internal 
8 
politics are deliberately transformed and rendered 
compatible with the perceived prevailing social climate. 
In exploring when and why liberalism predominates over 
conservative sexual politics (and vice versa),, I trace 
several distinct but related dimensions to law reform 
struggle. For example, in discussing one gay rights case 
(Mossop, 1989,1990)f I show that litigation results were 
partially dependent upon the luck of the draw - which 
decision-makers were selected to hear the case at its 
various stages. 
determined by 
Yet,, the progress of gay rights is not 
individual whim. The decisions of 
adjudicators and politicians are historically and 
culturally contingent. They are severely constrained by 
their perceptions of the prevailing I social climate I- what 
(or whose) construction of homosexuality is ascendant in 
the "public sphere, at that historical moment. 
Liberalism"s hegemony, for example, is clearly shown in 
several examples, such as the (slow and uneven) development 
of lesbian custody case law, the increasing success of gay 
rights legislative amendments, and the transition from the 
criminal pathologisation of homosexuality to the provision 
of lesbian and gay equal opportunity policies in the armed 
services and police. 
This "prevailing social climate' is in part shaped by 
shifts in medical-moral discourser and the outcome of gay 
rights law reform initiatives tends to follow the winds of 
9 
change in psychiatric and other professional constructions 
of homosexuality. Thus, the role of 'experts, in the law's 
construction of sexuality is something I closely consider 
(Smart, 1989). At the same time, however, powerful 
professional discourses, whilst significant constituters of 
social meaning, are not determinative of sexuality; the 
struggles of social movements, and the interjection of 
"other knowledges", is also important in shaping social 
understandings. And legal discourse is not completely 
immune to such finvasionsf. 
Thus, another factor influencing the liberal or 
conservative fate of lesbian and gay rights reform is the 
role played by social movement activists. Individuals and 
groups can "infiltrate,, and influence political parties 
despite and against the 'prevailing social climate' (and, 
in the process, hope to create a new one). In Canada, the 
Conservative Party has its fpro-familyl wing, and the left- 
of-centre New Democratic Party its 'lesbian and gay 
caucus'. In Britain, for example, Martin Durham (1991) has 
argued that Section 28 was an initiative of the 'moral 
rightf in the Conservative Government and did not have the 
active support of the Party mainstream. 
Finally, there is no one, uniform Fsocial climatef. 
Attitudes and existing policies towards homosexuality both 
reflect and produce the balance of power between opposing 
social movements. The process of law-making is, in this 
10 
conceptualisation, a terrain of struggle where diverse 
interests vie for popular support in what one conservative 
Christian text calls the "war of words" (Dobson and Bauer, 
1990). 
In addressing the third question I posed above, what 
happens when radical perspectives on sexuality, of both 
rights and left, do enter public arenas, I consider various 
interventions in gay rights campaigns and litigation by 
both feminists, and their New Christian Right opponents. 
I show that such perspectives are sometimes ridiculed, or, 
more often, simply ignored. At the same time, however, 
definitions of Fradicall are not static and unchanging; as 
John D'Emilio (1983: 244) has noted, early pioneers in 
lesbian and gay rights reforms were radical in their time. 
And, of course, Christian prohibitions on homosexuality, 
now deemed quaint and 'unscientific', were once the law of 
the land. Furthermore, the impact of radical interventions 
must be evaluated in the long-term, and not simply by 
calculating specific 'wins, or Ilossest. As Gusfield 
(1981) has argued,, social movements effect shifts in 
meaning over time, despite flosingf individual battles. 
[21 Liberalism and social change 
Given that liberalism has, to some extent, been able 
to provide a certain measure of lesbian and gay rights', 
what are its limits? My second principal argument is that 
11 
whilst liberalism (with respect to sexuality) is hegemonic, 
it is not impervious to change, and, perhaps, not 
inherently facilitative of the status quo (see Mouffe,, 
1988,1992). The relative fluidity of what I call the 
liberal 'minority rights paradigm, allows for the 
recognition of "new" identities as represented by 'new' 
social movements such as those of lesbians - and gay men. 
These movements have been somewhat successful in shifting 
the boundaries of legal liberal constructions of 
homosexuality - from the 'deviant and dangerous offender', 
to the Iminorityf subject of human rights protection, to 
the 'spousal' recipient of social benefits previously 
available only to heterosexual couples. 
In the process, the articulation of principles such as 
fequality' together with lesbian and gay, has, to some 
extent, caused cracks in the firmament of universal' 
heterosexuality. Lesbian and gay law reform struggles have 
prompted the concomitant defense of heterosexuality and 
traditional gender identities, a task unthinkable in a 
previous era of homosexual pathologisation. In this way, 
lesbian and gay rights compaigns, even those which appear 
ostensibly less radical in demands and rhetoric, can be 
seen to be, perhaps within Judith Butler's (1990) analysis, 
"subversive" of gender and hence "troubling". I thus 
contend, for example, that whilst legal liberalism has, 
arguably, only succeeded in entrenching and obscuring class 
divisions (Fudge and Glasbeek, 1992; Mandel, 1989), the 
12 
same is not the case for sexuality where concrete shifts in 
social meanings and practices have taken place. 
I also discuss the role of 'rights', as demands and 
rhetoric, within lesbian and gay legal equality campaigns. 
In avoiding the polarities of the 'rights debate, in social 
theory., I argue that I rights I are neither I good I nor f bad I- 
Instead, rights claims and rhetoric play unpredictable and 
contradictory roles in social struggle; and their Feffects' 
are complex and changing. In many ways, I advocate a Ide- 
centring" of rights, not so much within social struggle 
(where I see rights demands as largely inevitable), but 
within academic analyses of such struggles. 
Finally, however, I argue that the connection between 
rights acquisition for lesbians and gay men and the 
transformation of social relations which produce lesbian, 
gay, and other identities is not necessarily obvious or 
inevitable. Such a bridge must be built, not awaited. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of lesbian and gay identity 
within human rights law has, as I argued above, 
contradictory effects, including the entrenchment of a 
minority identity and politics. 
f3l fLaw and the statef 
I also use the example of lesbian and gay rights 
struggles in Canada to complicate analyses of law and the 
13 
state which see the two as one, and that one as homogenous 
in character - whether as a tool or instrument of the 
capitalist class (Mandel, 1989) or patriarchy (Mackinnon, 
1983,1987), or as reflecting 'at 'dominant ideology, 
(Collins, 1982; Gabel and Feirman, 1982). 1 also question 
poststructuralist analyses of law which tend to reject 
notions of the state and, in my view, reify the 
capabilities of legal discourse to produce subjects. 
Instead, this thesis proceeds from a conceptual is ation 
of state law-making processes in the field of sexuality as 
sites of struggle. In my view, there is no one 'state' 
with fall position on or 'interest' in lesbian and gay law 
reform. The perspectives of the federal justice 
department, the federal Minister for Womenfs Issues, the 
Secretary of State's funding administrators, the judges at 
the Federal Court of Appeal, the adjudicators administering 
human rights laws, individual employer-managers in the 
public service, and members of parliament from all 
political parties - all these and more are linked through 
their location in state structures but can not be said to 
share much beyond that. . In the arena of 
lesbian and gay 
rights, confusion and contradiction is far more prevalent 
than any common intention or strategy. 
Emerging within this thesis, therefore, is a view of 
legislation and policy in the area of lesbian and gay 
rights that sees such developments as both reflecting and 
14 
contributing to the constitution of the balance of power 
between social movements. In some ways, my understanding 
of the relation between social movements and the state is 
an instrumentalist one in that my analysis suggests that 
state bureaucracies and processes can be , won" 
(temporarily) by those seeking to further or halt changes 
to the regulation of sexuality (see also Cooper, 1992). 
C. Chapter Outline 
This first chapter concludes with a discussion of 
research methodology and ethics. Aside from describing and 
evaluating methodological approaches and material sources, 
I also place myself within the text, critically assessing 
my own role as academic and potential 'thesis subject'. 
The second chapter provides a brief and selective 
history of the Canadian lesbian and gay movement's 
engagement with human rights law reform, from the 1970s to 
the present. Besides offering an explanation for why some 
lesbians and gay men chose to advocate such reforms, I 
explain the structure of human rights regimes, and provide 
an overview of 'sexual orientationf case law in Canada. I 
also consider several different 'paradigms, of sexuality 
expressed by lesbians and gay men in their campaigns and 
litigation, and conclude by reviewing the development of 
'lesbian and gay legal studiesf. 
15 
The third chapter launches into the substance of the 
research. Taking the struggle for a 'sexual orientation, 
amendment to Ontario's Human Rights Code (popularly known 
as "Bill 7") as a "case study', I explore the processes 
leading up to the enactment of the amendment in 1986, its 
effects and implications, and the politics of the debate 
between opposing social movements. I argue that this 
lesbian and gay struggle for inclusion within human rights 
legislation had diverse implications. On the one hand, the 
lesbian and gay 'subject, publicly emerging from the 
conflict was one informed by liberal legalism, and not one 
that challenged such constructions. Further, the campaigns 
tended to strengthen and legitimate existing legal 
frameworks, thus undermining attempts to reform and replace 
them. At the same time however, the struggle succeeded in 
rendering visible lesbian and gay sexuality and occasioning 
public debate - albeit within a liberal paradigm of 
Itolerancef. 
The following chapter uses Bill 7 and other examples 
to consider debates about the politics of rights. I focus 
upon the role of rights as rhetoric, examining conflicting 
theories of rights efficacy in social movement struggle. 
I suggest an analysis which, with respect to the Bill 7 
contestation, moves beyond discussing the role of 'rights' 
in the abstract to one exploring the meanings of rights 
within particular contestations. I argue that the f lesbian 
and gay rights movement' can be seen as a modern movement 
16 
for inclusion in frameworks of social citizenship, and that 
the deployment of rights rhetoric must be assessed within 
this context. Whilst I agree with some of the positions of 
the , rights critics', I nonetheless put forward a view of 
rights which considers such struggles both in perspective, 
and in their specificity. 
The fifth and sixth chapters explore the politics of 
the primary movement standing in opposition to lesbian and 
gay legal equality - the New Christian Right. I examine 
the history of this movement, and then centre my analysis 
upon three of the organisations intervening in one gay 
rights case - the Mossop litigation. Chapter five details 
the sexual politics of this movement, whilst chapter six 
asks what occurred when these organisations attempted to 
intervene in the legal arena. I argue that the evangelical 
Christianity of these organisations, which motivates and 
inspires their opposition to lesbian and gay equality (as 
well as anti-racism, feminism, and so on) is, as with 
feminism above, rendered invisible within the legal 
process. I explore why this happened, but also suggest, 
however, that the effects of the New Christian Right must 
be assessed at a deeper level. I ask, in fact, whether the 
conclusions I reach in this chapter have implications for 
feminist, and lesbian/gay legal struggle. 
The seventh chapter considers the role of judges and 
experts within litigation. I first show the conflict 
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between legal processes and conventions, and the external 
knowledges 'experts' bring to their interventions. I then 
go on to consider what judges do with the fexpert' evidence 
that is presented to them, and also suggest why judges 
reach the decisions they do in lesbian and gay rights 
cases. This chapter contains discussions of the relative 
hierarchy of external knowledges within legal discourse, 
the ideological politics of individual judges, and the 
constraints and limitations within which judges can express 
these politics. I conclude by assessing sociology's 
contribution to the 'lesbian and gay legal subject'. 
D. Research methodoloqies and ethical considerations 
fll FEwirical sources'/lprimarv materials' 
This thesis is grounded in detailed studies of two 
events in the struggle for lesbian and gay equality in 
Canada. First, the 1986 campaign for a sexual orientation 
amendment to Ontario Fs Human Rights Code. Sources f or this 
study were: [a] documents of participating social movement 
organisations, particularly those of the Coalition For Gay 
Rights in Ontario [b] legislative debates [c] press 
coverage [d] interviews with individuals active at the time 
and [e] my own experience of participating in the campaign. 
My second "empirical study, is that of the litigation 
process in the Mossop case. For this analysis, I have 
drawn upon: [a] the materials of participating social 
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movement organisations [b] the legal submissions of all 
parties [c] the texts of the judgments and [d] interviews 
with litigants, lawyers, 'expert witness', and various 
social movement actors. 
In addition to these two case studies, I draw upon a 
variety of other sources in historically describing aspects 
of Canadian lesbian and gay law reform initiatives, as well 
as documents and interviews relating to other lesbian and 
gay equality cases. As indicated earlier, and in contrast 
to much (particularly American) legal analysis, I do not 
focus exclusively upon legal judgments. Only in Chapter 7 
do I specifically engage in "case analysis"; in other 
chapters, I consider statutory law, legal institutions and 
institutional regimes, political rhetoric, as well as other 
documents produced during legal struggle such as 
legislative briefs, affidavits, and appeal court 
submissions by intervening parties, as well as the views of 
actors in the process. 
For example, in Chapter 3,1 analyse the politics of 
human rights law ref orm within the struggle f or a sexual 
orientation amendment to Ontariofs Human Rights Code. I 
utilise several strategies, including: a textual analysis 
of the Code itself; critically examining organisational 
briefs and documents and comparing them to those produced 
during an earlier period of attempted reform; conducting a 
short media analysis; examining reports from the Human 
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Rights Commission; and drawing on interviews and accounts 
relating to the struggle. 
Limitations to these materials include the fact that 
they are English-language only and largely Ontario based - 
the "empirical sources' reflect the topic chosen. Legal 
struggle is an activity engaged in by primarily one sector 
of the Canadian lesbian and gay rights movement, usually 
located in large urban centres; campaigns tend to be led by 
relatively stable, structured organisations. Lesbian and 
gay litigants are often middle class professionals. This 
project, therefore, does not claim to represent or consider 
the diverse forms of lesbian and gay politics, nor the 
activities of more submerged, less publicly visible, 
movement sectors. Whilst this is undoubtedly a restriction 
to the scope of the thesis, it is, in my view, a necessary 
one. 
r2l Methodologies 
[i] analytical approachqs 
In terms of specific analytical strategies, I have 
employed several diverse approaches. For example, I employ 
a variant of a methodology advocated by Colin Sumner (1979) 
for examining the ideologies of law. He suggests such 
strategies as tracing the history of an ideology, following 
the ideologies of judges across a range of decisions, and 
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substantiating 'readings, by reference to other texts and 
debates (1979: 282-5). In contrast to Sumner, I do not 
believe that this gives a "scientific" reading of law 
whereby the "true" meaning of a legal decision can be 
discovered. I also have a different understanding of 
ideology in that I use the term to mean a framework of 
meaning within which social relations are understood. 
Nevertheless, I believe that Sumner's methodology provides 
a helpful interpretation of why judges reach the decisions 
they do. 
I draw on Sumnerfs approach in Chapter 7, which 
analyses several gay rights judgments. There I explore the 
different ideologies of decision-making forums. For 
example, in Mossop, the human rights adjudicator, I argue, 
expressed a broad liberal ideology in her attempt to find 
in Mossopts favour. Her judgment is based on ideological 
elements historically associated with liberalism, such as 
the public/private divide, and values of tolerance and 
democracy. This, I suggest, is in keeping with the 
different mandate and personnel of administrative 
tribunals, and also reflepts the particular politics of the 
feminist adjudicator herself. The judges of the Federal 
Court of Appeal, particulary Marceau who gave the key 
judgment, are, in contrast, conservativesf who insist upon 
strict interpretations, and non-intervention in market 
relations. 
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In this same chapter, I also explore the Mossop 
decision at other levels. The work of Carol Smart (1989) 
offers an analysis of the relation between law's 
epistemological power and feminist interventions, exploring 
the ways in which legal discourse constitutes its ftruth' 
and excludes marginal knowledges. So, for example, I read 
the judgments, not just for their politics,, - but also for 
how legal knowledge is produced, how other Fways of seeing' 
are structured out, and how various linguistic techniquest 
such as rhetoric and metaphor, are deployed to achieve the 
desired result. I have tried to use both ideological and 
discourse analyses as counter-balances to each other, in an 
effort to explore material at different levels, rather than 
attempting to synthesise the two approaches, or reject one 
altogether (see also Boyd, 1991). 
For example, I noted above that in Chapter 71 utilise 
a variant of Colin Sumner's (1979) ideological analysis of 
law. In this same chapter I also employ 'discourse 
analysis'; I consider the 'lesbian and gay subject' 
constituted through 'expert' discourses, and the role of 
legal arenas as sites. of struggle between competing 
knowledges. In my view, "ideological" and discourse' 
analysis provide different 'takes' on social phenomena and, 
in this thesis, do not compete with each other f or ultimate 
authority (but see Barrett, 1991). 
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Parts of Chapters 5 and 6, on the New Christian Right 
(NCR), reflect a traditional social science methodology. 
Here, I rely upon quantitative data on religious views, as 
well as conventionally empirical studies of the NCR 
movement. At the same time, the chapter Ideconstructsf NCR 
texts, and explores the disjunction between their internal 
sexual politics and the substance of - their legal 
interventions. I thus read the texts on a somewhat deeper 
level (see A. Young, 1990; Valverde, 1991), and use these 
readings to question some of the assumptions of the 
'scientific, studies. 
[ii] Fother voicest 
In general, I have adopted a strategy, also advocated 
by Ann Opie (1992),, which seeks to challenge my own 
ideological perspective. By doing this I hope to 
problematise, using myself as Isubjectf (see also Stanley, 
1990), any simple search for 'one right answer'. I do this 
by, at times, creating a 'dialogue, within the text between 
myself as author, other academics, the interviewees, and 
perspectives from alterngtive, non-academic media. With 
respect to these latter 'voices'. I have made some effort 
to include a range of lesbian and gay experiences, drawing 
upon movement publications, oral histories, and 
autobiographical accounts. I also, at times, refrain from 
"analysing" or "commenting" upon statements quoted from 
interview transcripts. The views of interviewees are, 
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occasionally, allowed to stand on their own (as mine do), 
without the interference of 'authorial interpretationf (I 
discuss issues related to the selection of quotations 
below). Such practices help to deter the researcher from 
simply 'using" "subjects' for her own ideological ends (see 
Opie, 1992). 1 do not, however, claim to have overcome 
this (or any other) methodological problem. - 
Nevertheless, I aspire to this goal in Chapter 4, for 
example, where I review arguments for and against the 
acquisition of rights. In that chapter, I draw on other 
sources . such as an autobiographical book by Karen Thompson 
(1986), a lesbian whose decade-long fight for legal 
guardianship of her brain-injured partner was the impetus 
for her radical politicisation. And, in addition to 
presenting the views of opposing theorists and indicating 
my own perspective on this issue, at the same time I have 
included the views of interviewees. Not just on 'rights' 
per se, but also their views on the academic "rights 
debate', much of which is not at all complimentary. 
[iii] reflexivity 
Above all, I hope that this study embodies several 
qualities often discussed under the general rubric of 
"research reflexivity" (Woolgar,, 1988; Atkinson,, 1990). 
This is usually understood to entail the creation of a text 
which is self-aware, does not pretend 'objectivity', and 
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does not claim to be aI scientifically true, 
social phenomena. Rather, the author of a 
is self-consciously aware of her own bias 
presents these 'upfront', rather than 
transcend them through the adoption o: 
techniques. 
explanation of 
reflexive text 
and goals, and 
attempting to 
E positivistic 
Furthermore, a reflexive study is attentive to its own 
conventions, strategies, and modes of representation. For 
example, the subsequent section of this chapter, entitled 
"the "I" in the text", employs a confessional style in 
which I describe characteristics and histories of myself 
ostensibly bearing some relation to the topic I have chosen 
to research. This strategy, aside from providing 'personal 
information, and showing the origins and motives for my own 
perspective, may assist in legitimating the thesis by 
highlighting my own experience and 'good intentionsf. 
Chapter 5, for example, on the sexual politics of the New 
Christian Right, emphasises the negative and hateful 
dimensions of this movement. Whilst I also note the 
positive things NCR organisations provide for their 
members,, these I'pastoraý, ' qualities are not given much 
prominence. Arguably, then, given my own political 
understanding, the portrait I paint of the NCR is somewhat 
one-sided. Finally, the entire thesis is written in a very 
conventional academic style, following and therefore 
legitimising 'acceptable form and standards'. There has 
been little attempt to disrupt this. 
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. 
r3l Dilemmas of identity and ethics 
[i] the "I" in the text 
Here, I wish to explore my own social location vis a 
vis the research. I came to this project with specific 
concerns about lesbian and gay legal strategies. MY 
political perspective was informed by a- variety of 
struggles and institutional regimes in which I had 
participated. Aside from having studied for university 
degrees in sociology and law, I had been moderately active 
in Toronto lesbian feminist and gay politics for over ten 
years -initially around violence against women, then in the 
pro-choice movement, and, later, around HIV/AIDS issues. 
I had also been peripherally involved in issues around 
antisemitism and racism. Only once was I involved with a 
law reform campaign; indeed, "gay rights" was,, for me,, 
synonymous with a gay male liberal agenda, and law reform 
was something which, until law school, I rarely considered 
a serious vehicle for social change. 
Whilst studying for my law degree, I began to note the 
frequency with which humýtn rights law reform and Frights 
rhetoric' was evident within lesbian and gay community 
media, and public debate. During my first year of law 
school, I even participated in one such struggle (the Bill 
7 episode of Chapter 3), despite having many reservations. 
It was, therefore, contradictions and questions such as 
these which led me to this project. In my third year of 
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the law degree, I wrote a paper from which, ultimately, 
this thesis emerged. I thus viewed myself as, somewhat 
paradoxically, having one foot in legal academe, and the 
other in social movement activism. 
An example of how the relation between my various 
selves plays out in this project is shown in Chapter 4. 
For most of the chapter,, the "I " in the text is that of the 
legal academic, applying a 'critical perspectivef to her 
"subject-matter'. However, the chapter includes a personal 
story, reflecting upon my own involvement in the Bill 7 
struggle, and positioning myself as a "subject' in the 
text. 
Aside from this point about juggling identities within 
academic work, other issues are raised by my location 
within the movement being studied and academe. For 
example, I chose to investigate Canadian developments at 
a British university. Whilst I had fairly good access to 
most materials I needed, and was able to return to Canada 
to conduct research if necessary, this distance raised 
problems. Correspondencq only reveals so much. It is not 
the same as actually living and working in the community, 
as I had done in the past. I was thus acutely aware of 
these constraints, although I did not find them 
sufficiently insurmountable as to cause a re-think of what 
I was attempting to do. Indeed, the opportunity to explore 
and experience British theory and European politics at 
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times provided important insights and counter-balances to 
both the insular world of North American academe, and its 
highly legalised culture. For example,, in Britain , the 
lack of procedural rights now deemed unquestionable in 
Canada (under the Charter) led me to reconsider Canadian 
Charter critiques. Also, discussions around creating a 
British Bill of Rights helped to clarify my thinking on the 
Canadian Charter. 
An additional concern, partly occasioned by distance, 
was my lack of political involvement in the Canadian 
lesbian and gay movement itself. I tend to believe that 
academic work is strengthened through being more directly 
involved in the activities one is Istudyingf - that 
campaigning, marching, leafleting, and generally 
participating in social movement projects provides 
important insights and feedback into the development of 
social analysis. The thesis, in my view, therefore suffers 
from this distancing. On the other hand, the fact that I 
had been involved in the movement I was writing about could 
have been, looked at a different way, a drawback. I was 
well aware of the compelling reasons why lesbians and gay 
men support rights struggles; I had done so myself. There 
might have been a tendency on my part to over-emphasise 
potential benefits - ones that I myself experienced - 
thereby privileging my own standpoint. 
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There are those who would argue for doing just this 
(Sandra Harding, 1986,1991; Harstock, 1983; D. Smith, 
1987). 1, however, am more persuaded by " standpoint,, 
critics who argue that "identity standpoints", whilst 
perhaps being a necessary stance within some forms of 
political campaigning, do not reveal "true" or "better" 
interpretations of social phenomena within academic 
research (see Flax, 1987; Kline, 1989b). Furthermore, such 
standpoints impose a homogeneity upon the 'category, being 
claimed which can not reflect or represent the diversity 
within it. 
Another issue revolves around the question of how 
membership in a 'legal elitef might effect the shape and 
content of my thesis. Law is extremely powerful, and quite 
seductive. During the writing of this thesis I was asked, 
for example, to comment on the legal submission of a 
coalition of progressive organisations intervening in the 
Mossop case. Agreeing to the request was to perhaps become 
caught up in the status of such a task, entranced with the 
potential power to influence the thinking of judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada.. At the same time, I questioned 
the whole process of having legal academics give these 
kinds of "opinions", becoming a lesbian and gay legal 
elite, indeed perhaps creating a new legal industry (as in 
the U. S. ), thereby contributing further to the 
'legalisation of politics' I criticise in this text. 
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Despite these contradictions, I went ahead and gave my 
comments. In actuality, my primary concern when writing my 
"opinion' was not how to persuade Supreme Court judges, 
but, rather, how to be sufficiently critical of the whole 
endeavour without offending or patronising the lawyers who 
wrote and were committed to the intervention. My comments 
ultimately reflected my own discomfort with-participating 
in the process. My decision to comment on the submission 
was a negotiation between various positions. I have, 
however,, tried both to remain conscious of these 
contradictions and to not exclude myself and my own work 
from the critical comments I make. 
[ii] the Fresearchero' and the researched" 
have discussed above questions to do with my own 
location within the research I have undertaken. Heref I 
wish to elaborate on some of these issues with respect to 
interviewing and publication. Although interviews do not 
comprise the core substance of 'source material' for this 
thesis, the issues raised by the interview process 
highlight dilemmas that eýxtend beyond it. 
Interviewing 
Feminist and other sociological literature on 
interviewing tends to revolve around three problematics: 
interviewing the 'dispossessed', thereby highlighting the 
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researcher's 'power over' her subjects (Oakley, 1981; 
Roberts, 1981; Opie, 1992); joining fradicalf groups 
covertly and collecting information in secret (eg: Bulmer, 
1982); additionally, there is a small literature on 
intervi-ewing the "locally powerful" (Bell, 1978),, meaning 
bureaucrats and professionals with local decision-making 
powers, usually working within key social institutions (eg: 
Smart,, 1984). The first approach, particularly its 
feminist manifestations, seeks to develop interviewing 
strategies in order to minimise power inequalities. Also 
posed are questions to do with 'empathy', 'identification', 
and 'appropriation'. The 'covert research" methodology 
literature finds its ethical dilemmas in the very nature of 
researching secretively, and in the problems arising from 
publishing studies of people who have not consented to 
become research subjects. Those who have written about 
studying the 'locally powerful' identify the researcher's 
relative inequality in the interviewing process. 
Whilst these literatures raise important questions and 
research dilemmas, their applicability to this project is 
not obvious. Relations of power, between myself and my 
interviewees, did not fit comfortably into any of these 
paradigms. When interviewees cannot be placed into a 
category of 'dispossessed, or 'powerful', and especially 
when they express views you abhor or hold status positions 
well above yours (which does not necessarily mean that they 
are 'powerful' within the problematic being studied), the 
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relation between researcher and "subject" becomes more 
complex. Unfortunately,, there is little methodological 
literature on this. 
In the case of the lesbians and gay men I interviewed, 
I was both "one of 11 them, thus feeling such things as 
empathy and solidarity, whilst at the same time being one 
of 'those' - namely, academics - thus feeling their 
hostility and my defensiveness. I was conscious that some 
individuals must have assumed my support for their 
positions, granted interview access, and at some level 
'trusted' me, partially based upon my ability to present 
myself as 'a lesbian'. Several of the contributors to the 
collection Doing Feminist Research (1981) make similar 
points in their own studies. 
On the other hand, in interviewing fellow members of 
the Canadian lesbian and gay movement, in many ways I was 
not the powerffull person in the relation. On the 
contrary, I was a student interviewing, for the most part, 
lawyers, well-paid civil servants,, and teachers. 
Furthermore, all three of the lesbian and gay litigants I 
interviewed patronised me in the sense of f inding some of 
my questions irrelevant or silly, and assuming my concerns 
were not those of 'real people'. For the most part, those 
I interviewed were savvy political actors who had given 
many interviews and knew how to handle 'researchers'. The 
interviews themselves, then, are products of our respective 
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attempts to ascertain each other's agenda, determine 
degrees of trustworthiness, and so on. Thus, whilst these 
individuals were, arguably, dispossessed of lesbian and gay 
equality, in many other ways their lives were quite 
privileged. 
A slightly different, but related, set of concerns 
emerged from interviews conducted with members of the New 
Christian Right. Over the course of the first year of my 
doctorate, I developed a friendly correspondence with 
several members of conservative Christian organisations, a 
number of whom regularly sent me newsletters, positional 
statements, and other organisational information. I went 
on to interview two of these individuals, plus one other I 
had not contacted previously. 
My first concern was to gain access, and thus whilst 
I did not claim to be born-again, I most certainly did not 
present myself as a Jewish, lesbian, socialist, feminist. 
I was not engaging in covert research, but neither did I 
wish to jeopardise the project. I did not lie, but I did 
not tell the whole truth -I said I was a sociologist of 
law (which, from their perspective, was bad enough). 
During the interviews, I was occasionally put into the 
position of having to respond to a direct question about my 
own religious affiliations. Each time, I avoided the 
question, giving an ambiguous answer that revealed very 
little. 
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The tapes resulting f rom these interviews are products 
of the curious relation between myself and people I have 
despised, feared, and fought against for most of my life - 
the same,, of course, is true f or them, vis a vis me. 
Various researchers who have interviewed conservative 
Christians, and even more radical right-wing groups, have 
written about the process by which one grows to feel 
empathy for 'the enemy' (eg: Aho, 1990). 1 have been no 
exception in this regard. The interviews I conducted 
provided me with a very different "take" on a group of 
people I would previously have dismissed as "religious 
fanatics'. I could not escape the fact that they were 
Inicef. towards me, that they did their utmost to assist my 
research, and that they rather poignantly expressed 
gratitude that 'at least someone is interested in what we 
have to sayy (see also Klatch's discussion, 1987-017). At 
the same time, I knew that the interviewees were utterly 
opposed to everything I believed in. 
The situation was even more complicated by my gradual 
realisation that the New Christian Right interviewees 
perceived themselves to be power'less, in society, and 
people such as myself ('secular humanist' academics) to be 
far more influential in setting public agendas and 
determining the character of social life. This view 
contradicted my own which, historically, had attributed f ar 
greater social power to Ithemf. Instead, I found I was 
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interviewing neither the Flocally powerful', nor any other 
simple elite. Not only did I not feel power"less, ' when 
speaking to NCR members, my knowledge of how they 
constructed me (as an academic producer of powerful secular 
knowledge) meant that I instead perceived them to be rather 
vulnerable. I thus felt uncomfortable leading them to 
believe, through sympathetic grunts or smiles-, that I might 
be supportive of their cause. On the other hand, I was 
also motivated by an activist concern to 'get information 
on these people, (in this sense the research resembled the 
covert model) . To do this, I needed to establish some kind 
of trust, or empathy, during the interviewing process. And 
yet, I found this was achieved at a personal cost, 
particularly when individuals expressed the most vicious 
perceptions of lesbian and gay sexuality. As Rebecca 
Klatch (1987: 18) has noted, in the context of interviewing 
right-wing women, research such as this involves, for the 
interviewer,, a "constant process of role negotiation". 
The interviews themselves are, therefore, products of 
a relation between individuals wary of, yet wanting 
something f rom the other.. What the NCR respondents were 
prepared to say to me, and the questions I was prepared to 
ask of them, all help to construct the interview transcript 
itself. As Tait (1990: 173) has suggested, interview 
transcripts are products of a social process, and 
interviewees quoted comments must be read in this light. 
Furthermore, the selection of quotations is itself a 
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politically-charged process; and, yet, abuses can only be 
controlled, not eliminated. 
Publishing 
Finally, there is a 'politics of publication, issue. 
Here, I wish to discuss the issue of how the publication of 
research implicates the relation between the academic and 
her "subject', and creates, for the researcher, an 
authority from which to speak. 
Before beginning my doctorate,, a paper I wrote was 
published in a Canadian law journal, and was subsequently 
re-printed in a collection of 'women and law' course 
materials. In this piece, I discussed, among other things, 
the political implications of a specific case being waged 
by Karen Andrews, a 'lesbian litigant'. The construction 
of her case, I suggested, had dubious implications for 
'women's liberationt. 
During the course of my doctoral research, I arranged 
to interview Andrews and, towards the end of our 
conversation, asked her to tell me what she thought of the 
article. She said that it had been very strange to see 
herself as the subject of an academic paper, and had felt 
that, as a person, her life had somehow been degraded and 
her concerns trivialised. 
I was out there, outside myself. I had become a 
"thing" ... I saw myself in the trenches getting my hands dirty... (during the litigation] I had got 
so many vicious phonecalls ... [then] I thought,, 
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this is an intellectual exercise ... who reads the Osgoode Hall Law Journal anyway? (Andrews, 
interview) 
In speaking with Andrews, I was at first upset and ready to 
re-consider the project as a whole. However, it was also 
clear to me that she had assumed I was someone with little 
or no experience in the lesbian and gay movement, and had 
been engaged in a kind of 'armchair' elitism. 
I do not know the "right" way of resolving this 
problem. Were I to self-censor every word in this thesis 
that other lesbians might disagree with,, there would be 
little point in continuing. On the other hand, I cannot 
ignore the concerns of those who, like Karen Andrews , 
express how they have experienced being a 'research 
subject'. In my view, research must be conducted 
ethically, within the context of a set of values. 
Publication of research should be sensitive to how 
"subjects, will read the text, but cannot be determined by 
possible or potential readings. One can never 'control' 
for this anyway. Nevertheless, I have tried to keep 
Andrewsf comments fin mind'. 
Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, I have utilised three primary devices 
in an attempt to respond to the problematic of the 
researcher/researched relation. First, I have tried to 
indicate that my own position lies on both sides of this 
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dichotomy. At various points in the text, I speak 
explicitly from my own experience in lesbian and gay 
politics, and offer 'my story' as one to consider. I have 
thus tried 'to subjectf myself, along with others, within 
the text (Stanley, 1990: 113). Second, wherever possible, 
I have included extracts f rom interviews where the views of 
lesbian and gay interviewees are at odds with my own. To 
some extent, then, and in some places more than others, I 
have attempted to create a dialogue between actors - 
between academics and activists. I have previously 
mentioned that I, at times, leave the views of others to 
stand on their own, unmediated by my direct commentary. 
Third, I have sent my work to interviewees and others for 
comments. Although I made no promises to alter my text, I 
considered any objections seriously, and had clear reasons 
for including material to which interviewees took 
exception. I have included their comments in an appendix 
to the thesis. 
There is another dimension to this problematic in that 
I have also subjected to critical scrutiny a series of 
actors and organisations to which I am politically and 
morally opposed - the New Christian Right. I have 
previously discussed this with respect to conducting 
interviews. However, the ethical dilemma re-emerges in 
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other contexts as well. 
'equally"? 
Am I to treat all my interviewees 
have concluded that this cannot be done. My project 
is an explicitly political one; I view it as a contribution 
to feminist, and lesbian/gay studies. Whilst, for example, 
I know that the REAL Women (RW) organisation wishes to keep 
its Christianity out of the public arena, my politics 
necessitate publicising this dimension of RW, so that like- 
minded people will be better-informed about 'the enemy'. 
At the same time, however, I am not sure whether I should 
justify my position here on the basis that the NCR is 
"powerfulf, whilst lesbian and gay men are 'oppressed'. As 
I argue in Chapter 6, conceptualising relations of power is 
rather complicated when exploring the activities of 
opposing social movements. I thus prefer to simply 
acknowledge that my project is both partial and partisan. 
At the same. time however, I have attempted to portray the 
individual interviewees as fairly as possible, and have 
tried to avoid tendencies to quote them out of context, or 
'set them upf to sound silly or inane. 
6 In addition to these ethical concerns, there are 
other, more practical, ones that have been raised by 
sociologists conducting similar research. For example, I 
have also been attentive to questions about how this 
experience of my interviewees will af f ect their granting of 
access to researchers in future. 
7 For an example of how I dealt with interviewee 
comments,, see Judy Anderson"s (President of REAL Women) 
editing of my draft in Appendix B, and compare with my 
final text in Chapters 4 and 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A. BACKGROUND TO LESBIAN AND GAY RICHTS REFORM_ 
AND AN INTRODUCTION TO LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL STUDIES_ 
This chapter provides an account of the evolution of 
Canadian lesbian and gay rights campaigns, case law, and 
scholarship. I hope to contribute here two elements to the 
thesis as a whole: a history of lesbian and gay struggle in 
this area; and the beginnings of a critical analysis of the 
relationship between human rights regulation and sexuality. 
The f irst section of f ers an explanation f or the development 
of lesbian and gay human rights struggles informed by ideas 
of citizenship and equality. I then outline the emergence 
of lesbian and gay human rights case law, trace the history 
of campaigns to amend existing human rights laws, and 
provide a more detailed discussion of the Mossop case, as 
this litigation is a key referent in subsequent chapters. 
I conclude by considering the emergence of lesbian and gay 
legal studies, particularly of the Canadian variety. 
A. "To Be Coded Human" (Ross, 1990) 
One starting point to considering the relationship 
between lesbians, gay men, and rights reform is to explore 
why such reforms, and the organisations which pressed for 
them, appeared on the political scene. One interpretation 
can be drawn from the work of Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe, in 
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her analysis of social movements and democracy, argues that 
modern social antagonisms often result when "new,, 
discursive subjects are confronted with other discursive 
practices which 'negate, them (1988: 94). Her example is 
that of Enlightenment discourse giving women the 
opportunity to reconstitute themselves as " equal,, , this 
constitution being a "contradictory interpellation" to that 
produced simultaneously by other, exclusionary discourses 
(1988: 94-5). According to Mouffe (1988: 95), the 
entrenchment of Enlightenment discourse, and its central 
value of 'equality', is at the centre of western democratic 
subjectivities. Mouffe's analysis, in my view, provides 
helpful insights into understanding the emergence and 
development of a lesbian and gay 'rights consciousness'. 
As various writers have noted, twentieth century 
flesbianf and gay, identity, as opposed to same-sex sexual 
activity, is, historically, a relatively new phenomenon. 1 
The claiming of such identities was contingent upon changes 
to the regime of sexual regulation, particularly the 
production of homo- and hetero- sexualities towards the end 
of the last century (see also Mort, 1987). Gradually, 
these "new subjects" formed the diverse strands of what 
1 The early work of Mary McIntosh (1981; orig. pub. 
1968) paved the ground for many subsequent theoretical 
developments. Michel Foucault (1976) is,, perhaps,, most 
often associated with articulating this %social 
constructionist' perspective. Others developing this 
approach include: D'Emilio (1983); Faderman (1991); Kinsman 
(1987); Weeks (1977,1981); and the collection edited by 
Ken Plummer (1981). See also, however, the debates in 
Stein, ed. (1990). 
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came to be known as flesbian and gay movements'. Adapting 
Mouffe"s analysis, lesbians and gay men can thus be viewed 
as newly emergent subjects confronted by contradictory 
discursive interpellations. For example, as asexual 
citizens they possessed formal equality; as homosexuals 
they were both denied official recognition/protection and 
subject to constant and changing medical 'diagnoses'; as 
'lesbians and gay men" they created positive, affirming 
community structures and culture. 2 The development of 
lesbian and gay movements, thus, followed from both the 
production of this distinctive identity, and its perceived 
exclusion (or inclusion as criminality) within dominant 
discourse. 
Within capitalist democracies, legal fequality' 
discourse is one of the foremost ways in which human 
I subjecthood is recognised, or called into being. In more 
recent years, 'ant i-discrimination I provision, or human 
rights laws, have become a significant means of ostensibly 
ensuring the principle of 'equal treatmentf. If. as Mouffe 
argues, the value of equality is so intrinsically a part of 
western consciousness (and this view is echoed by many 
others), it is not surprising that many lesbians and gay 
men, socialised in Canada and other similar countries,, 
demanded inclusion within and recognition by human 
2 For one discussion of this latter dimension in the 
U. S., see Castells (1983). For Canada, see Kinsman (1987). 
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(including constitutional) rights regimes, one of the 
primary forms of liberal equality. 
From the perspective of many Canadian lesbians and gay 
men, human rights struggles were, therefore, not about 
rights per se,, but about what rights were thought to 
signify - public/official recognition, social-citizenship, 
and fidentification'. In this sense, then, the demand for 
'lesbian and gay rightst is a struggle for membership in 
the 'human community', and perhaps also an expression of 
what bell hooks has called the 'postmodern, condition of 
"yearning", the 'urge to voice of the marginalised' 
(1991: 18-31). 
The claim for rights has always been a significant 
aspect to lesbian and gay social struggle (see Marcus,, 
1992). Over time, a distinctive rights-oriented lesbian 
and gay movement emerged and became an important, indeed a 
predominant, movement for lesbian and gay liberation. In 
subsequent chapters, I explore what Mouffe and others 
appear to underplay: the ways in which the extension of 
existing liberal categories to 'new, identities not only 
'recognises", but regulates, contains, and constitutes 
them. The claiming of rights has posed significant 
dilemmas for lesbian and gay movements. 
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B. Human Rigjlts CmipaigLris and Case Law 
In Canada, human rights legislation provides 
protection from discrimination on specified grounds, such 
as Isexf,, 'race, and 'disability', in the areas of housing, 
employment, and service provision. Each province has its 
own , human rights code which applies to matters within 
provincial jurisdiction, ' including government and the 
private sector. The federal sphere has its own human 
rights act for matters within its jurisdiction. Claims of 
discrimination are initiated by individuals, and 
investigated by a regulatory commission which endeavours to 
effect a settlement. Fines can be imposed, although the 
commissions are meant to be facilitative of 'good 
relations', not punitive towards individuals. Should the 
commission not conclude a satisfactory settlement, and 
providing it deems the complaint worthy, the claim is 
adjudicated by an administrative tribunal during a trial- 
like proceeding. Tribunal decisions can be appealed to the 
courts, within the principles of judicial review. In the 
following chapter, I Fdeconstruct' one such code, providing 
a more detailed review of its provisions and structure; the 
above description should suffice, however, for the purposes 
of this chapter. 
3 Canada (as of this writing) is divided into 10 
provinces and two "territories I each with its own 
parliamentary government. The federal government, based 
in Ottawa, is the national parliament. Federal and 
provincial governments have different, though in some cases 
overlapping, jurisdictional responsibilities. In terms of 
human rights, provinces are responsible for all matters 
except federal enterprises and other employers regulated 
by federal law (eg: telecommunications; railways; etc. ). 
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By the 1970s, human rights legislation had thus 
developed across the country. Viewed as an important 
symbol in the struggle to combat prejudice and 
discrimination, this form of law inevitably drew the 
attention of the emerging lesbian and gay law reform 
movement. Two related strategies were launched 
simultaneously: individual complaints based on pre-existing 
grounds of discrimination (eg: sex), and statutory reform 
campaigns aimed at adding a 'sexual orientation' ground to 
the list of protected 'categories'. 
r1i Earlv lesbian and gay human rights case law 
Four key early cases set the scene for future 
developments, including the decision to focus political 
campaigning upon achieving sexual orientation amendments. 
In 1975,, two men,, in different parts of the country,, 
officially complained that they had suffered employment 
discrimination because they were gay. In Saskatchewan, 
Doug Wilson, a graduate student and teacher who had been 
refused permission to supervise trainee teachers because he 
was a gay activist, filed a complaint with the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Commission alleging he was discriminated 
against under the 'sex, ground in the Code. He argued that 
his 'sexual orientation' was an immutable "sex" 
characteristic which he had not chosen and which should not 
be a legitimate basis for discrimination (Board of 
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Governors, 1976). Before processing the application, the 
Commission issued a ruling that 'sex, in the code included 
'sexual orientation'. Immediately, the University of 
Saskatchewan (the employer) applied for judicial review of 
the Commission's ruling. 
The higher court found for the Universityr stating 
that "sex, was a biological, physical condition making 
someone male or female, and had nothing to do with "sexual 
proclivity" (Board of Governors, 1976: 388-9). Wilson 
decided against an appeal (Jackson and Persky, 1982: 230). 
This case was to have a significant effect upon ensuing 
lesbian and gay human rights strategies; partially as a 
result of this decision, the rights movement was to place 
renewed emphasis upon achieving sexual orientation' 
amendments, rather than to remain struggling against 
judicial definitions of tsexi. 
Of equal or greater import, was the case of John 
Damien, fired from his job as an Ontario Racing Steward in 
February of 1975 .4 Having, it was perceived, no human 
rights remedy, Damien filed an unfair dismissal suit 
against the Ontario Racing Commission, hoping to gain 
redress (in the form of compensation) that way. Damien was 
to die, eleven years later, his case, due to the Racing 
Commission, 's delaying tactics, never reaching the trial 
4 For discussion of the Damien case and its political 
role within lesbian and gay communities, see Jackson and 
Persky (1982); Hofsess (1987); Kinsman (1987). 
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stage. In the early years of his legal battles, Damien's 
experiences were to galvanise a broad base of support, and 
to provide a catalyst for growing demands to amend the 
Ontario Human-Rights Code. 
Another important case concerned the Gay Alliance 
Toward Equality (GATE) in Vancouver (see Richstone and 
Russell, 1981). First established in Toronto in 1973, the 
Vancouver GATE affiliate, among other things, published a 
newspaper called Gay Tide. In November of 1974, following 
the refusal of the Vancouver Sun to run a Gay Tide 
advertisement, GATE filed a complaint with the British 
Columbia Human Rights Commission. 5 The Commission found in 
GATEI's favour, and this decision was upheld (on technical 
grounds) by the B. C. Supreme Court in 1976 (Vancouver Sun, 
1976). However,. the B. C. Court of Appeal subsequently 
overturned the lower court's judgment on the basis that the 
Sun"s refusal was reasonable, given popular attitudes 
towards homosexuality (Re Vancouver Sun, 1977). The case 
eventually found its way to the Supreme Court of Canada 
where GATE ultimately lost, although on different 
(jurisdictional) grounds, the Court deciding that the Sun's 
press freedom could not be curtailed by human rights 
statutes (Gay Alliance, 1979). The question of 
thomosexuall rights was left unaddressed. 
5 The applicability of the 'sex" ground to a gay 
newspaper seems to have been accepted, and not in dispute. 
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Another 'key' gay rights decision was given in Vogel. 
In this 1983 decision under the Manitoba human rights 
statute, the adjudicating tribunal denied the gay applicant 
FBpousall health coverage on the basis of dictionary 
definitions of the term "marriage". The court simply 
refused to consider Vogel's claim as 'Bext discrimination. 6 
The reasoning in these cases explains, to a large 
degree, why lesbian and gay rights organisations sought to 
achieve 11 sexual orientation f amendments to human rights 
codes. For these adjudicators, sexual orientation was 
deemed a species apart from 'sex'; the latter understood as 
conferring maleness or femaleness. The "sex 
characteristic', meaning reproductive organs, thus 
determined definitions of marriage -a union of 'opposite 
sexes'. Sexual orientation, on the other hand, whether 
accepted as immutable or not, was about sexual practice. 
Lesbians and gay men could not be fspouses, or argue 'sex' 
discrimination within this paradigm, despite the fact that 
Vogel, for example, could have received health benefits had 
he been a woman (or had his partner). Any analysis or even 
mention of heterosexual ity was notably absent f rom these 
decisions. 
6 In the late 1980s, Chris Vogel re-launched a similar 
case only to have both the human rights adjudicator and a 
lower court judge refuse to consider it (Vogel, 1992) - see 
also Chapter 7. 
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As I discuss in Chapter 7, judgments such as those 
given in Board of Governors and Voqel, together with the 
usual Judicial approach in lesbian and gay child custody 
cases (see Arnup,, 1984,1989; Gross, 1986),, reflect the 
conservative politics of the courts in question. But these 
cases also reveal several insights into the strategies of 
lesbian and gay rights reformers during this, period. Doug 
Wilson, for example, chose to insist that his 'condition, 
(homosexuality) was fimmutablef. By presenting 'expertf 
evidence 'proving' this 'truth', he hoped to persuade 
others that he should not be discriminated against for 
something over which he had no control. Homosexuality was, 
in this construction, almost a 'disability, - an affliction 
for which there was no cure, and one which did not cause 
harm to others. This model is rooted in the assumptions of 
early liberal psychology. As I explain later in this 
chapter, this 'new" paradigm of sexuality appeared to 
legitimate both de-criminalisation and the extension of 
rights to lesbians and gay men. In the 1970s and early 
1980s, this was the model of homosexuality relied upon by 
gay rights advocates, many of whom had also been active in 
the movement to de-criminalise gay male sex. In campaigns 
for statutory reform, a similar politics was expressed. 
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F21 CampaiSMs for statutory reform: EarIV orcranising 
Ontario 
Lesbian and gay law reformers turned their attentions 
towards achieving 'sexual orientation' amendments to human 
rights codes in the early 1970s. Nowhere was action more 
intense than in the province of Ontario. A variety of 
amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code being 
considered by the legislature in 1972 were the focus of the 
first (unsuccessful) Ontario gay demonstrations 
specifically directed at the Code. In 1973, a step towards 
the desired goal was achieved when Toronto City Council 
passed the first policy of its kind in Canada, prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in City 
employment (Jackson and Persky, 1982: 228). 
1975 saw the inauguration of the Coalition for Gay 
Rights in Ontario (CGRO) (later the Coalition for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights in Ontario). The organisation's goal was to 
attain "full civil and human rights for all homosexual men 
and women and in this way to advance the struggle for their 
liberation". 7 The organisation was to consist of member gay 
and lesbian groups with voting rights. A steering 
committee was established with one representative f rom each 
7 1, Statement of the principles, structure, program and 
strategy of the Coalition for Gay Rights ' in Ontario 
(CGRO)", ratified at the founding conference in Toronto 
January 18 and 19,1975 and revised at the Steering 
Committee of the Coalition in Ottawa July 31 and August 1, 
1976, Gay Archives of Canada. 
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m 
group,, and it was the responsibility of this committee to 
establish policy. 
The Coalition saw its primary task as that of 
"struggling for the amendment of the Ontario Human Rights 
Code to include the term sexual orientation, 11.8 In 
addition to making several Human Rights Code demands, the 
Coalition, in its founding statement, called for changes to 
education provision, equality for gays in health care, 
housing, and employment, an end to discrimination in 
custody and adoption determinations, as well as other 
related items. 9 Their seven-pronged strategy consisted of 
(i] lobbying provincial MPs [ii] presenting briefs to 
provincial parties [iii] seeking out support from non-gay 
community groups [iv] documenting cases of discrimination 
and developing attendant campaigns [v] "periodic pickets 
and other forms of public action" [vi] full participation 
of CGRO in making gay rights an election issue at all 
levels and [vii] the development of an education policy for 
the schools . 
10 
In May 1976 two private members bills attempting to 
amend the Code were defeated (Jackson and Persky, 
1982: 231). Nevertheless, the Coalition, in June of that 
year, presented its brief to the Ontario legislature and 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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continued to campaign for change. In 1977, another private 
member"s bill was defeated, yet CGRO could find some 
consolation in the recommendations of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code Review Committee (established in 1975) which 
included a sexual orientation clause in its amendment 
proposals (Jackson and Persky, 1982: 232). 
Ontario's lesbian and gay rights reformers were 
further encouraged by the success of a similar amendment in 
Quebec in 1977. An alliance of Quebec gay groups had begun 
to lobby the National Assembly for a sexual orientation 
amendment to the Quebec human rights charter in 1974 
(Jackson and Persky, 1982: 229). A formal brief was 
presented to the Assembly by the Association Pour les 
Droits de la Communaute Gaie du Quebec in October of 1977, 
and in that same month the Quebec Human Rights Commission 
endorsed a sexual orientation amendment (Jackson and 
Persky, 1982: 233). In December, as part of a wider package 
of reforms, the National Assembly passed such an amendment, 
quietly, without much debate (Ryder, 1990: 67). The 
inclusion of sexual orientation in the Quebec Charter was 
to remain an isolatedr and of t cited, example of such 
protection. 
Back in Ontario, 1978 witnessed another impending 
period of legislative debate on proposed Code amendments 
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and CGRO presented its second brief to Ontario MPPs ." 
This document opened by defining homosexuality as "the 
sexual and emotional preference of males and females for 
their own gender" (p. 3). In sections titled FThe Origins 
of Homosexual Behaviour$ and "The Incidence of 
Homosexuality in Modern western Societies', CGRO confronted 
various theories of homosexuality, disputing some and 
cautiously adopting others (p. 4). The brief stressed that 
homosexuals had and would always exist, and attempts to 
change this had and would not be successful. The 
bibliography accompanying these sections listed a series of 
12 
sexology studies (p. 5). 
A leaflet, prepared for the campaign which CGRO 
organised to accompany the introduction of Human Rights 
Code amendments in 1979, addressed primarily to the gay 
community, did not make explicit any particular analysis of 
sexuality. Rather, it assumed that human rights were both 
necessary and unproblematic. CGRO called on "gay people" 
to write to their provincial member of parliament and the 
11 Brief to Ontario Legislature, CGRO, March 1978, Gay 
Archives. 
12 The brief went on to 
religious and other persecution of 
with examples of present day dL 
CGRO concluded by listing various 
and other organisations that had 
campaign for human rights. 
describe a history of 
homosexuals, concluding 
scrimination in Canada. 
groups, municipalities, 
publicly supported the 
53 
three Party leaders, have any group to which they belonged 
do the same, and send financial contributions to CGRO* 13 
1981 saw another series of amendments to the Code 
accompanied by lesbian and gay mobilisation - but, again, 
all to no avail. The defeat of the 1981 Bill ended a 
somewhat demoralising decade of human rights struggles by 
Ontario's lesbian and gay rights movement. 14 'Sexual 
orientation' protection existed only in Quebec. 
Nevertheless, despite consistent setbacks, organisations 
such as CGRO regrouped, and went on to continue the 
(eventually successful) struggle for human rights reforms 
in the 1980s. 
The 1970s and early 1980s campaigns reveal a law 
reform movement dependent upon the public presentation of 
a medical model of homosexuality and the uncritical 
promotion of achieving social change primarily through 
formal political strategies. Whilst other lesbian and gay 
movements were engaged in quite different forms of 
13 "Our time has come, make it happen", CGRO, Leaflet, 
1979, Gay Archives of Canada. 
14 In 1979,, Michael Lynch wrote in The Body Politic 
that, despite the failure of the various Bills, the 
campaigns themselves had achieved great successes. Indeed, 
he argued that winning human rights amendments should no 
longer even be on the movementfs agenda, see (Jackson and 
Persky,, eds. 1981: 244). 1 return to these ideas in 
subsequent chapters where I problematise notions of 
% success, and "'failuref. 
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politics, 
15 the heterosexual public were made aware of 
lesbians and gay men primarily through the activities of 
organisations such as the Coalition for Gay Rights in 
Ontario,, as these campaigns were the most visible and 
interested the media more so than other forms of less 
conventional struggle. 
The efforts of CGRO and other lesbian and gay law 
reform organisations finally paid off in 1986 with the 
passage of what was popularly known as 'Bill 7", which, 
among other things, added a fsexual orientation' ground to 
the Human Rights Code of Ontario (see Chapter 3). By 1992, 
the provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, 
and the Yukon Territory would join Ontario and Quebec in 
providing lesbians and gay men with formal human rights 
protections, and the federal government had agree in 
principle to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act in the 
same way. 16 One of the late 1980s key gay rights cases, 
launched under this latter (as yet unsuccessful) statute, 
was that of Brian Mossop. 
15 As I noted in Chapter 1, this thesis is about only 
one branch of the lesbian and gay movement. During the 
period I am discussing here, other lesbians and gay men 
were very active in struggles that had little to do with 
reforming human rights laws, see, for example, Creet 
(1990); Davies (1988); Jackson and Persky, eds. (1981); 
Kinsman (1987); Weir and Steiger (1981); Stone (1991); and 
the documents of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, Gay 
Archives of Canada. 
16 1 discuss some of the factors responsible for this 
shift in subsequent chapters. 
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[31 The Mossop case 17 
Brian Mossop worked for the federal government 
(Treasury Board) as a translator. As a federal civil 
servant, his employment conditions were regulated by both 
a collective agreement and the Canadian Human Rights Act, 
the federal human rights code. In the spring of 1985, the 
father of Mossop"s partner died. Mossop -attended the 
funeral and then applied to have his absence from work 
considered as "Bereavement Leave" under the collective 
agreement, specifically stating that his lover was male. 
The application was denied by the employer on the grounds 
that his relationship did not fall within the "immediate 
f ami ly 11 category covered by the bereavement leave 
provision. Mossop,, with the support of his union (the 
Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees), 
filed a grievance, which was rejected. He then laid a 
complaint under the Canadian Human Rights Act. 18 
The crux of Mossopfs argument before the human rights 
tribunal was that the collective agreement contravened 
s-3(l) of the Act prohibiting discrimination based on 
"family status". The agreement provided bereavement leave 
for "immediate family", including common-law couples of the 
"opposite sex", and mothers and fathers-in-law. Mossop 
argued that this definition, and the resulting exclusion of 
17 Further discussions of this case are found in 
Chapters 4,6 and 7. 
18 Recall that this Act does not contain a 'sexual 
orientation, ground. 
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same-sex families, constituted "family status" 
discrimination. His case depended upon the acceptance of 
his relationship with his partner being defined as "family-, 
for the purposes of the, Canadian Human Rights Act. 
The principal evidence supporting this contention was 
the testimony of Margrit Eichler, a feminist sociologist. 
She argued that there was no one definition of family, that 
some general characteristics of families could be 
delineated (such as co-habitation; sharing in domestic 
arrangements; presence of emotional and sexual reliance; 
joint ownerships; etc. ). and that it was better to describe 
situations as "familial", rather than as "family" (Mossop, 
1989). Her conclusion, based on Mossop and his partner 
exhibiting most of these characteristics, was that Mossop 
lived in a "familial relationship". The adjudicator, Mary- 
Elizabeth Atcheson, adopted this view to support her 
finding of discrimination and her subsequent compensation 
and redress order. The Federal Court of Appeal, in 
reviewing Atcheson's decision, reversed her judgment 
(Mossop, 1990). Adopting the conservative approach of 
earlier case law (eg: North, 1974; Vogel, 1983), the Court 
found that a sociological' definition of family was 
inappropriate for a court of law. Legal precedent, the 
judges argued, must rule, and 'family, had never included 
homosexual couples, 19 
19 As of this writing, the case is before the Supreme 
Court of Canada which is expected to issue its ruling in 
early 1993. 
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Mossop is of interest, not solely for the politics of 
its judgments (discussed in Chapter 7), but also because, 
as with the Bill 7 struggle, the litigation itself became 
a focus for social movement intervention (see Chapters 4- 
6). Coalitions of lesbian, gay, feminist, disabled, and 
civil libertarian groups on the one hand, and -conservative, 
evangelical Christian organisations on the other, both 
seized on the case as a forum in which to do battle over 
sexuality. 
Finally, the Mossop case reflected a shift in the 
public presentation of lesbian and gay identity. 
Sociology, a discipline concerned with 'group relations' 
and 'structural inequalities' had come to court to inform 
legal constructions of homosexuality. As I discuss further 
in Chapter 3, this , new paradigm, ' was also expressed in 
campaigns for statutory reform as, for example, the 
Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario left behind its 
reliance on sexology to fight for 'Bill 71. 
141 Constitutional litigatio 
Another factor contributing to the judicial re- 
evaluation of 'gay rights' was the coming into effect and 
growing prominence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Enacted in 1982, the Charter is a 
constitutionally-entrenched document providing individuals 
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with a set of "fundamental rights", including freedom of 
association and expression, "equality,,, and several 'due 
process' guarantees. The judiciary is given the power to 
oversee that these rights are not denied unless such a 
denial can be "demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society" (s. 1). 
Early jurisprudence held that the Charter applies only 
to "government action", meaning that it can only be used to 
challenge the denial of rights by actors or agencies with 
some degree of "state" nexus (Dolphin Delive , 1986). 
Private persons and corporations can avail themselves of 
the Charter's protection, but are not themselves directly 
bound by its provisions. Section 1, which allows the state 
to justify its denial of rights, has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in a restrictive fashion, with 
the courts holding defenders to a relatively strict 
standard, depending on the subject-matter of the claim. 
The key difference between the Charter and human 
rights codes is that the former can be used to " strike 
down, legislative provisions as unconstitutional. Although 
governments have a power to "override" judicial decisions 
(s. 32),, it has rarely been used; hence, the perception 
that, since the Charter, power has shifted from parliament 
to the judiciary. The Charter is, thus, a 'third tier, of 
rights document, one to which both the federal Human Rights 
Act and the provincial human rights codes are subject (as 
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is all legislation). Given that the provisions of these 
statutes can be f ound unconstitutional, and that provincial 
codes do apply to the private sector, the Charter, 
indirectly, can affect the discriminatory practices of 
private actors (see Leshner,, 1992). 20 However, for lesbians 
and gay men, the Charter has primarily provided an 
opportunity to challenge heterosexist assumptions in public 
provision. 
Lesbians and gay men, in common with other social 
movements and 'identities", have focused their energies 
upon s. 15 of the, Charter (known as the 'equality section') 
which came into effect in 1985. Section 15, like the 
statutory codes, provides protection f rom, discrimination on 
specified grounds. It also offers a general guarantee of 
"equality before and under the law", and has, of course, 
the authority and legitimacy of its constitutionality. The 
grounds covered by the section are not carved in stone; it 
is accepted that other bases of discrimination will be 
identified, and accepted as analogous to those enumerated 
(known as "analogous grounds"). Although sexual 
orientation is not a specified ground,, it is one such 
category that has been so accepted. In order to enforce 
Charter rights, individuals must litigate, and one of the 
most notable developments in the politics of Canadian 
social movements has been the creation of "litigation 
20 The Charter can play an important role in re- 
defining concepts employed in other regulatory regimes, see 
discussions in Chapters 4,6. 
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organisations' to facilitate, through providing funding and 
litigators, this process (see, for example, Razack, 1991). 
Thus,, the coming into ef f ect of s- 15 of the Charter 
signalled a new era for lesbian and gay rights litigants. 
The Charter's role of challenging existing discriminatory 
legislation, as opposed to the discriminatory actions of 
employers, landlords and service providers addressed by 
statutory human rights provision, seemed, to many lesbians 
and gay men, an ideal way of attacking their exclusion 
within diverse social benefits schemes. Much, although not 
all, of the resulting litigation turned on definitions of 
"family" or I'spousef within various federal and provincial 
statutes. 
One of the f irst such cases was that launched by Karen 
Andrews, who applied for 'family' health coverage for 
herself, her partner, and their children under Ontario's 
Health Insurance Act (Andrews, 1988). The government 
refused to extend the coverage on the basis that lesbian 
and gay relationships were excluded from the definition of 
spouse upon which the coverage depended Her legal 
action, which included a Human Rights Code element that was 
never resolved, asserted that restricting the definition of 
'sPousef to heterosexual couples was contrary to several 
sections in the Charter, including s. 15. 
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The judge in the case, McCrea, set the tone for 
conservative Charter sexuality jurisprudence generally by, 
in 1988, denying Andrews' claim on the basis that lesbian 
and gay couples do not marry and procreate. Restricting 
benefits to heterosexual couples was justified given 
governments' important objective of "establishing and 
maintaining traditional families" (Andrews, 1988: 16194). 
McCreal's authorities were largely drawn from dictionaries, 
and previous human rights case law described above, such as 
Vogel (1983). 
Since the Andrews decision, a small but growing 
Charter jurisprudence has now arisen in the area of lesbian 
and gay equality. In addition to the Mossop case, which, 
although litigated under the federal human rights statute 
will have implications for Charter jurisprudence (indeed 
one could argue the distinction is less and less relevant), 
several judgments have been rendered under s. 15 of the 
Charter. One of the first was Veyse (1989), in which a 
federal appeal court found, without much discussion, that 
sexual orientation was an analogous ground under s. 15 and 
upheld the right of a gay prisoner to claim Charter 
protection. Interestingly, federal and provincial 
governments have since accepted this ruling and have chosen 
not to contest the basic right of lesbians and gay men to 
make claims under the Charter as a tdisadvantaged group' 
(see Brown, 1990; Knodelf 1991; Egan, 1991). 
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The Knodel and Eqan, decisions, both in 1991, 
exemplify, along with Mossop, the contradictory development 
of lesbian and gay rights case law. 21 In Knodel,, the 
British Columbia trial court found that the "opposite sex" 
definition of "spouse" contained in a provincial health 
statute infringed the sexual orientation protection 
guaranteed under s. 15 of the Charter. Whilpt in Egan, a 
very similar provision was found, by a federal trial court, 
to be justified under much the same conservative reasoning 
as that in Andrews, and the older Vogel and North cases. 
In a related development, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
has ruled, in a case about common-law heterosexual partners 
that may have implications for Mossop, that "unmarried 
persons living together" do not constitute a "disadvantaged 
group" as envisioned by s. 15 (Leroux, 1991). This would 
seem to imply that lesbians and gay men, in order to 
receive s. 15 protection, will be forced to claim that 
protection by invoking the analogous ground of I sexual 
orientation, ' and hence their history of "disadvantage" - 
This would effectively enshrine such claims within a 
'minority paradigm" and render more difficult an action 
which actually sought to challenge, f or example, the social 
legitimacy of marriage. 
22 
21 1 consider both these decisions more fully in 
subsequent chapters; I reiterate that here I am simply 
trying to provide an overview of case law development. 
22 
1 consider this more fully in Chapter 3. 
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In another important case, the Ontario Court of Appeal . 
has held that the absence of 'sexual orientation, in the 
federal Canadian Human Rights Act (the Act under which 
mossop is claiming discrimination on grounds of "family 
status") violates s-15 of the Charter (Haig, 1992). The 
remedy imposed by the Court was to rule that, henceforth, 
the CHRA was to be interpreted as though it contained the 
ground of "sexual orientation". Although the ruling in 
Haig technically applies only in Ontario, the federal 
government has since announced that it will not appeal the 
decision. Instead, the Conservative Justice Minister has 
instructed the Canadian Human Rights Commission to follow 
the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling in all relevant 
adjudications across the country. The Minister has also 
announced that, as a result, any plans to amend the Act in 
the parliament will be suspended. 
The Hajq case manifests both the problems and perils 
of Charter challenges: on the one hand, the Court allowed 
the gay litigant to circumvent the route of parliamentary 
reform. Those who decry the creation of an undemocratic 
supra-judiciary have little reason to applaud the 
judgment. " On the other hand, for many lesbians and gay 
23 In Chapter 4,, 1 explore the %politics of rights'. 
Some of this discussion considers issues to do with 
the 
supremacy of parliament, democracy, and judicial power. 
The %Politics of entrenched constitutions F is, however, not 
a focus of my research. In Canada, there is a 
large legal 
literature concerned with this question, 
for critical 
approaches see Bakan (1990,, 1991) Glasbeek and 
Mandel 
(1984). 
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men who have been attempting to force the Mulroney 
Government to amend the CHRA for many years, Haiq 
represents the Charter's promise - the chance to force the 
government's hand through invoking Charter rights. 24 
Finally, the Leshner (1992) decision is, as of this 
writing, the most recent gay rights case to have 
potentially significant, widespread effects. Here , an 
Ontario human rights tribunal found that the 'marital 
status' provision in the Ontario Human Rights Code 
contravened lesbian and gay equality rights in the Charter, 
and ordered the provincial government to take steps to 
ensure the provision of fspousall pension benefits to the 
partners of lesbians and gay men. 
New Charter cases continue to be regularly launched, 
although as public funding sources have been eliminated 
this is unlikely to continue at such a pace. 25 Li-tigants 
are challenging discriminatory immigration policies, 26 tax 
provisions, 27 and many of the cases noted above are 
currently under appeal. In the spring of 1992, two gay men 
24 The judgment alsb allows a Conservative minister, 
sympathetic to lesbian and gay rights (Kim Campbell), to 
avoid a potentially disastrous confrontation with right- 
wing backbenchers. 
25 
See discussion in Chapters 4 and 6. 
26 H. Fancott,, 'Lesbians and immigration I (February 
1992) Kinesis. See also D. McIntosh (1988). 
27 'Lesbian partners recognised as family' (20 March 
1992) The Mail-Star and "No family status for gay couples' 
(25 March 1992) The Mail-Star. 
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initiated a Charter -c hal lenge to marriage law. " Nearly 
twenty years earlierr Richard North and Chris Vogel (of 
North and Vogýl fame) went to court to force a Winnipeg 
registry of f ice to enter their I gay marriage I on its books. 
Their case was dismissed. Will the 'new era' of lesbian 
and gay rights jurisprudence offer to 1990s lesbians and 
gay men the fmarital privilegest which were-not proffered 
in the 1970s? 
f5l "E2g? grtsf and "the lawlf 
Behind this brief history of lesbian and gay rights 
law reform lies the important role played by Fscientific 
evidence, in shaping legal constructions of homosexuality; 
first, as a Fdangerl to Isocietyf, 29 and then as an 
unf ortunate af f liction. 30 Within medical discourse, the 
transition from an approach which feared and pathologised 
"the homosexual' to one which advocated empathy and 
tolerance was an important intervention in legal debates 
over criminalisation. Within child custody disputes as 
well, liberal psychology was deployed to show that the 
children of homosexuals turned out 'normal' (meaning 
28 S. Bindman,, "Gay couple go to court to fight for 
right to marryf, (19 May 1992) Toronto Star. 
29 See,, for example,, the discussion of the Klippert 
case in Kinsman (1987); see also Freedman (1989). 
Psychiatric constructions of 'dangerousness" have shaped 
the content of legislation and case law generally, see 
Menzies (1986). 
30 See discussion of liberal psychology in Kitzinger 
(1987). 
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heterosexual) and that lesbians and gay men could make 
fgood parents' . 
31 
'Expert, psychologists scrutinised the 
, 'causes, and 'effects, of homosexuality, testifying as to 
both its immutability and relative harmlessness. For many 
lesbians and gay men, this approach represented an advance 
over previous constructions of homosexuality as "sick", 
, 'depraved', and 'curable, (see also Vance, 1989). 
Nevertheless, psychology, in both its liberal and 
conservative manifestations, subjected homosexuality to 
interrogation and classification. The 'psy, professions 
(Donzelot, 1980), whilst sympathetic to the 'plight' of 
individual lesbians and gay men, nonetheless studied 
homosexuality as a 'conditionf. Homosexuality's $opposite$ 
- heterosexuality - remained the closeted, unspoken, norm. 
'Psy' constructions played an important role in 
lesbian and gay law reform struggles; first, by 
facilitating judicial conservatism (early psychiatric 
constructions) and then by constituting the homosexual as 
inherently disadvantaged but deserving of empathy,, 
tolerance, and compassion. Whilst these "Psy" 
understandings of homosexuality were not dominated by legal 
'equality' paradigms, liberal psychology has been relied 
31 See discussion in Cooper and Herman (1991). 
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upon by judges and others seeking to extend equality rights 
to lesbians and gay men (see Chapter 7). 
32 
Within lesbian and gay rights movements, the 
transition from criminal and family to human rights law 
reform has witnessed the entry of a 'new, discipline into 
the debate - sociology. Whilst sociology has always 
'studied, homosexuality (within the 'sociology of 
deviance'), this branch of the discipline had not played a 
key role in the development of legal knowledge of 
homosexuality which had, instead, tended to depend upon the 
"psyf constructions. However, contestations over the legal 
meaning of 'family, have offered new opportunities to other 
sociologies - particularly, sociology of the family, 
research in demographic patterns, and various feminist 
"expertisesf in these and other areas. 
A similar transition also occurred within Black civil 
rights litigation in the United States. As Chesler et al. 
(1988: 21-22) discuss, the landmark school desegregation 
decision in Brown (1954,1955) was partly based upon a 
'new, ' liberal psychology that emphasised the psychological 
harm suffered by Black children. This approach became the 
new psychological paradigm, supplanting the older, 
conservative victim-blamingf psychology as evidenced 
in 
32 A key E 
Richard Green; 
expert witness 
article (1988) 
also Kitzinger 
munciator of this form of psychology is Dr. 
in the United States he has appeared as an 
in several gay rights cases. See 
his 
and Eve Sedgewick's critique (1991). See 
(1987), and Chapter 7. 
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racist decisions such as Plessy (1896). Liberal 
psychology, for the emerging civil rights movement and its 
leading law reform organisation the National Association 
For the Advancement of Colored People, in continuing to 
pathologise 'Black, and not 'white', was not an ideal anti- 
racist paradigm. On the other hand, it did represent a 
movement forward in that it could anchor a programme of 
positive action. 
By the late 1970s, liberal psychology had, within 
school desegregation litigation, itself been largely 
replaced (Chesler et al., 1988: 24-26). Sociological 
explanations of structural disadvantage now competed with 
"rational choice, models from political science. 33 As 
Chesler et al. (1988) document, within a twenty-five year 
period psychology 'experts' had come to play a far less 
signif icant role in contributing to the f ormat ilon of 
desegregation law. 
I would argue that, by the late 1980s, lesbian and gay 
rights reform had undergone a similar transition. Lesbian 
and gay campaigners, no longer dependent upon the 
'sympathetic pathologies' of liberal psychology, began to 
offer different paradigms to ground their claims to 
equality. The Mossop case is one example of this new 
33 The latter arguing, f or example, that Black parents 
choose, to live in Black neighbourhoods for entirely 
%rational' reasons, and not because of institutional 
racism. 
69 
approach. By invoking the new legitimacy of feminist 
sociology', and rejecting the old paradigms of 'dangerous 
illness' or 'harmless abnormality,, MOssop symbolises the 
"new era' of lesbian and gay law reform in Canada. And 
even where adjudicators dismiss these interventions as 
'upstart science", as in Mossop (1990) or Vogel (1992),, 
conservative decision-makers nevertheless now rely upon 
sociological, rather than psychological, expertise to 
counter challenges to traditional definitions of 'family', 
'spouse',, and so on. 
34 
C. Lesbian and Gay Legal Studies 
As lesbian and gay rights demands emerged and, in some 
cases, were met by judges and politicians, a distinctive 
'lesbian and gay legal scholarship, also arose. Writers 
have both developed legal argument in the area, and, more 
slowly and less visibly, engaged in rcritiquesf of rights 
strategies and politics. By the late 1980st American law 
journals had published dozens of articles on the subject, 
and, gradually, Canadian scholarship has also taken root. 
In this section, I wish to consider some of this material, 
both to explain the kinds of approaches that have been 
taken, and to distinguish my own perspective from these. 
The predominant form of scholarship has been one which 
expresses a "legal positivism', whilstr somewhat in the 
34 In the conclusion to Chapter 71 assess the 
advantages of the %sociological paradigm'. 
70 
margins of debate, are located several lesbian theorists 
with a "separatist' agenda. 
_rll 
Legal Positivism 
By 'legal positivism', I am referring to analyses of 
law and legal strategies that tend to view 
_law 
itself as 
neutral, objective, and somehow unconnected to the 
formation and reproduction of social relations. Rather, 
positivists are concerned to show how anti-gay judgments 
are 'irrational' and 'homophobict; with the fcorrect' 
information inserted into the legal process, lesbian and 
gay rights will be assured. The positivist approach in 
Canadian lesbian and gay legal studies is evident from the 
first forays into the field (eg: Richstone and Russell, 
1981). Here, I will focus upon writing produced in the 
aftermath of the Charter, particularly subsequent to the 
coming into effect of the "equality section" (s. 15) in 
1985. For it is in the Charter"s wake that academic 
approaches to 'gay rightsf claims have largely developed. 
One of the first to explicitly evoke s-15 in the 
struggle for lesbian and gay equality was Jim Jefferson 
(1985), a lawyer active in the gay community. For 
Jefferson, s-15 was a tool to be used, and one open to 
accommodating "gay rights". He (1985: 70) argued that 
"homosexuals" shared a "group characteristic" of attraction 
to the "same sex" and thus were legitimate claimants of 
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s. 15 protection. At no point did he suggest that the 
experience of lesbians and gay men might vary, or that the 
implications of particular legal arguments might be 
different for each. Nor did Jefferson consider how his 
legal arguments might impact upon other groups or movements 
struggling for legal equality. For him, law reform, whilst 
clearly not a solution to discrimination in itself, was a 
necessary first step and one requiring coming up with the 
"right I, persuasive argument. The possibility that Charter 
claims might bring as many problems as benefits was not 
considered. Others writing within this framework argued 
that Canadian society was, at its core, a tolerant one; by 
showing how pervious judicial decision were rooted in 
aberrant prejudice, rather than sound legal argument, gay 
equality would be assured (see also Bruner, 1985; Girard, 
1986; Green, 1987). 
Legal Positivism tended to be expounded by male 
writers with little attention paid to the specificity of 
lesbian experience. One exception was Wendy Gross' 1986 
article on lesbian custody. Gross (1986) reviewed relevant 
case law in order to argue for an increased use of 
"scientific evidence" in lesbian custody litigation. In a 
highly empiricist style, Gross (1986: 520-1) marshalled 
"expert evidence" to show that the children of lesbian 
mothers turn out Inormalf - meaning that such children are 
as likely to be heterosexual as the children of 
heterosexuals - quoting extensively 
from psychiatric and 
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other discourses to 'prove' her case. For Gross 
(1986: 530), "expert testimony" is "absolutely critical" to 
"educate judges,,. This is the view taken by Margaret 
Leopold and Wendy King (1985) as well. 
Writers such as Gross, in relying on the sympathetic 
evidence of 'experts', left unchallenged the legitimacy of 
these figures to make authoritative pronouncements upon 
child sexuality. Indeed, her article affirms the power of 
psychiatry in the lives of lesbian mothers. For Gross,, 
there is 'science' and there is 'Prejudice'; lesbian 
mothers would fare better in the legal system if 'the lawf 
were to reflect the former, rather than the latter. The 
project of legal rationalism is an empiricist one. In 
contrast to, for example, a Foucauldian approach that might 
explore how 'truth' was discursively produced within 
custody determinations, Gross and others sought to posit a 
'better' set of truths upon which to base legal decision- 
making. Irrational judicial fbias' was to be replaced by 
the authoritative tones of the rpsy, professions. 
Another article employing the assumptions of legal 
Positivism is one by Bruce Ryder (1990). His purpose was to 
describe legal discrimination against lesbians and gay men, 
and then to see if section 15 "can change this situation" - 
namely, the legal entrenchment of "heterosexual privilege" 
(1990: 44). Like many of the others, Ryder's approach 
tends 
to reify law, finding that it has largely "shaped and 
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defined" family and heterosexuality, and is the "source of 
oppression" for lesbians and gay men. He tproves, this by 
listing, in great detail helpful to future scholars, 
countless instances where legal provision favours 
heterosexual couples. Sexuality and its relation to legal 
regulation is left relatively untheorised, and his analysis 
is rife with problematic assumptions. For example: that a 
homogenous 'lesbian and gay movement, is demanding 'equal 
rights'; that 'sexual orientation' human rights protection 
does not 'promote' homosexuality; that the hegemony of 
liberalism in legislative debate indicates a "lack of 
political power" on the part of lesbians and gay men (52- 
3); that the category of "race" is an immutable one (67); 
and that "s. 15 has the potential to pose a significant 
challenge to the legal construction of heterosexual 
privilege" (57). 
Ultimately, Ryder relies on the power of rational 
legal argument to win the day; he further assumes that 
legal change leads to social change, and does not appear to 
consider that the reverse might also be the case. Lesbians 
and gay men are conceptualised as victims, of legal 
discrimination, rather than as active agents participating 
in the struggle over legal meaning and interpretation. 
Ryder"s approach is also found in much of the American 
material. For example, Sexual orientation and the 
Law 
(1989), a book written by the editors of the Harvard 
Law 
Review, contains descriptions of legal discrimination 
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against lesbians and gay men, and proposes several legal 
arguments which may be made to decision-making forums in 
order to effect change (see also Mohr, 1988). 
The positivist approach does not inquire into the 
relation between social struggle and law reform, and its 
assumptions preclude it from understanding the ways in 
which any f orm of law is reg]Alation of some kind. These 
authors wish to exchange the indeterminacies of homophobia, 
with the certainty of correct (or better) knowledge. In 
doing so, they leave unchallenged the 'politics of truth, 
(Foucault in Gordon, ed. , 1980) . the politics of sexuality, 
and the politics of law ref orm. At the same time, however, 
their work is extremely useful to lesbian and gay rights 
reformers. As I discuss further in Chapter 4,, activist 
reformers often find more value in positivistic 
contributions than those offered by 'critical scholars'. 
[21 Lesbian (legal) separatism 
Alongside the scholarship noted above, there has 
arisen a distinctive flesbian, approach to sexuality and 
law reform. In the United States, for example, Ruthann 
Robson 15 has advocated the creation of a flesbian 
jurisprudence', and has proposed several arguments and 
strategies that she believes would help lesbians achieve 
35 Robson (1990a, b, c, d; 1992) has published several 
articles and a book outlining her perspective. 
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legal equality (see also Cain, 1989; Leonard, 1990). For 
Robson, neither the gay male, nor the feminist movements 
have managed to provide solutions to specifically lesbian 
issues. In Canada, Robson's perspective has been endorsed 
by several writers (see Faulkner,, 1991), including Mary 
Eaton (1991), who has written particularly within the 
context of human rights reform. I consider her work below 
as she is one of the few Canadian writers to theorise the 
relation between lesbian sexuality and human rights reform. 
Eaton (1991) takes as her point of departure what she 
perceives to be the specificity of lesbian experience, as 
distinct from that of gay men. She argues that lesbians 
must engage in separate struggles around law reform, and 
grounds her approach in lesbian separatist theory. Eaton's 
primary purpose is to explain how human rights responses to 
homosexuality are rooted in the homophobic construction of 
gay male sexuality. The law, she argues, focuses its 
energies constructing the sexuality of gay men as 
aggressive, predatory, dangerous, and diseased. 
Historically, this is shown through the ways the criminal 
law was deployed to regulate sexual activity between men. 
Eaton (1991) suggests that more recent human rights case 
law is premised on many of the same assumptions. 
Using primarily American jurisprudence (particularly 
to do with military personnel), Eaton argues that judges 
have created a "conduct/orientation" distinction; lesbians 
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and gay men are to be protected from discrimination for 
"being" homosexuals, but not for specific sexual activities 
in which they might engage (1991: Chp. 4). In judicial 
practice this has meant, for example, that an openly gay 
man against whom no alle_qation of actual sexual conduct has 
been made, was discriminated against when discharged from 
the U. S. Army (Watkins, 1989), whilst state sodomy statutes 
enforced only against male same-sex activity are deemed not 
discriminatory (Bowers, 1986). 
Eaton contends that this "doing/being" distinction is 
rooted in the legal construction of a dangerous gay male 
sexuality that must be restrained, and bears no relation to 
lesbian experience. The interests of lesbians, she argues, 
are not served by struggling alongside gay men for human 
rights reforms as they are currently conceived 
(1991: Chp. 5). In the process of being associated with and 
subsumed under the construction of a gay male sexuality, 
lesbians are not only rendered legally invisible; they are 
also denied human rights for reasons that have nothing to 
do with their actual practice and lives. Eaton thus argues 
that lesbians must separate themselves from gay men, and 
develop legal strategies in the interests of lesbians, 
taking to task legal scholars that have insufficiently 
theorised lesbian sexuality (1991: 13-19). 
I take issue with several of Eaton's key points, as I 
find her perspective ultimately unsatisfying and 
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potentially problematic. First, I am troubled by Eaton's 
apparent suggestion that because a homophobic construction 
of gay male sexuality is the model for legal regulation, 
that lesbians, as a result, should dissociate themselves 
from the law reform struggles of gay men. I am not opposed 
to Eatonfs advocation of a form of lesbian autonomous 
organising; however, I cannot accept that it should take 
place for such reasons. 
The logic of her position would seem to suggest that 
any group, when linked to a negative representation of 
another, should break solidarity with that I other F and seek 
change on its own. Whilst it is no doubt necessary for 
lesbians to insist upon a self-presentation during law 
reform struggles, and I would agree that this is seldom 
achieved, it is not, even in Eatonfs terms, gay men' who 
are the problem, but how gay male sexuality is legally 
constructed. Eaton would no doubt agree that this 
construction is homophobic; however, she seems to be 
suggesting that this fact alone should propel lesbians to 
a separate struggle. Would Eaton accept lesbians re using 
to associate themselves with anti-racist campaigns because 
Jews are constructed as having lots of money, or Black 
people a drug problem? This question may be unfair to 
Eaton; nevertheless, as I read her work, this seems to be 
the implication of her argument. 
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Aside from this point, which in some ways is the key 
to Eaton's argument, she has, in my view, insufficiently 
considered the relationship between sexual practice and 
sexual identity. As others have noted, many of the 
activities popularly associated with gay male sexuality - 
for example, washroom sex, and paedophilia - are often 
engaged in by men who would define themselves as 
heterosexual. Eatonts main argument rests on an unstated 
assumption that, somehow., the law's construction of gay 
male sexuality is 'true' for gay men, but not for lesbians. 
Whilst she never explicitly says this, she similarly never 
indicates that gay men may not freallyf be paedophiles, or 
possess insatiable sexual appetites (see 1991: 220). Her 
concern seems solely to be with explaining that judges hold 
these views and apply them when considering the extension 
of lesbian and gay rights. Lesbians,, she argues#, must 
invent separate legal strategies. 
Eaton"s analysis is further complicated by her 
insistence that the "conduct /orientation" distinction is in 
imminent danger of being imported into Canada (1991: Chp-4). 
cannot agree; there is little evidence to suggest that 
such an approach has taken or is about to take root in the 
Canadian context. Eaton herself can find almost no 
Canadian cases on point, and thus is forced simply to 
contend that Canadian lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence 
is about to f ollow this path. Eaton's argument, to have 
validity, need not be rooted in the inevitable adoption of 
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this distinction. Her key point, that lesbian and gay 
rights must be theorised. separately, remains an important 
one regardless of the "being/doing" distinction. However, 
her analysis, in my view, in attempting to find a 
distinctive path for lesbians, results in some Confusion. 
Indeed,, at times Eaton seems so intent on f inding 
absolutely no shared ground between lesbians and gay men 
that her review of jurisprudence is somewhat distorted. 
For example, in discussing custody cases, Eaton focuses on 
how lesbian mothers are denied the right to be 'political 
lesbians', and are granted custody on the basis that their 
sexuality is kept private and hidden. The same is true, 
however,, for gay fathers (see P. B.,, 1988). In my view, 
when gay fathers do win custody, it is usually the result 
of the mother"s failure to appear as a "good mother",, I 
parents are not held to different standards on the basis of 
their sexuality, but their gender. 36 As I discuss further 
below, the lesbian separatist approach not only severs 
connections between gay men and lesbians, but also between 
lesbians and heterosexual women. 
Eaton"s decision to focus her energies upon the 
homophobic construction of gay male sexuality and the 
attendant implications for lesbians means that she f ails to 
explore what, in mY view, is a more obvious trend in 
36 An interesting case highlighting some of these issues is Robertson v Geisinger (1991). See also Wishard 
(1989). 
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Canadian lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence - the 
deployment of liberal ideologies to support lesbian and gay 
human rights demands. In several places, Eaton's analysis 
indicates that lesbian and gay rights cases have largely 
been lost in Canada. Whilst I agree that a simple 'results 
tally' might once have suggested this, I believe she 
ignores the myriad of complex ways in which meanings 
changer movements organise, and the balance of power 
shifts. 
As I go on to explore in following chapters, lesbian 
and gay rights campaigns, on a variety of f ronts, have been 
enormously successful, despite the Flossf of specific 
battles. Furthermore, Eaton's virtual obsession with gay 
men and the "being/doing" distinction in American law 
unfortunately renders it impossible for her to consider the 
hegemony of liberalism within Canadian lesbian and gay 
legal struggle. Much of my thesis is,, therefore, an 
attempt to come to grips with this dimension. 
My research thus takes a quite different turn from 
both legal positivism and lesbian separatism. I am not 
concerned with drawing out 'essential' differences between 
gay and lesbian practice in order to argue for legal 
strategies suited to lesbian experience, but in exploring 
the ways in which social movements engage in legal 
struggle, particularly the diverse and contradictory 
effects of such engagements. The values underlying my 
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project are not those of separation but solidarity, and my 
intention is to argue for an analysis which links lesbian 
and gay oppression to wider sets of social relations, 
rather than to write "for lesbians only 11 . 
37 
Finally, in responding to Mary Eaton's concerns, it 
may be worth here considering a point made by Judith Butler 
(1991),, writing in a somewhat different context. She has 
observed, as have many others, that in public discourses, 
"the lesbian' has been notably absent. Whilst sex between 
men was certainly given an entirely negative construction, 
at least male homosexuality was present in public debate, 
law, and other discourses. This, Butler argues, has 
offered to gay men a site from which to resist. 
To be prohibited explicitly is to occupy a 
discursive site from which something like a 
reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be 
implicitly proscribed is not even to qualify as 
an object of prohibition... It is one thing to be 
erased by discourse, and yet another to be 
present in discourse as an abiding falsehood 
(Butler, 1991: 20). 
Human rights laws, perhaps, offer to lesbians the 
opportunity to articulate a form of resistance. In 
debating our inclusion within this tgender neutral' form of 
law,, in contesting the paradigms of sexuality deployed to 
gain 'our rights', lesbians are perhaps able to participate 
in public sexuality debates as never before. Indeed, the 
work of Ruthann Robson, Mary Eaton, and others, as well as 
that contained in the pages which follow, attest to this. 
37 This is the title of a lesbian separatist 
anthology, see Hoagland and Penelope (1988). 
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CHAPTER 
HAVE NO IDEA AND FRAMKLY I DO NOT CARE: ' 
LIBERALISM'S HEGEMONY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AMENDMENT TO ONTARIO"S 
HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, 1986 
In Chapter 21 argued that as lesbian and gay 
identities emerged and consolidated the demand for and 
acquisition of rights were seen by many to be an intrinsic 
aspect of lesbian and gay liberation. Underlying many of 
such demands was a desire on the part of these "new 
subjects" to be "coded human" (Ross, 1990), to be 
"identified, as social citizens; inclusion within existing 
systems of state-based rights and status thus became a key 
demand. Two questions can follow from this. How was 
'lesbian and gay equality, constructed within this field of 
law? And, what are the implications of striving for 
inclusion within liberal equality structures? I respond to 
these questions by exploring the 'politics of Bill 71 - the 
struggle, in 1986, to add a sexual orientation' ground to 
Ontario's Human Rights Code. I first outline the events of 
Bill 7, and consider some of the reasons for its successful 
Passage. I then go on to examine the politics underlying 
the struggle. 
1 From legislative speech of Bob Rae, MPP, Ontario 
Hansard, 2 December 1986,3851. 
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In short,, my argument is that, in this specific 
struggle, a 'liberal equality' paradigm was hegemonic. In 
other words, that public debate on the sexual orientation 
amendment was structured around this paradigm, and that 
liberal legal ideology achieved an authoritative dominance 
that both excluded or marginalised other perspectives from 
debate, and produced a consensus within which lesbian and 
gay equality was to be defined and permitted. I consider 
some of the contradictions within this ideology, including 
the ways in which human rights law was simultaneously 
articulated as significant and of little practical effect. 
I also explore how human rights lal 
, minority rights paradigm', constructs 
sexualities, and consider the extent to 
and gay organisations, legal strategies 
do not necessarily indicate a 'buying 
values and ideologies. 
A. The CampaiýM For Bill 7 
, particularly the 
homo- and hetero- 
which, for lesbian 
are pragmatic, and 
into " of dominant 
The original text of Bill 7, introduced into the 
Ontario legislature for first reading in 1985, contained no 
mention of sexual orientation. The Bill was an omnibus 
statute, amending a series of other pieces of legislation, 
in order to render Ontario law compatible with the newly 
effective equality provision of the Charter of Rights and 
freedoms, section 15.2 This process of 'Charter review' was 
2 For description of the Charter see Chapter 2. 
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taking place across the countryls provincial legislatures. 
In Ontario,, one of the many statutes scheduled f or minor 
amendment was the Human Rights Code. 
Significantly, the provincial goverment at this time 
was a minority one, the I left-leaningf New Democratic Party 
(NDP) holding the balance of power while the-Liberal Party 
(LP) formed the government. At the start of 1986, Bill 7 
moved to the legislature's Justice Committee. A number of 
amendments were tabled there, including one to add sexual 
orientation to the list of grounds upon which 
discrimination was prohibited. The amendment was proposed 
by Evelyn Gigantes, the NDP Justice critic. 
The somewhat unexpected introduction of the Gigantes 
amendment prompted a measure of activity from lesbian and 
gay organisations. Two figured prominently, the Coalition 
For Gay Rights in Ontario (CGRO), as in earlier campaigns, 
as well as the Right to Privacy Conunittee, a group of gay 
men predominantly active around criminal code and policing 
issues. 
initiated 
The organisations quickly produced briefs, and 
low-key lobbying efforts. The firm NDP 
commitment coupled with that party's new legislative power 
encouraged some hopes amongst activists; however, CGRO did 
3 The previous autumn, Gigantes had introduced an 
unsuccessful Private Member's Bill to achieve the same 
purpose. 
4 My focus is upon CGRO. For a discussion of the RTPC 
(not re Bill 7) see, for example, McCaskell (1988). 
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not expect the amendment to attract Liberal Party support 
on the Committee. 5 
There is little evidence that the amendment caused 
much controversy at the Committee stage. Whilst the 
Liberals did not adopt the amendment as their own, ian 
Scott, Attorney-General at the time, was sympathetic, and 
his and other Liberal votes were cast in favour when the 
justice Committee voted in May. Two Conservative members 
also approved, with two others casting negative votes. 
David Rayside (1988: 114) suggests the amendment was not 
taken particularly seriously, few legislators believed it 
would reach final reading, and also that other business 
assumed priority at the time. However, at least one 
prominent Cabinet member publicly expressed his opinion 
that the amendment would pass the legislature. 6 Up to this 
point, the amendmentis progress had been smooth, with 
little conflict, and without a perceived need for mass 
7 
mobilisation in its support. 
5 Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario, CGRO Brief 
Support Group, Minutes,. 23 April 1986, Gay Archives of 
Canada. 
6 See comments of Attorney-General Ian Scott, Canadian 
Press, 6 May 1986. 
7 David Rayside (1988) an academic active in CGRO at 
the time seems to suggest that CGRO deliberately chose to 
conduct a quiet, non-confrontational campaign, and did not 
actively seek to mobilise lesbian and gay communities 
around the amendment. Chris Bearchell, another Bill 7 CGRO 
activist, disagrees, and argues that large numbers of 
lesbians and gay men were mobilised by CGRO across the 
province (interview). I discuss this further below. 
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It was,, in some respects, the decision of the New 
Christian Righte in Ontario to make Bill 7a rallying point 
for themselves that led CGRO and others to initiate a full- 
scale pro-amendment campaign. The anti-amendment lobby was 
headed by the Coalition for Family Values (CFV), an 
organisation founded the year before in response to a 
positive federal parliamentary recommendation on sexual 
orientation-9 Its core members were Protestant churches 
(particularly Pentecostals); in addition, other less 
visibly Christian organisations, such as REAL Women and the 
National Citizens Coalition, also participated-10 The CFV 
was further strengthened during the Bill 7 episode by the 
addition of the Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
By the autumn of 1986, the CFV campaign had gathered 
considerable momentum as the Bill headed back to the 
legislature for second reading. The Christian coalition 
had launched a massive letter-writing and phone campaign, 
8 See Chapters 5 and 6 for full consideration of this 
movement. 
9 In 1985, a federal all-party committee had 
recommended the inclusion of sexual orientation in the 
Canadian Human Rights Act, and had agreed that s. 15 of the 
Charter protected lesbians and gay men by way of analogy. 
See Equality For All, Report of the Federal Equality 
Committee, 1985. 
10 REAL Women,, formed in 1984, is dedicated to 
overturning what they perceive to be the successful 'anti- 
woman' initiatives of the Canadian women's movement. More 
recently, they have focused much energy upon fighting ", gay 
rightst, see Ross (1988). The National Citizens Coalition 
is a neo-conservative lobby group, backed by wealthy 
individuals and corporations. REAL Women is further 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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prepared briefs, and courted public opinion, relying upon 
materials prepared for a previous federal debate which 
characterised homosexuals as perverted, predatory, 
paedophiles. " However,, the formal briefs submitted to 
politicians tended to avoid such evocations in favour of 
dry, legal arg=entation. 
12 
Towards the end of October, the amendment struggle had 
become highly-charged and publicly visible. Both sides 
intensified their campaigns as the amendment appeared to be 
splitting the Liberal Party, with rural MPPs coming under 
intense pressure as a result of the anti-amendment 
campaign. 13 As the government began to delay and 
equivocate, lesbian and gay activists became increasingly 
concerned. Both CGRO and the Right to Privacy Committee 
decided to prioritise their own letter-writing and phone 
campaigns, as well as to plan a major public rally. The 
latter, held at Toronto's St. Lawrence Market Hall on 20 
November, attracted nearly 1500 people. mPPs from all 
11 For example,, the REAL Women ýsexual orientation" 
pamphlet, discussed further in Chapter 5, was widely 
distributed. See also Coalition For Family Values, Open 
Letter to Fellow Ontarians from Rev. Hilsden,, 4 October 
1986, Gay Archives of Canada. 
12 See, f or 
Fellowship of Canada 
An Evangelical Resp 
Canada. See Chapter 
whereby conservative 
legal language. 
example, Brief of the Evangelical 
of Canada on Homosexual Legislation: 
onse, ' . July, 1986, Gay Archives of 6 for a consideration of the process 
Christian beliefs are translated into 
13 See, for example, S. Oziewicz, "'Ontario Liberals 
divided over homosexual rights legislation' (18 October 
1986) Globe and Mail. 
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three parties spoke, as did representatives f rom the labour 
and women's movements, and others such as writer Margaret 
Atwood. This rally reflected not only CGRO's attempts to 
mobilise lesbians and gay men, but also the strategies of 
coalition-building and the recruitment of popular 
14 
celebrities . As the pro-campaign intensified, Premier 
David Peterson declared his support at a Liberal Party 
caucus meeting on 18 November (Rayside, 1988: 119). 
Although the Premier formally indicated his intention to 
permit af ree vote, most Liberal MPPs perceived a sof t whip 
to be cracking. 15 
By this time, the media had Idiscoveredf the issue. 
Whilst media interest peaked with the start of legislative 
debate on 25 November, a number of stories, depicting the 
conflict between pro and anti-amendment forces, appeared 
beforehand. 16 Indeed, the two major newspapers both felt 
14 Endorsements were also sought and obtained from a 
variety of organisations including: the Ontario Federation 
of Labour, the Canadian Auto Worker's Union I the Ontario 
Secondary School Teacher's Federation, the National Action 
Committee on the Status of Women, the Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund, and the United Church of Canada. 
15 The personal support of Liberal Whip Joan Smith is 
evident from CGRO documents. She was in regular contact 
with CGRO, and, together with Scott and Peterson,, was 
instrumental in ensuring the amendment's passage. See, 
CGRO, Steering Committee Meeting, 20-21 September 1986, 
Appendix 16, Spokespersonfs Report re Bill 7, Gay Archives 
of Canada. 
16 See, for example, J. McLeod, ", Bill banning anti- 
gay bias "Powder keg"' (10 October 1986) Toronto Sun; P. 
Comeau, ", Gay rights bill tests Grit will', Toronto Sun (5 
November 1986); C. Cornacchia, "-Planned bill to protect 
gays is in trouble, churchman says" Globe and Mail (3 
November 1986). 
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the issue sufficiently significant to devote editorials 
indicating their endorsement of the amendment. The Globe 
and Mail, for example, using the language of "equality" and 
"dignity". argued in the amendment's favour on 19 
November. 17 
With the start of legislative debate, the struggle 
intensified. Despite both movements sensing by now that 
the amendment was likely to win approval, the political 
battle continued, primarily through the media. The content 
of MPPIs speeches was carried in detail on the front pages 
of the press for days. "' Supporters of both lobbies 
attended the debates, cheering or heckling speakers on all 
sides, the conduct of legislative observers becoming as 
much a focus of press interest as the debate itself. On 2 
December, after days of controversial and emotional 
speeches, the amendment passed. The entire Bill itself 
became law two weeks later. 19 Having described the course 
of events, I now wish to explore some of the reasons 
explaining Bill 7's success. 
David Rayside (1988) has carefully considered the 
question of why Bill 7 passed when so many other sexual 
17 % Rights and Sexuality' (19 November 1986) Globe and 
Mail. See also, 'Of homosexuals and discrimination' (15 
November 1986) Toronto Star. 
18 See,, for example,, S. Oziewicz,, ", Tory MPPs assail 
bill banning homosexual bias' (27 November 1986) Globe and 
Mail. 
19 Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, 
S. O. 1986, c. 64. Some provisions relating to disability 
were declared not yet in force at that time. 
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orientation amendments had failed . 
20 He has identified a 
number of factors influencing the Bill's outcome. One of 
these is the history of lesbian and gay organising in 
Ontario (including, but not limited to, past Human Rights 
Code struggles) which politicised people within and without 
lesbian and gay communities , and created organisations with 
resources that could be drawn upon when necessary. The 
importance of social movements creating formal, 
bureaucratic structures has also been emphasised by other 
writers (see Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Simon, 1982; 
21 Staggenborg, 1988). 
In addition, Rayside (1988) suggests that the lobbying 
tactics of the lesbian and gay organisations, including a 
"calmness of style" and "low key argumentation" (partially 
orchestrated by Rayside himself, an active CGRO member at 
the time),, were responsible for the pro-Bill forces being 
well-received by politicians. These tactics included the 
decision not to hold demonstrations or marches in order not 
22 to alienate Liberal MPPs (1988: 127) . He further argues 
that the 'dirty' campaign waged by the Coalition For Family 
Values backfired by offending liberal sensitivities. As I 
20 For a review of this history see Chapter 2. 
21 Piven and Cloward (1977) argue formal structures 
are de-politicising, although other research suggests this 
is not an ", iron' rule. See also Morris (1984). 
22 It is worth noting, again, that Chris Bearchell's 
assessment of the campaign is rather different (interview). 
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discuss in Chapters 4 and 6, this does appear to have been 
the case. 
Rayside's views here presume a kind of liberal 
consensus with respect to ending discrimination against 
lesbians and gay men. According to him, survey data showed 
a liberalising shift in Canadian attitudes towards 
homosexuality. A 1985 Gallop poll, for example, revealed 
70% in favour of extending human rights codes protections 
to lesbians and gay men (Rayside,, 1988: 129). Rayside 
further suggests that this trend had been reflected in the 
media (as the largely positive editorial response during 
Bill 7 would seem to show). Arguably, the 
institutional is ation of formal anti-discrimination measures 
for other groups was perceived by many liberals as needing 
extension to the category of 'sexual orientation'. 
Elsewhere, Rayside and Bowler (1988) have shown in more 
detail how this liberalising trend occurred along-side a 
concurrently-held view that homosexuality itself was 
'morally wrongf. Thus, Canadian heterosexuals were 
formally committed to the equal treatment of lesbians and 
gay men,, whilst believing firmly (and equally) in the 
abnormality and wrongness of homosexual expressions. I 
consider this apparent contradiction more closely in 
Chapter 4. 
Another factor noted by Rayside (1988) was the 
existence of an opportune political moment. The 
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combination o minority government, NDP support, federal 
developments, and so on, all contributed to the amendment's 
success this time around. Finally, and, from Rayside"s 
perspective perhaps most importantly, internal party 
bureaucracies contained important amendment supporters. 
The unequivocal support of the NDPI particularly the 
determination of feminist MPP Gigantes, backed by the 
Party"s gay caucus, forced the Liberals to respond. And it 
was the coming-on-board of the two most prominent Liberal 
Cabinet members, Premier Peterson and Attorney-General 
Scott,, that ensured the amendment's passage (Rayside, 
1988: 135-7). Rayside suggests the amendmentfs appeal to 
such persons lay in how it was framed ideologically; as a 
"minority rights issue, lodged within classic liberal- 
democratic principles" (Rayside, 1988: 132). 1 agree, but, 
as I go on to discuss, this is not unproblematic. 
Whilst I largely concur with Rayside's assessment, I 
will return to problematise some of his points in this and 
the following chapters. For the moment, I wish to add one 
further factor responsible, in part, for Bill 7Fs success. 
By 1986, the impact of the Charter on Canadian culture had 
begun to be felt. Whilst legal cases under the equality 
provision (s. 15) had only started to filter through lower 
courts . the increased power, prestige, and authority of 
the 
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Supreme Court of Canada had been demonstrated in a series 
of decisions under other sections. 
23 
The process Mandel and Glasbeek (1984) have termed 
"the legalisation of politics" did not originate with the 
Charter. 24 1 indicated in Chapter 2 that, from a much 
earlier period, lesbian and gay rights movements sought to 
achieve social change through legal rights reform. 
Nevertheless, the Charter's enactment signalled the 
increasing pre-eminence of a public discourse of individual 
rights and liberties. "Charter-challenge, became a new 
catch-phrase, entering the politics of everyday life. 25 
Indeed, it was the desire to ensure that the Code's 
provisions did not conflict with Charter guarantees that 
had prompted the introduction of Bill 7 in the first place, 
and,, hence the opportunity f or Gigantes to present her 
amendment. Whilst there is no way of measuring the ef f ects 
of the Charterts advent upon popular consciousness, there 
23 See, for example,, Hunter (1984); Big M Drug Mart 
(1985); Morin (1985); Singh (1985); Edwards Books (1986); 
Oakes (1986). 
24 Mandel and Glasbeek (1984) argue that the Charter 
has fostered a de-politiC*Isation of social struggle through 
the reification of abstract rights. See also, Mandel 
(1989); Glasbeek (1989a); Fudge and Glasbeek (1992). 1 
discuss these ideas further in Chapter 4. 
25 In keeping with these developments,, the Supreme 
Court of Canada endorsed, during this period, a "living 
tree 11 approach to interpreting human rights code 
legislation, which, the judges pronounced, was a ", special 
case I of law standing above other regulatory regimes. See, 
for example, O"Malley (1985); Bhinder (1985); subsequent 
decisions reiterated this approach, Action Travail (1987); 
Robichaud (1987). 
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can be little doubt that 'rights', as goal and rhetoric, 
entered Canadian political struggle as never before. This 
influenced, I would suggest, not only the shift in public 
opinion documented by Rayside and Bowler (1988), but also 
the potential for the introduction and success of 
initiatives like the Bill 7 amendment. 
Thus, a number of factors were involved in the 
eventual success of the Ontario amendment campaign, 
including: the fourteen years of effort spent creating a 
more receptive social climate; the growing strength and 
sophistication of the law reform movement; the increased 
visibility, vitality, and activism of lesbian and gay 
communities generally; and, last but not least, the advent 
of the Charter and the increasing prominence, authority, 
and significance of human rights paradigms in public debate 
throughout the country. I now wish to explore these 
developments at a somewhat deeper level. 
B. The Politics of Liberal Equali 
The process of interaction between pre-existing legal 
frameworks and social movement identity politics is 
complex. The Human Rights Code regime for guaranteeing 
rights and resolving conflicts is one based on a view of 
society as containing a variety of diverse minority-like 
populations, each of which suffers a kind of antiquated 
prejudice no longer tolerable in liberal democracies. The 
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Codel's Preamble speaks of "the inherent dignity and the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family"; it is Ontario "public policy" to create "a climate 
of understanding and mutual respect". 
The legislation attempts to resolve 'social problems', 
for example racism and sexism, through encoding individuals 
as discrete categories, whose difficulties can be 
alleviated through providing "freedom from discrimination" 
on specified grounds: race, ancestry, place of origin, 
colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual 
orientation, age, marital status, family statuS26 and 
handicap. The goals of the Preamble are presumably 
facilitated by providing a "right to equal treatment" and 
a "right to freedom from harassment" with respect to goods 
and services, housing, employment, and membership in 
professional associations (ss. 1; 2; 4; 5). This, then, 
was one of the legal frameworks the Canadian lesbian and 
gay movement confronted as it grew and began to express 
demands beyond the repeal of criminal code sanctions. 
However, the choice to struggle for inclusion in these 
regimes necessitated a self -definition compatible with pre- 
existing concepts. 
The model currently hegemonic within human rights- 
type struggles is one of a homogenous minority population. 
26 This ground features in the Mossop litigation where 
federal human rights legislation contained no 'sexual 
orientation' provision. 
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As applied to sexuality, the model represents society as 
having always contained a majority of heterosexuals, and a 
minority of homosexuals. Often, this is made explicit 
through reliance on the concept of immutability - that 
sexual orientation is fixed genetically or in early 
childhood, only waiting to be discovered. There have 
always been and will always be those who sexually prefer 
their own sex. This preference, occurring without any 
conscious agency on the part of the individual, should not, 
liberal argument goes, be a basis for discrimination (see 
Cooper and Herman, 1991). When liberals acknowledge 
biology may not be factor, they analogise sexual 
orientation with religious orientation - as a deep-seated, 
fundamental aspect of identity that cannot be changed 
except at great cost (if at 
Liberal legalism, upon which human rights laws are 
premised, 
thus assumes a series of Truths: society is pluralistic, 
there are majorities and minorities, true democracy 
necessitates the protection of minorities from the tyranny 
of majorities, and true minorities share characteristics 
that differentiate them from the majority "norm". The 
majority must exhibit qualities of tolerance, 
understanding, and compassion, ultimately evidenced by 
their willingness to extend legal protection to identified 
minorities. Even in periods when anti-discrimination laws 
are rolled back, as in the United States in the 1980s, and 
97 
,, real" incidents of abuse escalate, this ideology continues 
to dominate. Even neoconservative Politicians have tended 
to pay it at least lip-Bervice. 
27 
However, the minority model is problematic when 
applied to any group of people; in relation to lesbians and 
gay men it seems particularly inappropriate. If, as many 
feminists and others contend, sexuality is socially 
constructed, and there is no necessary or 'natural' link 
between reproductive capacities, gender categories, and 
sexual desire, then representing lesbians and gay men as an 
immutable minority may restrict rather than broaden our 
understandings of sexuality. Lesbians and gay men are 
granted legitimacy, not on the basis that there might be 
something problematic with gender roles and sexual 
hierarchies, but on the basis that they constitute a fixed 
group of 'others, who need and deserve protection . 
2" Human 
rights frameworks thus pull in 'new' identities thereby 
regulating them, and containing their challenge to dominant 
social relations. 
29 
27 Witness George Bush's struggle around the 1990 
Civil Rights Act in the United States. 
28 See also Carole Vance's (1989) discussion of the 
relationship between lesbian and gay movements and notions 
of immutability. The relevance or appropriateness of the 
concept 'minority, to lesbian and gay identity is an 
historical debate within the movement - see, for example, 
Weeks (1985: 95-201) and Kinsman (1987: 90-3) for different 
views. Here, I am focusing upon how human rights law 
compels its adoption, despite this debate. See Chapter 8 
for further discussion. 
29 1 continue this point in the conclusion to this 
chapter. 
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Another consequence of the human rights strategy is 
that it tends to entrench the liberal 'public/privatef 
divide by locating the source of lesbian and gay oppression 
in the public spheres of employment, housing, and service 
provision addressed by the Code. The CGRO Bill 7 brief 
represents the areas of employment and housing provision as 
key sites of discrimination (as they must be in order to 
publicly justify a sexual orientation amendment to 
legislation that only applies in a limited realm )0 
30 
Interestingly, the CGRO Brief also lists child custody as 
one of the areas where discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men occurs (p. 16); however, Ontario's Human Rights 
Code has no jurisdiction over the expression of judicial 
homophobia in custody judgments. 
31 
Judy Fudge (1989) has contended, in the context of 
women"s rights, that too much attention paid to achieving 
inclusion within laws which re-enforce the public/private 
divide may in fact further obscure 'private sphere' 
relations, a key site of woments oppression. Feminists who 
critically analyse notions of political citizenship make a 
similar point (see, for example, Pateman, 1989). 1 would 
30 See Discrimination Aqainst Lesbians and Gay Men: 
The Ontario Human Rights Omission, A Brief to the Ontario 
Leaislature, Coalition For Gav Riqhts in Ontario, October 
1986. 
31 This was a point stressed by Ontario Attorney- 
General Ian Scott in the aftermath of the amendment, s 
passage. 
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extend this analysis and argue that, in the context of 
sexuality struggles, a focus on 'Public spheref 
discrimination leaves unsaid and therefore unaddressed one 
of the primary sites of the construction and enforcement of 
heterosexuality - home and family relations, 32 
Another drawback to the liberal equality paradigm is 
how it serves to obfuscate divisions within social 
movements, perhaps marginalising important political issues 
in the process. In the Bill 7 campaign, CGRO presented the 
heterosexual public with a homogenous whole,, a group of 
women and men self -def ined as lesbian and gay, who suf f ered 
the same discrimination. There was no question that both 
lesbians and gay men deserved the same protections. 
Ironically, with the exception of organisations like CGRO, 
few gay men and lesbians actually worked together, 33 and 
political battles raged often between them. Liberal 
equality discourse not only minimises divisions within the 
'minority,, it also renders it nearly impossible for 
linkages to be made between individuals different 
'minority" memberships - each is seen to be discrete, and 
capable of individual resolution (see Crenshaw, 1989). In 
the case of the so-called 'lesbian and gay minority'r this 
32 However, one could also argue that the legitimacy 
of lesbian and gay equality in the ýpublic sphere" has 
long-term effects on "'private' relations; for example, by 
contributing to the production of a `, new' consciousness on 
the part of parents. 
33 The more recent advent of AIDS and Queer Nation 
activisms has shifted this somewhat. 
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has the effect of ensuring that lesbians" experience as 
twomenf, f 'Jewish', 'Black', and so on is submerged. 
Yet, on the other hand, it was, according to David 
Rayside (1988: 127), it was CGRO's expression of just such 
liberal principles that facilitated mainstream politicians 01 
support in the Bill 7 process. The principles of liberal 
equality were clearly appealed to in the CGRO brief to 
Mpps. The introduction refers a number of times to the 
Charter and the values it is perceived to represent. 34 
Citing a paper prepared by Ian Scott, then Ontario 
Attorney-General, CGRO outlines the factors that might make 
a group of people a legitimate "analogous ground" under the 
Charter, namely that the group: has received human rights 
protection elsewhere, is subject to a pattern of 
discrimination (the main subject of the brief), and is not 
economically based . 
35 CGRO also borrows two further 
factors. 
That the major characteristic defining the group 
not be easily changeable by the individual - 
recent medical and psychological research 
concludes overwhelmingly that it is not easy to 
change one's homosexual orientation. 
That the group be a discrete and cohesive class - 
though not all its members are necessarily 
visible, the lesbian and gay community has a well 
established group identity distinguishable in 
34 Discrimination AQainst Lesbians and Gay Men: The 
Ontario Human Rights Omission, A brief to the Ontario 
Legislature, Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario, October-, 
. 
19-8-6, p-5. 
35 This last factor is often noted by marxist Charter 
critics who argue that the Charter functions as an 
instrument of class rule. 
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part by networks of friends, an alternative 
social-service support system,, and shared social 
cultural, commercial and political activities. 31 
Here, the brief explicitly presents a homogenous, immutable 
minority - 
Elsewhere, the brief advocates a , right to abstain 
from or indulge in sexual practices as long as it violates 
no one's rights" (p. 7), and continues, 
Most Canadians appreciate the difference between 
acceptance and tolerance - and most are prepared 
to be tolerant. Citizens of our country tend to 
believe that all people, even those whose views 
and practices they cannot accept, should be 
treated equally by the law. The law should not 
try to force acceptance, but it should enshrine 
tolerance .... We are convinced that peoplefs 
experiences can change their prejudiced 
attitudes; tolerance is often transformed into 
acceptance by the realisation that a person one 
is close to belongs to a denigrated minority. We 
need the minimal protection afforded by inclusion 
in the Code in order to be able to share our 
lives more honestly and to show homophobic 3P 
eople 
that their beliefs about us are not true. 
In addition, then, to presenting lesbians and gay men as a 
fixed group with a shared identity, CGRO also explicitly 
expressed elements of liberal ideology, in its appeal to 
the values discussed earlier. 
During the legislative debate on the amendment, 
liberal and social democratic MPPs took up these themes of 
pluralism, tolerance, and society's commitment to fighting 
discrimination against minorities. Ian Scott, in 
36 
Ibid. 
37 
Ibid., p. 8. 
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introducing the amendment and being the first to speak on 
its behalf , argued that no one should be deprived of 
services or discriminated against as a result of their 
membership of a "class". 38 People, he went on, should be 
considered on their "merit" and "willingness to obey the 
law". 39 Society, Scott argued, was "pluralistic", and 
opinions as to the morality of certain beha_viours were a 
private and "personal" matter. 40 He urged his fellow MPPs 
to consider "how we have honoured the human rights of our 
fellow citizens". 41 
Themes of tolerance and pluralism were echoed by many 
who spoke in the amendment I's defense. Robert Nixon, 
Liberal House leader and veteran of over thirty years in 
the Ontario legislature, spoke of government"s duty to 
enshrine and extend human rights for all citizens, and to 
eliminate "prejudice" in all its forms. 42 In a speech 
detailing various incidents of discrimination he had 
observed,, David Reville, NDP MPP,, eloquently urged the 
legislature to exhibit "tolerance,, and moral fortitude. 43 
Liberals Caplan, Wrye, and Peterson, and Conservatives 
38 Hansard,, 25 November, 3620. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. f 3623. See also Johnstone, 
Ontario Hansard, 
26 November 1986,3670. 
41 Ibid., 3622. 
42 Ontario Hansard, 26 November 1986,3690-3691. 
43 Ontario Hansard, 1 December 1986,3788-90. 
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Fish, Gillies, and Grossman, all echoed these sentiments, 
extolling the virtues of a Canadian society committed to 
ending the persecution of minorities. 
44 
Interestingly, Bob Rae, the social democratic leader 
of the Ontario NDP (and provincial premier following the 
1990 election) I offered the fullest amendment 
-defense 
based 
on liberal ideology. His speech brings together ideas of 
tolerance, rights, harm, privacy, and pluralism and 
typifies the liberal approach. 
We start with the af f irmation that it is a 
question of rights ... rights are not given by the 
state. Rights are not delivered to individuals 
as a matter of utilitarian convenience. Rights 
are not given; they are recognised in law because 
they are innate to what it means to be human... I 
speak as a democratic socialist and as someone 
for whom liberty is a fundamental value... 
... the other value which I think we are 
attempting to af firm in this amendment is a value 
to which I ascribe a great deal of importance, 
and that is the value of privacy. I have 
literally no idea whether the vast majority of 
the people with whom I deal day to day are gay or 
not. I have no idea and frankly I do not care, 
because I do not think it is any of my business 
in the work that I do as a legislator. It is not 
relevant... 
We are a pluralist society ... the purpose of law 
is not the expression of private outrage but 
rather the expression of public tolerance. 45 
Provincial legislators varied in the extent to which these 
values were viewed as already dominant in society, or in 
44 See, respectively, Ontario Hansard: 1 December 
1986r 3790; 2 December 1986,3838; 2 December 1986,3856; 
1 December 1986,3805; 2 December 1986,3842; 2 December 
1986,3853. 
45 Ontario Hansard, 2 December 1986,3850-3852. 
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the necessary process of being extended. Their common 
position was that the appropriate role of government was to 
foster these principles, and that, indeed, a consensus 
existed as to this being desirable. Further, there was an 
assumption that government, through its legislative powers, 
had the ability to create a society where everyone was 
truly treated Fequally'. 
Few of those who spoke in the amendment's f avour chose 
to explicitly discuss sexuality. Indeed, their emphasis on 
"privacy' precluded this. Those who did venture into 
discussions as to the 'causes, of homosexuality tended to 
hold views relying upon its genetic origins. 46 This 
contrasted sharply with the speeches of those who spoke 
against the amendment. Whilst I consider how the moral 
right construct sexuality more fully in Chapter 5, the Bill 
7 episode reveals the extent to which liberal ideology 
abandons discussions of sexuality to the right. Twenty- 
six MPPs spoke against the amendment, and, often using 
rhetoric taken directly from CFV materials, almost every 
one offered their views as to what homosexuality 'was', and 
what purpose heterosexuality and "the family" serve in 
46 Susan Fish,, one of four sympathetic Tory MPPs to 
vote in favour, did so explicitly, Ontario Hansard, 1 
December 1986,3806-7. Liberal MPP Caplan, for example, 
referred a number of times to lesbians and gay men as a 
"class of persons",, Ontario Hansard, 1 December 1986,3790. 
Another Liberal, describing himself as a "psychiatrist and 
amateur social political philosopher" spoke of his 
dilemma 
re attempting to resolve the question of "homosexual 
causation', Henderson, Ontario Hansard, 26 November 1986, 
3676. 
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society. 47 Many of these politicians expressed the view 
that homosexuality was a choice that threatened societal 
stabi ity. 
48 
one voice did attempt to inject a feminist analysis 
into the debate. Evelyn Gigantes, the MPP responsible for 
the amendment, responded in her speech to right-wing 
rhetoric by arguing that heterosexual men were largely 
responsible for the abuse of children, linking the rightfs 
obsession with gay paedophilia to the privileging of boys' 
experiences over the sexual abuse of many more girls by 
49 heterosexual men. She described right-wing Bill 7 
propaganda as "semi-pornographic" and exposed the 
contradiction embodied in the view that heterosexuality is 
simultaneously Inaturalf and Ithreatened'. 50 Gigantes also 
explicitly addressed the sources of homophobia. 
I feel deeply offended by the understanding that 
some men will organise in religious and business 
groups to say that men who are not like them are 
traitors to a system where sex is a rightful 
means of oppression. Some of those men are 
hypocrites. Some are not telling the truth. 
Some know they are not heterosexual. Some of 
47 See, for example: McKessock, Ontario Hansard, 25 
November 1986,3629; Bernier, Ibid., 3634; Haggerty, Ibid., 
3639; Runciman, Ibid.,. 3673; Hennessy, Ibid., 3678; 
Villeneuve, Ibid., 26 November 1986,3682; Gregory, Ibid-r 
27 November 1986,3738; Marland, Ibid., 3743; Sheppard, 
Ibid., 3748; Pope, Ibid., 1 December 3786; McCague, Ibid., 
3782; Wiseman, Ibid., 3797; Leluk, Ibid., 2 December 1986, 
3835. 
48 See particularly: Gregory; Marland; McCague; Leluk, 
Ibid. 
49 Ontario Hansard, 25 November 1986,3626-27. 
50 
Ibid. , 3627. 
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those women are strangers to what is best in the 
female sex, directness and honesty. 
There are 125 elected representatives in the 
Ontario Legislature: 10 are women. If the sexual 
numbers and the social power were reversed, I 
believe the clauses of section 18 relating to 
sexual orientation might not even be necessary. 
Women do not feel threatened by homosexual 
people, male or female. It is the maleness of 
economic and social domination of our society 
that is threatened by this reform; not the 
womanness or the childness, but the maleness that 
so profits by its domination through being male. 
00 At is my humble opinion that the hatred and 
victimisation of homosexual people is part of a 
male-dominated system, dealing with men who do 
not join as if they were traitors. There is no 
task that I have undertaken that has made me f eel 
51 more radical than this one. 
Gigantes' speech is remarkable, not only for its content, 
but for the fact that there was no other speech like it, 
and, indeed, no other similar contribution from any 
amendment campaigners. 
For the most part, the CGRO brief and the speeches of 
supportive MPPs shared a common language and ideology - 
legal liberalism. However, parliamentary briefs and 
legislative debates are rather elite forums. Whilst the 
galleries tended to be full during the Bill 7 debate, most 
Ontarians would have read about the speeches in their daily 
newspaper. How were the ideas discussed above translated 
into media copy? 
Whilst I do not intend a comprehensive 'press 
analysisf of this struggle, I do wish to briefly consider 
51 
Ibid. , 3629. 
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the question of how the Bill 7 struggle was represented in 
the mainstream media, particularly in the three major 
Toronto-based newspapers. As I have suggestedi, whilst 
there was some coverage of the amendment prior to its 
discussion in the House, the press did not become fully 
interested in the amendment until the 'anti, campaign 
intensified and legislative debate began. Major newspapers 
thus became participants in the Bill"s interpretation at 
the height of its controversy. In this respect, one could 
argue that the press was quickly compelled to take sides', 
and this is, indeed, what happened. By the end of 
November, the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail were 
identified as being amendment supporters. The Star's 
. 
52 
coverage was the most explicitly in favour of the Bill, 
whilst the Globe's reporters were somewhat more neutral, 
their paper's editorial board was not. 53 The Toronto Sun, 
in keeping with its reactionary, populist stance, came out 
against the amendment. 54 
52 See particularly the columns of Rosemary Spiers: 
"Bewarel Propaganda at work, (29 November 1986) Toronto 
Star; "Grossman shows hets is no captive leader' (3 
December 1986) Toronto Star; "Thou shalt not defame otherst 
(6 December 1986) Toronto Star. Also, editorial 
'Conscience prevails, (3 December 1986) Toronto Star, and 
previous editorial endorsing amendment, "ýOf homosexuals and 
discrimination, (15 November 1986) Toronto Star. 
53 See "Rights and Sexuality' (19 November 1986) Globe 
and Mail. Also, opinion column by 0. French, "-Societyfs 
values weighed, (3 December 1986) Globe and Mail. 
Sun. 
54 Eg: ý'Unreasonable act, (3 December 1986) Toronto 
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During the period of debate, three points in 
particular are worth making about press participation. 
First,, up to the point of the amendmentfs passage, there 
was virtually no reported comment from CGRO activists or 
any other lesbian and gay spokespeople. Second, the 
campaign and views of the Coalition For Family Values (CFV) 
did receive a great deal of publicity; 55 however, in the 
Star and the Globe the CFV was portrayed as extreme, 
vindictive, and 'out of touch". 56 Thus, whilst the views of 
the anti-amendment lobby were widely disseminated, much of 
this took place within a context of condemning those views 
and the tactics employed by those holding them. 
Third, the only perspective publicly endorsing the 
amendment's passage was that embodied by liberal ideology. 
The editorials of the Star, Globe, and Ottawa Citizen, for 
example, all used the language of tolerance, pluralism, and 
spoke of Canadats 'great history, as a human rights leader. 
These writers further insisted that the amendment was 
simply a way of extending basic liberal values to a group 
suffering discrimination, and did not signify in any way a 
radical re-structuring of society. Even the Sun's 
editorial decrying the amendment's passage insisted upon 
55 Particularly in the Toronto Sunt see for example: 
J. McLeod, "Bill banning anti-gay bias "powder keg"' (10 
October 1986); L. Goldstein,, "Group raises new adoption 
fears, (3 December 1986). 
56 See previous discussion; also M. Maychak, "'Emotions 
ran high as lobbyists swamped Queen"s Park' (3 December 
1986) Toronto Star. 
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that paper's support for "equality" and its condemnation of 
57 
"Persecution". 
Thus, a short review of press coverage shows that the 
values expressed by liberal Politicians during legislative 
debate were the same as those providing justification for 
the amendment in the major newspapers. The defenders of 
the amendment were not lesbians and gay men themselves, or 
their representatives, but rather, politicians, reporters, 
and editors. 58 The lesbian and gay movement had almost no 
entry into what was communicated to the public through the 
press. 59 
This process of exclusion (and, as I discuss below, 
self-censorship) ensured that the 'minority, lesbian and 
gay subject dominating the Bill 7 stage rendered invisible 
an alternative, feminist construction of, for example, 
57 See above. The hegemony of liberal ideology is 
further demonstrated in action taken by the Ontario 
Conference of Catholic Bishops following the amendment's 
passage. A member of the Coalition for Family Values, the 
Conference later insisted that it did not approve the CFV's 
press releases, had not supported the organisation 
financially, and were in favour of "basic human rights". 
See M. McAteer, *, Catholic bishops deny launching campaign 
against homosexuals" (4 December 1986) Torontý Star; R. 
Spiers, ", Thou shalt not defame others' (6 December 1986) 
Toronto Star. 
58 1 am not suggesting that none of these people were 
lesbian or gay, but that they were not speaking 
'as, 
lesbians or gay men. 
59 Some activists were quoted in the press 
the day 
after the amendmentfs passage, see M. Maychak, 
`, MPPs vote 
to give homosexuals protection from discrimination' 
(3 
December 1986) Toronta_Star Al; G. Drummie,, "Nictory 
for 
"dignity" applauded, (3 December 1986) Toronto 
Sun. 
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,, compulsory heterosexuality,, (Rich, 1981). Indeed, with 
the exception of Evelyn Gigantes" speech in the House 
(which appears to have been ignored by the media), 
heterosexuality remained an unstatedi, unquestioned norm 
against which others were measured and perceived to be 
, 'different from". As I have argued, this obfuscated an 
understanding of the relationship between sexuality and 
gender, whilst further entrenching, and hence leaving 
unchallenged, principles of liberal equality ideology. 
Instead, lesbians and gay men were to be allowed into the 
"human family,, through the paternalistic benevolence of 
political patriarchs. 
Aside from how CGRO and its supporters contributed to 
the ideological hegemony of legal liberalism through their 
choice of discourse, the pro-amendment campaign had other, 
related, effects. The very goal of the pro-amendment 
campaign meant that the Human Rights Code itself remained 
unquestioned. Unquestioned not only as a legitimate way of 
addressing systemic oppression, but, also, the mechanisms 
and procedures of the Code could not seriously be 
challenged within such a. strategy. 
The experiences of classes of people previously 
included in the legislation, for example under the grounds 
of "sex,, or tracer, have not been positive. Particularly 
in the area of race discrimination, the code has not proved 
to be an effective weapon at all. The Code's individual 
ill 
complaints (and perpetrator) model, coupled with the 
Commission's mandate to conciliate and effect a compromise, 
have not been perceived by human rights 'consumers' to have 
aided in eradicating racism in Ontario. 60 The experience of 
many people who have filed complaints is one of massive 
delay, bureaucratic bungling, and poor results . 
61 These and 
other criticisms have been made of anti-discriminatory 
structures in the United States (Freeman, 1982) and Britain 
(Fitzpatrick, 1987). Further, as Kristen Bumiller (1988) 
has documented, many people who could file complaints, for 
a variety of reasons, do not. 
Bumiller, drawing upon Foucault's work, has argued 
that modern anti-discriminatory law is continuous with 
older mechanisms of social regulation (1988). It functions 
as such by constructing a "classification of identities" 
(Bumiller, 1988: 61) - categories of persons who are, in 
some way,, "lesser thaw, an unstated norm (1988: 69). She 
suggests that American civil rights legislation produces 
subjects that are not able to effectively engage in social 
struggle. The "victims" of anti-discriminatory provision 
are passive on-lookers, who play little or no role in 
redressing the abuse they have experienced. Indeed, the 
form of law in this area produces individuals who decline 
60 Eg: D. Harrington,, "Rights watchdog fails racial 
groups director admitsf (14 September 1985) Toronto Star 
A10. See also, Frideres and Reeves (1989). 
61 Re sex discrimination, see: Cote and Lemonde 
(1988); Mossman and Jai (1979); Reaume (1979); Backhouse 
(1981). 
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to identify their problem as a flegall one, blame 
themselves f or what they have suf f ered,, and create non- 
legal "strategies of resistance" that succeed in further 
entrenching their "victim" status. Bumiller concludes that 
anti-discriminatory law is another form of modern 
discipline, producing self-policing identities, and 
ensuring the channelling of resistance in ways that do not 
radically shift the balance of power (1988). 
Whilst Bumiller, 's analysis tends, as do many 
Foucauldian approaches, to reify an all-powerful 
discourse, 62 she nevertheless provides an important insight 
into understanding human rights law. These legal regimes 
produce and enshrine fragmented identities; people are 
forced to compartmentalise their complex subjectivities in 
order to 'make a claim". often, as Bumiller notes, the 
result is not to make a claim at all. Instead, individuals 
construct their 'problem, as trivial, view human rights law 
as ineffective anyway, and often get more satisfaction from 
'sacrificing, themselves (by not complaining) than by 
'losing control' through entanglement in bureaucratic 
procedures (Bumiller, 19 
. 
88: 82-107). Ultimately, all of 
this serves to channel and diffuse social protest by 
reinforcing the , victimisation" of the legislation's 
alleged beneficiaries (Bumiller, 1988: 39; 49-51). 
62 See Habermas' (1987a: 290-3) critique of Foucault. 
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One study of lesbians, views of Bill 7 itself, 
conducted a few years after the amendment's passage, would 
seem to confirm Bumiller's research. Didi Khayatt (1990) 
found that lesbian teachers knew about the amendment, felt 
it was important "psychologically,,, but were under few 
illusions as to what the Code provided in the way of 
redress. No teacher felt more able to come out as a 
result, and, whilst they tended to believe the Code would 
be helpful if they lost their job due to discrimination, 
most felt that the work atmosphere, should they be re- 
instated, would be intolerable (Khayatt, 1990). As the 
Reports of the Ontario Human Rights Commission show, 
extremely few complaints based on "sexual orientation" have 
been made. 63 
During the Bill 7 struggle, lesbian and gay 
campaigners were not unaware of these issues; indeed, the 
CGRO brief makes explicit reference to some of these 
concerns. 
Prejudice and oppression are not automatically 
eradicated by legal protection, as is shown by 
the experiences of women and people in our 
community oppressed by racism or religious 
intolerance. Long after sexual orientation is 
added to the Human Rights Code, we can expect 
discrimination against us to continue. Getting 
rid of deep-rooted anti-gay attitudes will 
require more fundamental social change than is to 
be achieved by expanding the interpretation and 
enforcement of the law (8). 
63 For example, there were 20 sexual orientation 
complaints in 1987-88 (1% of total received, 21 in 1988- 
89 (1% of total received), and 33 in 1989-90 (2% of total 
received). See Ontario Human Rights Commission,, Annual 
R@22-r-ts. 1987-88,1988-89,1989-90. 
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Thus,, at the same time as campaigners and supporters 
expressed the importance of amending the Code, enhancing 
its status as an agent of social change, a message was also 
being given out that the amendment "s ef f ects would be 
minimal. This is most clearly revealed in the political 
speeches of amendment supporters during legislative debate - 
Member after member minimised the significance of the 
amendment, arguing that its achievement would barely cause 
a ripple of change in social life, at the same time as 
insisting that the amendment must pass if Ontario society 
was truly to reflect liberal values. mpps Scott, 
Johnstone, Reville, Mackenzie, Wrye, Rae, and Peterson all 
64 discussed at length what the amendment would not do . Much 
of this denial was to counter the rightfs doomsday 
rhetoric; nevertheless, these politicians were also 
expressing the commonly-held view that human rights laws 
make little difference to people's day-to-day lives. 
Indeed,, at one stage Attorney-General Scott advised 
lesbians and gay men to engage in Charter-litigation if 
they wanted to achieve substantive new rights; the Code, he 
suggested, was not the appropriate instrument. 65 
64 See, respectively, Ontario Hansard: 25 November 
1986,3619; 26 November 1986,3669; 1 December 1986,3788; 
Ibid. , 3804; 2 December 1986,3838; Ibid., r 3849; Ibid. F 3856. See, also, Cicchino et al. (1991) for a discussion 
of a similar process in an American campaign. 
65 L. Hirst,, "Tourts the place to fight for rights 
homosexuals toldf (13 December 1986) Toronto Star. 
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However,, for the Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario, 
amending the Code was seen to be necessary not because 
doing so would end discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men, but because doing so would signal that 'society' was 
formally condemning homophobia. The amendment was viewed 
as a significantly symbolic gesture (see Elder and Cobb, 
1983; Edelman, 1988). Following its passage, David 
Rayside,, a CGRO spokesperson,, in one of the f ew CGRO 
contributions making it into the mainstream press,, was 
quoted as saying that although the amendment would do 
little to change people's daily lives, 
I think this kind of legislation 
signal. And I think it"s a much 
process. It, s not evident in th( 
tribunals. It happens in the hearts 
people. And that can take a decade, 
half a century. 66 
sends out a 
longer term 
3 courts and 
and minds of 
two decades, 
Three days later however, other CGRO activists were quoted 
making quite different comments. John Argue, also active 
in the NDP Gay Caucus, argued the amendment would ensure 
the extension of health benefits to same-sex couples, and 
Tom Warner predicted that "there will be complaints in a 
wide range of areas", including child custody law. 67 At the 
same time, Ian Scott, the Attorney-General, was insisting 
66 Quoted in M. Maychak, ý, MPPs vote to give 
homosexuals protection from discrimination" (3 December 
1986) Toronto Star. 
67 Quoted in L. Hurst, *, Homosexuals see rights bill as 
key to new benefits, (6 December 1986) Toronto Star. 
116 
that the Code could not be used to challenge existing law, 
611 including child custody. 
Paradoxically, or, perhaps, ironically, the choice to 
struggle for inclusion within human rights regimes 
legitimated legislative frameworks that even amendment 
supporters seemed to deride. This contributed to the 
enhancement of the Code as a favoured instrument of social 
change, marginalising the experience of those already all 
too familiar with its inadequacies. At the same time, a 
'no major impact" rhetoric was partly deployed 
strategically to quieten opposition, and partly as an 
honest assessment of the Codefs importance. Contradictory 
and conflicting messages, as to the point of law reform, 
were thus communicated, and the campaigners intended goals 
somewhat undermined. Finally, the constant repetition by 
liberals that Canada was a country with a "great human 
rights record' served to perpetuate this racist myth and 
rendered the experience of those who would dispute it of no 
account. 
69 
68 See his comments quoted in: L. Goldstein, *, Group 
raises new adoption fearsf (3 December 1986) Toronto Sun; 
L. Hurst, "Courts the place to fight for rights homosexuals 
told' (13 December 1986) Toronto Star. 
69 The history of systemic and institutionalised 
racism in Canada has been well-documented, in hundreds of 
sources which I can not do justice to here. A very broad 
sweep, in relation to the development of human rights law, 
is given by Anand (1985). 
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C. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have argued that the goal of 
achieving inclusion within existing human rights structures 
renders more legitimate the legislation itself and its 
attendant ideologies. It also has these effects with 
respect to law in general. For example, the CGRO Brief 
implied that part of a solution to the discrimination and 
violence it detailed necessarily required legislation. The 
politics of the pro-amendment campaign succeeded in 
reifying law, the Code in particular,, as an answer to 
'social problems, (see Smart, 1989: 161). Whilst within 
lesbian and gay communities, the amendment was viewed by 
most people as a first step of largely symbolic value, 
70 
and,, as I have shown the brief itself partially makes this 
point, the wider public received contradictory messages. 
Whilst some activists and their lawyers implied that the 
amendmentfs passage assured the impending release of 
various benefits, liberal politicians argued the Bill would 
have little practical effect. 
Some might question whether it is wise to distil for 
"Public' consumption a model of sexuality, and a view of 
formal institutions (like law), not particularly dominant 
within lesbian and gay communities. others have argued 
that,, as a first step, particularly in a neo-conservative 
climate, it is necessary to do so (Cicchino, et. al., 
70 See, for example, the Bill 7 coverage in (1987) 3 
(8) Rites, including comments by CGRO activists Bearchell 
and LaChance. 
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1991: 628). Could the members of CGRO have chosen to 
challenge the legal assumptions, rather than accommodate 
them, and provide for Ontario's 'public' a justification 
for human rights protection not reliant on traditional 
liberal ideologies ? 71 Why was the voice of a heterosexual 
feminist MPP the only one to link homophobia to male 
domination? If she could do this standing on the floor of 
the Ontario legislature surrounded by over one-hundred men, 
was there not, perhaps, more room to communicate a 
progressive sexual politics than amendment campaigners 
allowed? 
Chris Bearchell, a long-time Toronto lesbian activist 
and CGRO campaigner during Bill 7, deems such questions 
irrelevant (interview). Communicating a radical sexual 
politics to fthe public' was not CGRO's priority. She 
argues that the point of the campaign was to organise and 
politicise lesbians and gay men, not the heterosexual 
fpublic' (interview). CGRO used the Code struggle to draw 
lesbians and gay men into a political battle, to educate 
them, and to facilitate a province-wide lesbian and gay 
network. According to Bearchell, 'radical rhetoric, is not 
effective at moving lesbians and gay men to the left; 
peoplefs politics shift through their engagement in 
grassroots struggles, and through their relationship to a 
community (interview). 
71 For one such attempt, see the factum of EGALE et 
al. in Mossop (at the Supreme Court of Canada). Further 
discussion in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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Other CGRO activists might not concur with Bearchell Is 
views as to the 'pointf of the CGRO campaign. 
Nevertheless, her comments are important in terms of 
pointing out the divergent concerns of academics and 
activists. Much of this chapter has been an inquiry into 
the dominance of liberal ideology in public. debate around 
sexuality, particularly in the context of Bill 7. One of 
my concerns was that oppositional gay and feminist sexual 
politics were seemingly structured out of the legal process 
in this instance. Yet, as Bearchell's comments suggest, 
CGRO itself made little effort to inject an alternative 
perspective into the debate, choosing instead to rely, for 
pragmatic reasons, upon liberal rhetoric. It may be,, 
therefore, inaccurate to suggest that alternative 
perspectives were excluded at the stage of public debate; 
in fact, communicating an alternative sexual politics may 
have been deemed either impossible or unimportant by CGRO 
itself at an earlier stage - hence, the lone parliamentary 
voice of Evelyn Gigantes. 
The intentions of CGRO,, or any other sector of the 
lesbian and gay community, are not unimportant. Howeverf 
my concern is precisely with unintended implicationst and 
under-considered effects. By choosing, for whatever 
reasons, non-threatening rhetoric and f acceptable I campaign 
strategies, lesbian and gay communities, I have argued, 
leave unchallenged liberal principles, and contribute to 
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the entrenchment of problematic concepts such as the 
minority rights paradigm. 72 At the same time as some 
lesbians and gay men were being politicised into a lobbying 
campaign, the identity they were being asked to take on was 
that of the 'minority, subject of liberal human rights law. 
In contrast, perhaps, to Bearchell, I do not view 
'Politicisationt as an inherently progressive process; the 
support of lesbians and gay men f or human rights protection 
for ourselves says very little about the character of our 
political commitments in other areas. 
Furthermore, the decision not to infuse the debate 
with alternative ideas about sexuality was, as I have 
noted,, an abandonment of the f ield to liberals and the 
right. The effects of pragmatic political struggle are 
seen not solely in terms of what was communicated to the 
heterosexual public, but also in terms of what was 
communicated to lesbians and gay men in the mainstream 
media. CGRO, ' s choice to be a voice of lesbian and gay 
liberalism, implicitly meant that the organisation was not 
speaking for feminist, socialist, and other progressive 
lesbians and gay men. Thus, whilst some apolitical people 
may have been gathered into the process, others, such as 
myself at the time, became increasingly marginalised from 
the "public face' of the lesbian and gay movement. 
72 Jeffrey Weeks (1985: 195-201) seems to suggest that 
the concept of 'minority, may be transformed through its 
adoption by lesbians and gay men; I do not see much 
evidence of this in Canada. See also Kinsman (1987: 190- 
3). 1 return to this point in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BEYOND THE RIGHTS DEBATE 
Chapter 2 began by suggesting that the struggle to 
amend Ontario's Human Rights Code, was one about inclusion 
within liberal equality discourse, rather than about 
'rights' per se. In this chapter, I wish to consider how 
, 'rights rhetoric I was deployed by various agents in the 
struggle over Bill 7, as well as by actors involved in the 
Mossop litigation. ' By rights rhetoric, I particularly mean 
rights as/in speech - the language of rights - although I 
also consider demands for a right or rights. I have argued 
that it would be inaccurate to characterise the lesbian and 
gay human rights strategy simply as a demand for an 
abstract right; nevertheless, the language of rights did 
play a role, and does so more significantly in other 
lesbian and gay legal struggle. 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that liberal 
ideology achieved authoritative dominance on the Bill 7 
stage. Rights is arguably one of the most significant 
rhetorics of liberal equality. The claim of a frightf and 
the rhetorical deployment of phrases such as "we have a 
right to... 1, are evocative, persuasive symbols in 
contemporary social struggle. In this chapter, thenr I 
1 See Chapter 2 for a description of this case. 
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focus specifically on rights rhetoric as a 'tool' social 
movements wield whilst engaging in political action. 
However, the use of rights rhetoric has been a 
frequent subject of criticism by legal scholars. I begin 
by broadly outlining various positions within what has 
become known as the "rights debate " in critical legal 
theory, and then continue with a discussion of the 
questions raised by this literature with respect to Bill 7. 
Following this, I expand the field of inquiry to include 
the views of social movement actors,, particularly those 
involved in the MOssOR litigation, and also consider 
related issues to do with mobilisation and communication. 
A. Bill 7 and the Rights Debate 
Most progressive legal theorists agree that 'rights' 
(as objectives and discourse) are potentially problematic. 
The main point of disagreement, as I read it, is between 
those who characterise frightst as abstract, 
individualistic, disempowering, and obfuscatory, 2 and those 
who say rights struggles may be these things, but they can 
also, perhaps simultaneously, be pmpowering, necessary, 
f oci for resistance .3 From either a marxist or 
2 Freeman (1982); Fudge (1987,1989); Fudge and 
Glasbeek (1992); Gabel (1984); Glasbeek (1989a, 1989b); 
Kingdom (1991); Mandel (1989); Smart (1989); Tushnet 
(1984). 
3 Hunt (1990); Matsuda (1987); Minow (1990); Schneider 
(1986); P. Williams (1987); R. Williams (1987). 
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poststructuralist Position, rights-critics argue that 
current rights struggles are either examples of a de- 
politicised culture, or questionable invocations of 
dangerous discourse. 'Rights defenderst, on the other 
hand, some of whom also espouse socialist and 
poststructuralist perspectives, emphasise the positive 
effects of rights struggles upon social movement 
mobilisation and individual consciousness, whilst tending 
to marginalise the structural and discursive constraints 
noted by the 'rights critics', 4 
Many writers, on either side of the debate, often use 
the word frightsf inter-changeably with "law" or 
'litigation, (the latter two also tending to be used as if 
they meant the same thing, particularly in American legal 
theory). Debate is, in my view, further clouded by the 
fact that quite different 'rights regimes, are often being 
discussed. For example, in North America, those defending 
civil and human rights statutes often argue with those 
critiquing entrenched constitutions. It is unclear, and 
usually unaddressed, to what extent rights frameworks can 
be analytically distinguished, thus rendering critiques and 
defenses more specific to their context. 
In exploring struggles such as Bill 7, a number of 
questions are raised by this literature. How helpful is it 
4 For a critical review of much of this literature, 
see Bartholomew and Hunt (1990). 
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to characterise this conflict as one about 'rights'? 
Certainly, rights rhetoric was deployed by all parties; 
however, can this dimension alone be said to constitute the 
"substance, of the struggle? Bill 7 was an act to amend 
the Ontario Human Rights Code; does this fact reveal 
something significant about the strugglells' lessencef? 
Further, are the implications of rights struggles 
inherently negative, or does the language of rights, as 
some argue,, assist in the building of an "interpretive 
communityF, an arena of shared understandings facilitating 
political communication (Minow, 1990)? Or does rights 
rhetoric, as others contend, obscure fundamental relations 
whilst de-politicising social struggle (Fudge and Glasbeek, 
1992) 
First, with respect to Bill 7, one must question the 
usefulness of those analyses which are litigation-centred, 
those which proceed on the basis that the achievement of 
abstract rights per se was the goal, and those which focus 
on the individualistic character of rights claims. The 
fight for Bill 7 needs to be analytically separated from 
questions to do with Code utilisation; furthermore, I have 
argued that CGRO and its constituency desired positive 
social recognition (not abstract rights) - In addition, the 
pro-amendment forces advocated for rights on a collective, 
not individual basis. The anti-amendment forces countered 
this, not so much by asserting the individual rights of 
125 
others (although this was done by the tabloid press) 5 but 
through implying that legislative protection condoned the 
sexual (and immoral) flifestyle, of a political group by 
giving them "special rights'. For both sides, Bill 7 
clearly invoked the collective 'lesbians and gay menf (or 
"homosexuals'), rather than the individual lesbian or gay 
supplicant. 
Furthermore, whilst the "pro' campaign masked one 
"reality, of the lesbian and gay movement (in the sense of 
minimising underlying political divisions and presenting a 
homogenous community), it could not be characterised as 
"abstract". 6 For example, incident after incident of 
discrimination and often brutal violence was detailed in 
7 the CGRO brief. The liberal press picked this up, focusing 
on the theme of 'discrimination'; its editorials used 
rights rhetoric to address questions relating to the 
necessary eradication of unacceptable prejudice in liberal 
5 For example, a Toronto Sun columnist asserted the 
rights of families and social agencies, likening the 
amendment to laws curtailing individual rights in a wide 
range of areas (including anti-smoking by-laws). The 
amendment is viewed as *one more assault on individual 
f reedom by a pandering, over- interventioni st state. See J. 
McLeod, 'Gay way is 'ok"... so therel",, Toronto Sun (14 
October 1986). Another editorial lamented the amendment's 
impact upon employer's and landlord's rights, see 'Sober 
look needed before Bill passed', Niaqara Falls Review (9 
October 1986). 
6 Some %critics' are speaking about only 
constitutional rights when discussing abstraction. 
However, this is not always made clear. 
See Chapter 3. 
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democracies. 8 At issue for the amendment supporters were 
not frightsf per se, but, rather, questions to do with 
"what is right', particularly with respect to the extension 
of "tolerance' and other liberal values, and the role of 
the state in facilitating these values. 
Similarly, the Coalition for Family Values deployed 
the language of rights strategically. They and their 
supporters argued that lesbians and gay men wanted "special 
rights 11 .9 For them, the amendment signified official 
condonation of a 11 lif estyle 11 choice. 10 ' Rights '. thus used, 
meant privileges. In their legislative briefs, 
conservatives worked to distance homosexuality from other 
"characteristics' receiving human rights protection. " In 
their less official materials, the CFV and others described 
homosexuality as a predatory lifestyle, posing a danger to 
a Ibid. 
9 See comments of following during debate: Haggerty, 
Ontario Hansard, 25 November 1986,3639; Villeneuve, Ibid, 
26 November 1986,3682; Gregory, Ibid., 27 November 1986, 
3738; McCague, Ibid., 1 December 1986,3792; Leluk, Ibid., 
3835. 
10 See: Bernierr Ontario Hansard, 25 November 1986, 
3634; Johnsonr Ibid. f 26 November 1986,3642; Hennessy., Ibid., 3678; Partington, Ibid., 3684; Barlow, Ibid., 3688; 
Marland, Ibid., 27 November 1986,3743; Sheppard, Ibid., 
3748. 
11 See, for example, Brief of the Evangelical 
Fellowship of Canada on Homosexual Legislation: An 
Evangelical Response, July, 1986, Gay Archives. 
Interestingly, it could be argued that this process helped 
to legitimise the pre-existing Code protections, despite 
the likelihood of right-wing objections to human rights 
regimes generally (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
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young children, and expressed through practices such as 
paedophilia, necrophilia, and bestiality. 12 Human rights 
protection, then, would make it impossible for 'good 
peoplef to protest against such practices by giving 
homosexual practitioners fspecial rights'. 
It seems unhelpful to analogise the appearance of 
rights rhetoric in the Bill 7 episode with that existing 
in, for example, abortion debates. Bill 7 was not about a 
, 'conflict of rights' requiring some kind of political 
balancing. 13 ' Such a conflict is a potential result of human 
rights adjudication; for example, a situation where a gay 
man f iles a complaint based on a newspaper Is ref usal to run 
his explicitly same-sex personal ad may well centre on the 
man "s, right to be f ree f rom discrimination based on sexual 
orientationf as balanced against the paper"s 'right to 
freedom of the press'. 14 Whilst it may be appropriate to 
question lesbian and gay human rights strategies on the 
basis that Code utilisation may lead to a 'duelling rights' 
showdown (although this seems a criticism of institutional 
practice rather than a comment on the 'nature, of 
language), the political struggle over amending the Ontario 
Human Rights Code did not itself raise these issues. 
12 
See also Chapter 5. 
13 This is Alan Hunt's (1990) example - however, i 
seems an inappropriate one from which to generalise. 
Elizabeth Kingdom (1991) notes the specificity of this 
example, although much of her book nevertheless seems to 
generalise from it. 
14 
See discussion of GATE case in Chapter 2. 
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Carol Smart (1989), another 'rights critic', makes a 
different point to the ones above. She suggests that 
rights achievements bring increased state surveillance as 
claimants must "conform to specification [as] a 
prerequisite for exercising such rights" (1989: 162). State 
agencies must collect information,, ensuring individuals 
"fit" the category under which they are claiming. I would 
argue, however, that not all rights claims necessarily 
bring increased surveillance. The law reform achieved by 
lesbians and gay men through Bill 7 does not appear to do 
so; 'provingf one's sexual orientation (or race or sex) is 
not a prerequisite for redress under the Code. What one 
must prove is discrimination on the basis of a listed 
factor which it is assumed the claimant possesses. One 
need not reveal the intimate details of one's life, only 
those 'relevant' to the allegations at hand (legal 
relevancy is, of course, a highly problematic concept). 
However, with respect to other kinds of legal claims, for 
example a gay couple"s claim to be a 'family', Smart's 
warning becomes more meaningful. As I noted in Chapter 2, 
and explore further in Chapter 7, texpert, constructions of 
homosexuality play an important role in categorising and 
constituting lesbian and gay ' families'. Nevertheless, 
even when lesbian and gay rights struggles do bring 
increased surveillance, they may also offer points from 
which to resist. " 
15 
See comments in conclusion to Chapter 2. 
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Another aspect to the rights-critique is to suggest 
that individuals and social movements are 'fooled' by the 
promise of rights. Rights become reified in political 
struggle, by a duped or mystified constituency labouring 
under a kind of false consciousness (eg: Gabel,, 1980). 
Michael Mandel, for example, refers to Charter rights as a 
"hoax" (1989: 308), whilst Judy Fudge indicates that 
Charter-using feminists "accept', prevailing discourse, 
"assume" the state is an instrumentr and "see" the courts 
as autonomous and rights-claims as self-executing 
(1989: 459). Whilst I accept and am persuaded by many of 
the arguments made by these writers, I find this view of 
social movement struggle to be somewhat unhelpful - at 
least with respect to lesbian and gay political activity. 
During the Bill 7 episode, a comparison, for example, 
between the CGRO brief and Bill 7 editorials, and 
commentary from CGRO activists in the radical lesbian and 
gay press reveals the extent to which the discourse of 
liberal pluralism was deployed strategically, and did not 
indicate a duped or mystified lesbian and gay community. 16 
In fact, one of the principal architects of the CGRO 
campaign, partially responsible for its careful, liberal, 
muted tones, was a gay man who, in a later article, 
described himself as holding socialist-feminist beliefs. 
16 See CGRO Brief and issues of The Body Politic and 
Rites. 
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David Rayside (1988) has provided a sophisticated, 
political defense of human rights strategies within a 
committed left-wing perspective. Another CGRO activist, 
Chris Bearchell, expressed in an interview having had a 
similar perspective and strategy. There is no reason to 
doubt that many other lesbians and gay men reached similar 
conclusions after much deliberation, either being genuinely 
persuaded that rights campaigns were theoretically 
defensible, or that they were, simply, necessary, pragmatic 
steps. 17 
Within lesbian and gay rights movements, few, if any, 
people believed that winning Bill 7 would achieve equality, 
much less liberation. The human rights code strategy was 
always one amongst many; it was viewed as a necessary step, 
as much a symbolic hurdle as a material benefactor. "The 
law, was resorted to because it was there, the structure 
existed, and, as modern lesbian and gay identity emerged 
and consolidated, analogies between lesbian and gay 
experience and other 'oppressions' were made. The 
admonitions of some theorists not to expect serious change 
f rom law ref orm seems, in the case of Bill 7, F to be 
misplaced. Whilst the public rhetoric of the pro-amendment 
forces suggested that discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men would end with their incorporation into human 
rights legislation, few were so naive as to seriously 
believe this (see Khayatt, 1990; Ross, 1990). The 
17 See also Chris Bearchell's comments, Chapter 3. 
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discourse deployed was strategic and hopeful, not 
indicative of a wistful, trusting, submissive approach to 
law or belief in law's neutrality, objectivity, and so on. 18 
In order to more fully explore the 'rights perspectives, 
of social movement activists, I consider below the views of 
several actors involved in the Mossop litigation. 
B. Experiential accounts 
fll Conservative Christian pprspectives 
As I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, conservative 
Christian activists have become increasingly involved in 
trying to stem the tide of lesbian and gay equality. Here, 
I wish briefly to consider some of their views on rights 
claims and rhetoric. 
For Don Hutchinson, a Captain in the Salvation Army of 
Canada and its legal advisor, rights rhetoric and claims 
are quite problematic. Rights move the focus away from a 
discussion of privileqes, (which is what so-called rights 
"really are'), and responsibilities, which is what people 
ought to have. 
I don't like the word rights, because it implies 
that I can take something away from you. I 
prefer privileges and responsibilities... When we 
put it in the context of rights, we start to get 
18 1 have, however, previously discussed the dangers 
Of presenting just such a view to the press and public, see 
Chapter 3. It seems to me that these two points are 
different. 
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into a battle between you and me about what I can 
do, and what you can do, as opposed to what the 
society we live in permits us to do. The 
question of rights tends to focus on 
individuals ... (interview) 
Hutchinson associates the dominance of a 'culture of 
rights, to the role of lawyers in formal politics. 
We live in a very rights-oriented society which 
has partially come about because our principal 
legislators are people who were involved in the 
adversarial system, who have a very different 
perspective on life. (interview) 
He argues that "when we start to focus on rights,, we start 
to move away from a focus on needs" (interview). 
Judy Anderson, President of REAL Women,, has similar 
views. I I'd like to see a Charter of 
responsibilities rather than a Charter of 
Rights ... the Charter of Rights pits group 
against group, ideology against 
ideology ... rights have become paramount to 
everybody ... the Charter creates a more 
selfish society, [it's] win/lose and makes 
society more polarised, makes people less 
willing to compromise (interview) 
Anderson"s opinion of other human rights legislation is 
also largely negative. Whilst she believes in the idea of 
having human rights laws, she characterises the Ontario 
Human Rights Commission as "social engineers" and "Big 
Brother", telling me a story about a friend who has been, 
unjustly in her view, charged with race discrimination 
under the Code and "intimidated" (interview). 
Hutchinson and Anderson's opinions on rightst at 
times, appear similar to those of the rights-critics 
discussed above. Whilst progressive theorists tend not to 
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engage in a discourse of I privileges and responsibilities II 
they do identify social life as being overly rights- 
oriented and litigious. Some, in keeping with Don 
Hutchinson, also prefer to focus on notions of "needs",, 
rather than rights. Others, like Anderson, have discussed 
the problems inherent in a means of adjudication which 
insists on a 'winner-take-all F resolution. In a subsequent 
chapter, I discuss how conservative Christian leaders 
associate the Charter and the Supreme Court with an assault 
on local democracy - yet another point at which they and 
the rights-critics converge. 
[21 Lesbian and gav 1?! grspectives 
In interviewing lesbian and gay rights litigants and 
lawyers, I found that few concerned themselves with the 
meanings of 'rights, per se, or with many of the issues 
with which theorists occupy themselves. Instead, people 
cared about the extent to which they received publicity and 
were able to publicly communicate their lesbian or gay 
politics, and/or mobilise others. For manyr impact on a 
personal level was not due to qualities intrinsic to rights 
rhetoric or claims, but was simply a consequence of being 
engaged in public legal struggle. 
Karen Andrews, for example, went to court to have her 
household declared a legal rfamilyr for the purposes of 
receiving dental coverage, not for I rights' in the abstract 
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(interview; see also Andrews, 1989). She found her 
experience with the legal process to be "a productive use 
of anger" (interview), despite losing her case (Andrews, 
1988) and having her grounds for appeal rendered moot. She 
believes that her case made people think about lesbian and 
gay issues, and have to look at pictures of a lesbian 
couple on the front page of their newspaper for the first 
time (interview). According to Andrews, the litigation 
process was a success, regardless of outcome, as she was 
able to appear regularly in the media and be a prominent 
public spokesperson (interview). 
Brian Mossop and Ken Popert, two gay litigants whose 
'family benefits, case is currently before the Supreme 
Court of Canada, agree with this assessment. For them, 
their legal case was simply a "way of getting yourself on 
radio or television, so you can say things and millions of 
people can hear it" (Mossop, interview). 
There are only a limited number of ways in a 
society like ours that you can gain access to the 
mass media, one of them is to hold 
demonstrations, one of them is to launch some 
kind of legal case. The media defines the forums 
in which it's possible to find the platforms ... 
It"s very useful now we have the Charter of 
Rights, it's a legitimate subject, no one 
questions, as they might have before the Charter, 
whether there is such a thing as 
"rights" ... Rights gives you a 
language. (Popert, 
interview) 
Somewhat unsurprisinglyr Andrews, mossop, and Popert were 
all quite dismissive of academic opinion condemning rights 
struggles. Karen Andrews finds academics to be 
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disrespectful of social activists, and believes they write 
little of relevance to "real people, (interview). 
According to Ken Popert, . WZI- 
It's only lawyers and academics who actually are 
fooled and think that rhetoric is the only thing 
going on. Most people understand what the real 
questions are, even though it's being cast in a 
different way. (interview) 
Brian Mossop argues that when he and Popert appeared 
on radio shows about their case, callers wanted to talk 
about "homosexual ity 11 , not rights, or law, or litigation. 
The ability to do this, gain access to the media to talk 
about homosexuality, was the whole point of the action. 
The main audience is the youngest generation of 
people who are listening, people who maybe have 
not come out yet ... who are worried about what lif e holds in store for them. We go on the radio 
and say - here we are, we're a gay couple ... it 
doesn't have to be all that bad ... maybe you could 
consider telling one of your parents ... the whole 
point is for people to come out earlier and 
earlier and earlier... (Mossop, interview) 
For these gay litigants, a case which they have lost on 
appeal (Moss22,1990) has been an unqualified success. In 
response to a question about how radical analyses of 
sexuality are excluded from legal processesF Ken Popert 
stated that he doesnf t "particularly care what is said in 
factums, or in court" (interview). 
Certainly, this is not true for all those involved in 
lesbian and gay legal struggle. Karen Andrews, whilst 
critical of academic endeavours, nevertheless expressed 
some interest in legal arguments made on her behalf 
136 
(interview). The coalition of progressive organisations 
intervening in the Mossop case (see Chapter 2) took great 
care with the writing of their legal submissions. For Gwen 
Brodsky, the coalitionfs lawyer, getting the right 
language, tone, and politics was crucial (interview). 
Brodsky,, too, has little time for the frights 
critics'. She believes such writers are far removed from 
the concerns of "disadvantaged people" (interview). In 
contrast to much critical theory on the Charter, for 
example, Brodsky argues that the Charter's advent has 
encouraged social movements to build coalitions and think 
about what equality means in the concrete. 
... the possibility of increasing rights, to take 
steps to secure more rights, has helped the 
community-based organisations to mature, and has 
given them a focus that they didn't have before. 
It has created both the opportunity and the 
necessity to try and figure out what"s being 
talked about in any given circumstance where 
equality is the essential objective. Ten years 
ago, I don't think there were conversations in 
community organisations about what equality 
meant. The lobbying was more ad hoc, there was 
not much opportunity to figure out unifying 
themes .... (interview) 
Interestingly, Brodsky closely ties these develoPMents to 
the Court Challenges Programme which, until 1992 
(subsequent to the interview), provided public funding to 
groups seeking to challenge discriminatory laws. 
... if there hadn"t been any money available through the court challenges programme to allow 
groups to undertake litigation, and to have 
national consultations to formulate their 
positions in the litigation, the Charter would 
not have had the effect IIm talking about at 
all ... to the extent those funds exist, they 
have 
fuelled an interest among the community 
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organisations to better understand their own 
positions ... and that's empowering, to even have the sense that there's a chance of success in an 
effort to secure increased rights. (interview)19 
In contrast to Ken Popert,, Brodsky believes the factum- 
writing process to be an important one for the social 
movement organisations involved. What the judges think of 
it, whilst important, is not the only issue. Preparing a 
legal submission on behalf of diverse interests has been, 
according to Brodsky, a growing and learning experience f or 
all participants. 
It "sa very dif f erent experience to try and do 
litigation that is respectful of the clients, is 
an empowering experience for them, does place 
control in their hands, that's a very different 
thing from the traditional model of 
litigation ... really listening for hours and hours , going away and re-draf ting af actum 12, 15,20 times, sending it out to 10,15, maybe 20 
people, who then send it out to their boards, 
sub-committees ... it grows and advances as we 
work, in the process of talking about what our 
position ought to be,, how to express it,, the 
different co-intervenors have heard one and 
other ... the factum really will be a collective 
effort. In a situation like this, you just don't 
release it until you have something that people 
are prepared to say is theirs. All of them. To 
claim it. (interview) 
For these groups and their legal counsel, the goal is not 
'to get on the radio', but to collectively share knowledge 
and experience, and, eventually, write a document that all 
can feel is "theirs" -that does not advocate equality for 
some,, at the expense of others (Brodsky, interview). 
19 Brodsky further discusses access to justice issues 
in Brodsky and Day (1989). 
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Brodsky fs comments suggest that critical scholars have 
perhaps devoted insufficient attention to the positive role 
of federal funding programmes in facilitating social 
movement networking. Progressive writers often focus on 
how state funding constrains and co-opts actors and 
movements (see, for example, Findlay,, 1987j, 1988; 
Schraeder, 1990); however, Brodsky argues tha t this was not 
the case with the Court Challenges Programme. 
Administrators usually acted in an arms-length fashion, and 
did not attempt to control or police the organisations they 
funded. However, at the time I interviewed her - prior to 
the cancellation of the Programme - Gwen Brodsky also noted 
that Ministry bureaucrats were increasingly attempting to 
assert control over the Programme, one recent change having 
been to curtail meeting f unds allocated to legal coalitions 
(interview). According to Brodsky, many of the positive 
effects facilitated by social movement Charter litigation 
would therefore no longer be possible. Concern with the 
effects of the Programmefs cancellation in February 1992 
again points to the vastly divergent agendas of social 
movements and critical scholars. 
At this point, I would like to briefly offer an 
experience of my own as example. During the Bill 7 
struggle,, I was a member of (although not an activist 
within) the Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario. I 
responded positively to their calls for letter-writing and 
phone calls to MPPs, encouraging family and friends to do 
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the same. I attended the rally at St. Lawrence Market on 
20 November (see Chapter 3). At the same time, i 
entertained serious doubts as to the merits of the demand - 
from within both my feminist and socialist perspectives. 
Nevertheless, I felt that it was incumbent upon me, as a 
lesbian feminist, to show solidarity with this lesbian and 
gay struggle, despite my reservations. 
When legislative debate began, I decided to stop off 
on my way home to have a look and listen. I returned 
nearly every afternoon, fascinated and appalled. What I 
remember most were the speeches of Conservative Party 
backbenchers, filled with hatred and disgust, directed, as 
I experienced it, at me . 
20 
Describing what I heard the next 
morning, my straight law school friends (I was in my first 
year) would say, "how could you bear to sit through that? " - 
And yet, somehow addicted to the spectacle, I went back 
each day for more. 
Not being a party to 'insider' knowledge, I had no way 
of telling (the media was ambiguous) whether the amendment 
would pass or fail. When the vote was called, and the 
amendment's passage announcedr the portion of the gallery 
where I sat erupted into applause, many of us hugging and 
20 Becki Ross (1990) has written about her feelings, 
sitting in the Ontario legislature, day after day, like I 
did. She, too, had no illusions about the ability of the 
Code amendment to effect major social change; however, her 
experience of ýhouse sitting, had a significant impact upon 
her view of the Bill. 
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congratulating each other. Was I duped into believing that 
this victory meant I was now a liberated lesbian? I do not 
think so; although there is no doubt that the Bill 7 
experience moved me, in various ways. I can't say that I 
felt 'empowered'; I knew the Code would be a most 
ineffective instrument. I did not feel that my 
participation as a social movement organisation 
'constituent' left me particularly powerful as an 
individual; although I did get some sense that the lesbian 
and gay movement as a whole had been strengthened through 
the process of obtaining a 'victory' , whatever its content. 
I did, however, feel a strong sense of self- 
affirmation. Bill 7ts passage gave me increased 
confidence; its defeat would have felt demoralising, both 
on a personal and collective level. The fself' that was 
affirmed for me was the construct of lesbian feminist 
politics, not legal equality discourse, although it 
troubled me that the public, had been presented with 
something else. 
C. RigLhts Are Neither "Gbody Nor "Bad' 
Does all this then mean that, as some argue, rights 
rhetoric necessarily serves important positive functions 
within political struggle? Alan Hunt (1990), for example, 
suggests that the language of rights claims is the kind of 
'universal' discourse necessary to construct a new moral 
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order. In contrast to Fudge (1989: 449), who warns that 
rights rhetoric can also be used by conservative forces, 
Hunt finds the fact that rights claims raise competing 
claims to be a factor in their favour, as this compels a 
serious public debate over which and whose rights should be 
prioritised. This argument, as previously noted, is only 
marginally applicable to the Bill 7 episode where the 
expression of competing rights claims was rare. Whilst the 
potential for a serious debate exists hypothetically, 
within the Bill 7 struggle no such engagement took place. 
Discussions of whose rights should have priority, for 
example a lesbian tenant's or a heterosexual landlord's, 
were rarely found. 
I would agree with Hunt, however, that one cannot 
condemn a legal strategy solely upon its ability to be 
successfully deployed by opponents. The fact that rights 
rhetoric can be used by either side in a struggle is a fact 
neither in, nor against, its favour. Surely all strategies 
for change are potentially available to all those seeking 
it. This, in my view, says little about the efficacy of 
the strategy at any given moment, for any given movement. 
Words and strategies have no inherent meaning; struggles 
between social movements are exactly about and over the 
power to interpret. In the case of lesbians, gay men, and 
their opponents the meaning of 'family', Fspousell 
"normal, ', and indeed 'womant and Imant are at stake. 
Certainly, not all social movements have equal resources to 
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engage in these battles, and this is a point somewhat 
neglected by the rights-defenders. Yet, the fact of 
resource inequality says little about the intrinsic value 
of any particular goal. If rights rhetoric mobilises a 
progressive movement around a given issue, it seems 
tangential to counter-argue that right-wing movements could 
use rights to mobilise themselves. At the same time, it 
seems injudicious to suggest that such counter-movements 
are inherently facilitative of communication and justice, 
or that all movements have an equal capacity to mobilise 
and make successful public interventions. 
Hunt (1990) goes on to espouse a perspective, drawn 
from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), that argues that new social 
movements "re-combine" elements of existing discourse in 
constructing a* new,, liberatory one - Thus, it is only 
fnaturalf that social movements use rights rhetoric (Hunt 
speaks of making "rights claims"); the point is that 
rights are re-articulated in ways that transform them. In 
arguing his politics of "rights without illusions" (not 
dissimilar to Scheingold's Position nearly twenty years 
ago )21 , Hunt f inds further encouragement in the 
f act that 
rights struggles play a role in constituting social actors 
and their identities. With respect to Bill 71 it is worth 
exploring each of these assertions in turn. 
21 See Scheingold (1974). Hunt argues his conception 
of rights is not the neutral one of Scheingold's. 
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First, were rights and other elements 'Ire-combined" 
within pro-amendment discourse in ways that could be said 
to be "counter-hegemonic" (Hunt, 1990)? 1 argued in 
Chapters 2 and 3 that 'rights, was used synonymously with 
'equality', and that equality was implied to be achievable 
through inclusion within existing legal frameworks. it 
seems dubious whether this articulation Was 'counter- 
hegemonict. On the contrary, I have suggested that this 
approach entrenched principles and structures of liberal 
equality without challenging the paradigm's limitations. 
The anti-amendment forces, on the other hand, 
articulated rights awa from equality; "gay rights" was 
synonymous with 'paedophilial and 'bestiality'. Within a 
political climate increasingly responsive to lesbian and 
gay rights claims, it was the Coalition for Family Values' 
articulation that more clearly played an oppositional role. 
The fact that mainstream liberal politicians were 
sympathetic to CGRO, and appalled by the extremism' of the 
anti-amendment lobby also suggests this interpretation. 
Indeed, at the time, two Conservative Party MPPs took the 
unprecedented step of speaking out to the press about their 
disgust with the CFV campaigno 22 it could thus be argued 
that there is nothing inherently progressive about engaging 
in "counter-hegemonic opposition' - it depends on what (or 
22 See comments of Susan Fish and Yuri Shymko, 
Canadian Press, 1 December 1986. 
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whose) 'hegemony, one is both fighting against, and 
attempting to create. 
There is also no reason why progressive social 
movements necessarily re-articulate rights in such a way as 
to challenge power relations. On the contrary, many social 
movements deploy rights rhetoric conventionally; indeed, it 
is the expression of rights within traditional liberal 
epistemology and values that is often most successful in 
terms of social movement goal achievement, particularly 
when specific goals are to achieve inclusion within liberal 
legal frameworks. Certainly, this seems to have been the 
case with the Bill 7 sexual orientation amendment campaign. 
Furthermore,, the perspective of Hunt (and others) 
would seem to reify "discursive struggle", finding it 
capable of achieving almost anything - most of which is 
somehow assumed to be progressive. Whilst the rights 
critics tend, in my view, to be overly dismissive and 
apocalyptic, the rights defenders take insufficient account 
of the limits and constraints within which progressive 
social movements work (aee Fudge, 1987; 1989). Not all 
social actors 
I 
have access to similar resources, means of 
communication, and so on. In addition, discursive 
elements' cannot simply be, as Martha Minow seems to 
suggest,, 'Ire-invented" and disseminated at will (1990: 306- 
7). As Carol Smart (1989) has shown, powerful, oppressive 
discourses such as law can play a , colonising" role, Ire- 
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combining" the expressions of progressive movements in 
unprogressive ways. And, as Joel Bakan has persuasively 
argued, institutional constraints can render the best 
intentions ineffective (1991). 
With respect to Hunt's (1990) second pointr it is no 
doubt true that legal struggles, and rights claims in 
particular, construct subjects and identities. I have no 
argument with this; however, why should this process be 
seen as an unqualified 'good'? Surely questions to do with 
what kinds of subjects and identities oriented to what end 
must be posed. In Chapter 3,1 suggested that the form of 
many lesbian and gay rights claims entrenches the binary 
opposition between hetero- and homo- sexualities rather 
than seeking to transcend it. Human rights regimes pose, 
like criminal law, their own dilemmas of regulation. Is 
the minority model of homosexuality that dominated the Bill 
7 struggle a positive, progressive one? Should we 
celebrate equally the right-wingfs construction of the 
'defender of civilisation and family, during this struggle? 
Not all social movements are to be applauded simply because 
they are social movementq, 'new' or not. 
Martha Minow (1990), another 'rights defender', 
suggests that the language of rights has a particular 
resonance, that rights rhetoric is so much a part of the 
fabric of social life that its deployment can achieve a 
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kind of shared understanding. Rights rhetoric "makes those 
in power at least listen" (1990: 297). 23 She argues that, 
The langauge of rights thus draws each claimant 
into the community and grants each a basic 
opportunity to participate in the process of 
communal debate (1990: 296). 
How helpful is this analysis? 
Neil Milner (1986), in applying the views of Minow and 
others to his studies of two organisations involved in 
struggles over psychiatric patient rights, argues that 
"rights-talk" produced contradictory effects. On the one 
hand,, an organisation of 'patients' families' expressed an 
anti-rights discourse, arguing that patients were incapable 
of exercising rights, and that a frightst model masked the 
reality of family caregiving (by giving patients rights 
against the state, which then undermined family decision- 
making) (Milner, 1986: 653-8). And yet, this same 
organisation used "rights-talk" to build their own communal 
identity; Milner argues that the families appropriated 
rights language to ground their own collective claim to 
recognition as caregivers. 
Organisations representing patient interests had, at 
the same time, their own rights dilemmas. On the one hand, 
23 Elsewhere in her book, Minow clearly implies that 
Powerful "decision-makers" are well-intentioned people 
doing their best to resolve "the dilemma of difference" 
(1990: 44-7). All that is needed to overcome inequality is 
for judges to understand the experience of "others'; hence, 
Minow's relatively uncritical perspective on rights, which, 
in her view, facilitate such understandings. 
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groups argued for a general patient's right to choose and 
refuse treatments, based on the individualfs capacity to 
make treatment decisions. At the same time, many of the 
same organisations advocated a different approach vis a vis 
electroshock 'therapy, -namely, special safeguards, or even 
banning, based on a model which constructed the patient as 
a 'victim" of coercive practices who could- not exercise 
"free choice, (Milner, 1986: 664-6). 
Milner reaches several conclusions as a result of his 
detailed studies (1986,1989). Whilst he suggests that the 
rhetoric of 'patients' rights' may build an interpretive 
community", he argues that these dominant understandings 
can then undermine popular struggles which highlight power 
inequalities, such as the anti-shock campaigns (1986: 670; 
1989: 123). He also suggests that the "rights-talk" 
favoured by lawyers imposed a legal model upon the 
patients I movement, and fostered conflict between activists 
and lawyers (1986: 665-6). Milner ultimately argues that 
rights language is a complex tool; its effects are not 
predictable. His research is one of the few attempts to 
actually study the role of rights within social movement 
activism. 
Returning to the study at hand, it seems apparent that 
the articulation of lesbian and gay rights with liberal 
equality principles did succeed in building a kind of 
interpretive community. In the Bill 7 struggle, a liberal 
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consensus was achieved amongst both mainstream politicians 
and the press that 'homosexuals F deserved jobs and housing. 
As Rayside and Bowler (1988) have suggested, this consensus 
may extend to a majority of the Canadian tpublic'. If one 
takes the view that a consensus formally condemning 
discrimination is a pre-requisite for more substantial 
shifts in practice and opinion, then this achievement is no 
small success. However, it can be just as easily argued 
that the interpretive community that Bill 7 and similar 
struggles establish is an elite one. A community of 
politicians and press editorial boards may not necessarily 
be the one an oppositional lesbian and gay movement wishes 
to build, particularly when the wider public continues to 
maintain a simultaneous belief in the 'unnaturalness' of 
homosexuality. Just as we must ask "what subjects", we 
must also ask what or whose 'community' are we talking 
about ? 24 
One might also ask, how deep are these understandings? 
At what point do "those with power" stop "listening" 
(Minow, 1990: 297) (assuming they started)? There is reason 
to suggest that I'dialoque" (Minow,, 1990: 296) (assuming 
there was one) breaks down as soon as rights are given 
concrete meaning. Whilst a majority of Canadians support 
"equal rights" for lesbians and gay men, it is unlikely 
that this fcommunityl will exist once these rights are seen 
24 This struggle also can be seen to have exacerbated 
a divide between urban and rural communities, strengthening 
each, against each other. 
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to be operationalised in adoption and fostering procedures, 
in alternative insemination policies, in affirmative action 
programmes, and so on. Practical issues such as these are 
often shifted to the margins when rights rhetoric is 
deployed. 
In interviews, Don Hutchinson, Judy Anderson, and Jim 
Sclater, three New Christian Right activists, each 
expressed the opinion that lesbians and gay men deserved 
"basic human rights". However, when pressed, they were 
largely unable to specify exactly what kinds of rights they 
supported. Furthermore, each also approved, in principle, 
of human rights codes. However, in conversation with me, 
they clearly did not accept the ways in which the codes had 
been used; in other words, they expressed agreement with 
'human rights F in the abstract, but did not wish to see any 
25 
actual change in the lives of human rights beneficiaries . 
There seems little advantage to creating 'shared 
understandings f at such abstract levels. Indeed, one could 
argue that rights rhetoric and legal frameworks actually 
inhibit serious dialogue (see also Milner, 1986: 670) - this 
certainly seems to have been the case with Bill 7 where 
concrete issues were only discussed in order to reassure 
25 It could also be argued that the Charter, and 
perceptions of its "misuse by special interest groups', has 
resulted in the de-legitimising of human rights codes as 
these are increasingly identified with the *, new selfish 
rights seekers'. 
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the heterosexual public that the Human Rights Code 
amendment would have no effect upon them*"' 
Furthermore, Bill 7 demonstrates that the New 
Christian Right may have succeeded in building their own 
interpretive community. There is little evidence that each 
community engaged with each other in any meaningful way, 
nor is there any reason to think that they would. As I 
have argued, it is dubious whether those who respond 
positively to a general call for 'lesbian and gay rights'. 
whilst maintaining disgust with homosexual expressions, are 
actually being gathered into a fcommunity, at all. Simply 
because rights rhetoric is powerful, and tends to get the 
best response, does not mean that anything terribly 
significant has happened. This may also be the case with 
the lesbian and gay 'community, as well. It could be 
argued that, as in Milner's (1986) 'patients, families' 
example, a sense of 'communal identity' was partly forged 
through the use of rights rhetoric. However, in the 
previous chapter I suggested that, perhaps, apolitical 
lesbians and gay men were only being gathered into a 
community, on the basis of narrow self-interest, and not 
with any broader kind of feminist, socialist, or anti- 
racist politics in mind. This too may not be something to 
applaud. 
26 
See Chapter 3. 
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Other rights-defenders, and I include here theorists 
such as Patricia Williams (1987) and Elizabeth Schneider 
(1986),, have suggested that, for 'Black, people and women' 
in the United States, the expression of demands in the form 
of rights, the use of 'rights rhetoric', has been 
empowering and self -af f irming. Rights claims, f or Williams 
(1987), are important symbolic expressions -for those who 
have historically been denied 'self'-ownership (see also 
Matsuda, 1987; R. Williams, 1987). Interestingly, many of 
the writers making such a claim were active themselves 
within social movements and, thus, speak from their own 
senses/feelings about how that experience affected them and 
their colleagues. Such a perspective is meant to be a 
corrective to the perceived excessive negativity of the CLS 
and marxist 'rights critique'. bell hooks, speaking in a 
different context, has written that "the civil rights 
movement made it possible for me to be talking" (1991: 219). 
Despite my own, previously expressed,, difficulties 
with the left-wing critique of law/rights/litigation, I 
would nonetheless question to what extent these 'rights 
defenders I have responded to the substance of the critique. 
It is not enough to simply say that rights assertion is 
I self -af f irming I. one must ask, what F self I are we talking 
about? And, who is doing the 'talking, on our behalf? The 
lesbian and gay I self I publicly expressed through struggles 
like Bill 7 is largely the construct of liberal medical 
discourse - the abnormal member of an immutable sexual 
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minority who deserves tolerance and protection, rather than 
repression and discrimination. As I suggested in Chapter 
3,1 do not believe that this 'subject, is one to celebrate 
unquestioningly. 
D. Rights as Facilitative of Mobilisation and 
Communication: Case Studies 
In this section, I wish to consider Bill 7 and Mossop 
to explore the specific effects of legal struggle in these 
examples, particularly with respect to issues of 
mobilisation and communication. It could be argued, for 
example, that Bill 7 mobilised the 'pro-family' movement 
more effectively than it did the lesbian and gay. 
Certainly, the Coalition For Family Values was able to 
initiate a greater letter-writing and phone campaign, and 
succeeded in having the amendment discussed across a 
network of conservative churches. Furthermore, as I showed 
in the last chapter, their statements were given ample 
publicity by politicians during debate, and by the media. 
The CFV's leader, the Rev. Hudson Hilsden, became a 
prominent spokesperson f or the anti-amendment lobby, indeed 
of all social movement actors his individual role was most 
visible. 
This was not the case for the 'pro' campaign. Whilst 
Chris Bearchell contends that lesbian and gay communities 
were mobilised as well (interview), it is difficult tO 
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argue that this occurred to the same extent at the 
grassroots. 27 At the same time,, I have suggested that 
feminist and radical gay analyses of sexuality were not 
publicly communicated. In these respects then, the anti- 
amendment campaign was more 'successful,, despite losing 
the short-term battle. However, I have also suggested that 
the CFV's campaign backfired. Whilst their-words made it 
into print, this often occurred within a critical context 
which undermined their authority. Thus, the illiberal CFV 
contributions had little practical effect upon shifting the 
terms of debate. 
Other effects were shared by the two movements. For 
example, each gained valuable experience, established 
provincial networks, and forged links between formal 
organisations and their constituencies. Both the CFV and 
CGRO had some success in politicising previously inactive 
sympathisers. And each established ties with other social 
movements and organisations, although CGRO was, arguably, 
more successful at linking with a wider range of interests, 
partly because CGRO was, unlike the CFV, a singler formal 
entity with a defined set of goals and practices. 
For CGRO and its constituency, the Bill 7 'victory' 
was, on one level, empowering and strengthening. However, 
losses often have the effect of retrenching social 
27 For example, MPPs received far more phone calls, 
letters, and petitions from CFV supporters than from those 
in favour of the amendment. 
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movements, and further provide a stark enemy' upon which 
'losers' can focus future battles. Bill 7 was only one 
instance of a conservative Christian Fgay rights, 
intervention; in subsequent years there have been many 
more. 28 'Wins'. on the other hand, can cause complacency, 
apathy, and the disintegration of coalitions that no longer 
have a clear purpose. With the important exception of AIDS 
activism, I would argue that Ontariol's lesbian and gay 
communities have seldom been as collectively organised as 
with Bill 7. 
I have thus far suggested areas in which the New 
Christian Right may have either surpassed or equalled the 
achievements of the lesbian and gay movement, irrespective 
of the amendment"s passage (much of this analysis might 
also apply to pro- and anti-choice struggles in the 1980s) - 
I would argue that in only one area did CGRO establish a 
'gain' that the CFV did not, and this was due to something 
quite unpredictable. During the Bill 7 campaign, important 
support for lesbian and gay equality was achieved both 
within the Liberal Party, and the NDP. The Coalition for 
Family Values, for its part, garnered substantial support 
from the Conservatives. However, the coming to power of a 
Liberal minority government shortly before Bill 7 signalled 
the end of over forty years of uninterrupted Tory reign in 
Ontario. Four years later, the Liberals were to be 
replaced by the first ever NDP government. Without these 
28 
See Chapter 6. 
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political shifts, Bill 7 might never have passed, and the 
inroads made into established parties by lesbian and gay 
organisations rendered of no consequence. Such events are 
unpredictable 'chaos, phenomena that send contained 
theories and strategies awry. 
Without engaging in too much repetition, I could make 
a similar set of arguments about the Mossop case. However, 
in this example, I would suggest that the lesbian and gay 
participants fared significantly better than their 
Christian activist counterparts. First, both shared, in 
contrast to Bill 7, a lack of mass mobilisation. Further, 
each, again, has gained valuable experience. The 
progressive EGALE coalition has perhaps fared better here, 
but only 'because they switched law firms and are now 
represented by counsel committed to achieving as much 
social movement "empowerment" as possible (Brodsky, 
interview). 
EGALE has arguably achieved a higher level of 
networking; paradoxically, this was a direct result of 
29 federal funding 
And, if we compare the experiences of Karen Andrews, Brian 
Mossop and Ken Popert, with that of Judy Anderson of REAL 
Women, the former feel that they have far more successfully 
communicated their sexual politics to the public. In 
29 See discussion of Court Challenges Programme, 
earlier in this chapter. 
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contrast to the Bill 7 episode, where the CFV had the only 
visible spokesperson on the public stage, these instances 
of litigation have provided lesbians and gay men with 
opportunities to speak on behalf of their communities. 
However, this is, of course, not unproblematic. Just 
as the Rev. Hilsden may not have at all times spoken on 
behalf of the Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops during 
Bill 7,30 so too it may be that the lesbians and gay men the 
media select as newsworthy do not represent at all the 
diverse interests, identities, values, and politics of 
lesbian and gay communities. 
The fact that a lesbian's picture is on the front page of 
the Toronto Star says little about who she is politically, 
or whether lesbian communities appreciate her words. 
am suggesting, then, that whilst Bill 7 politicised 
and mobilised lesbian and gay communities, there was no 
concurrent effect of communicating a progressive sexual 
politics to that or any other group of people. And, whilst 
the Mossop litigation has provided a platform for 
individuals to speak out about sexuality, and 
organisational leaders to network, it has not acted as a 
catalyst for wider mobilisation. At the same time, the 
conservative Christian countermovement has achieved its 
OWn,, related successes. 
30 
See Chapter 3. 
It would thus appear that both 
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rights-critics and rights-defenders have had their fears 
and hopes realised. 
Finally, it is important to remember that political 
mobilisation can occur at an individual level, and that 
individuals are what make up 'movements'. Take, for 
example, the experience of Karen Thompson, -whose 
7 year 
long battle for legal guardianship over Sharon Kowalski, 
her brain-injured partner, became a key symbol in the fight 
for lesbian and gay equality in the United States (see 
Thompson and Andrzejewski, 1988). In writing about her 
experiences as a closeted lesbian in 'small-town America,, 
Thompson explains how her lif e was irrevocably changed, and 
radicalised, through her attempts to have the courts 
recognise her, rather than Kowalski's parents, as the most 
suitable legal guardian. Towards the end of her largely 
autobiographical book, Thompson writes a symbolic letter to 
the hospitalised lover that she has not been allowed to 
visit for many years. In it, she expresses some of the 
effects her legal battles have had upon her own political 
development. 
I want you to understand how fighting for our 
right to live our own lives and make our 
decisions has transformed me from the 
conservative, private person you knew into an 
-activist and feminist. Activist and feminist: 
probably you know more than anybody how these 
words used to frighten me. I see that same fear 
in other people, who are more afraid of me as an 
activist and feminist than as a lesbian. Mom 
told me last spring, "I know you love Sharon and 
I understand that you want to bring her home. 
But why do you have to be the Grand Marshall 
in 
the New York City Gay Pride Parade? "- She seemed 
worried that if I went too far, if I was too 
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visible and outspoken, I would get hurt. But I know now that I have suffered more because of my 
silence. 
Sharon, I feel the pain of our separation every day. Since I couldn't be with you, I had to do 
something with my rage or it would have destroyed 
me. I decided to speak out and work for positive 
change to come out of all you and I have suf f ered 
- all you have suffered, Sharon. Our story has 
touched the hearts of thousands of people who 
will never be the same. If only you could know 
and feel the support we have received from all 
over the country, it might give you the courage 
to keep fighting. It might give you hope that we 
still have a future together. 
I still want to win this case for us, but in 
fighting for us, I have also begun to feel the 
pain of others who have also experienced 
oppression. And I have learned about the 
connections between different forms of prejudice 
and the people who profit from others misery. I 
have learned how people with power can manipulate 
and twist Ff acts I to blame those who are victims. 
I have experienced being called aggressive, crazy 
and vindictive when our rights were being 
violated and I sought to protect them. 
I have watched people label you helpless and 
childlike in their efforts to take control of 
your lif e. I have discovered that people who are 
uncomfortable with differences make disabled 
people 'invisible, and keep them out of sight in 
order to avoid their own fears. I have seen how 
institutions have removed the rights of women, 
disabled people and others under the guise of 
'for their own good' ... 
My commitment to you hasnFt wavered, even though 
years have passed since I've seen you. if 
success means that you are free, than so far I 
have failed. But if success means that thousands 
of people have- opened their minds or obtained 
legal protection as a result of our struggle, you 
and I have already made a difference in the 
world. Sharon, I will continue to fight for us 
and for all the others who have been or could be 
separated by this same injustice. And I hope and 
pray that some day we will be fighting side by 
side - that we'll have the chance for a 
love that 
shares all we've learned (1988: 219-220). 
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Karen Thompson and Sharon Kowalski won their case in 1992, 
the court f inally recognising their "f camily of af f inity "0 31 
Concluding Remarks 
It may be a self-evident observation that we are 
critical of things we do not get much 
. 
out of, and 
encouraged by things we do. In the area of labour law, f or 
example, it is generally accepted that the Charter has not 
advanced the rights of workers; indeed, the courts have 
used the Charter to de-legitimise certain labour 
activities, such as secondary picketing, by not protecting 
them under Charter grounds. Various writers have noted and 
been critical of the capacity of the Charter to effect any 
positive change in the social conditions of working life 
(see Glasbeek and Mandel, 1984; Glasbeek, 1989a; Fudge and 
Glasbeek, 1992). 
In addition, it would be difficult to argue that 
Charter litigation, and its attendant rights rhetoric, have 
assisted in the mobilisation of the working class, or in 
communicating class analyses to the wider public. At the 
same time, the courts have used the Charter to fill out the 
legal personality of corporations, giving them rights, 
religions, and so on. In very few ways, if any, has the 
31 See and Kowalski win' (February 19 9 2) Off 
Our Backs. Remember, also, the comments of Evelyn Gigantes 
during the Bill 7 debate: "There is no task that I have 
undertaken that has made me feel more radical than this 
one", Ontario Hansard, 25 November 1986,3629. 
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Charter effected any erosion of corporate Power or profit. 
Hence,, the almost universal Charter denunciation by marxist 
legal theorists. 
On the other hand, a majority of feminist lawyers 
clearly view the Charter"s advent as a good thing for 
women. Whilst some academics, notably those writing within 
a marxist tradition, remain critical in this area as well, 
most others are 'cautiously optimistict 
32 
_ not only about 
results, but, as Gwen Brodsky argued above, with the 
capacity of Charter litigation to mobilise social 
movements, and open up avenues of communication, not only 
between movements and 'the public", but also between 
movements themselves. Many activists within lesbian and 
gay movements agree. 
No doubt, if cases involving complaints of sex 
discrimination were decided differently, if feminists felt 
they were not getting anywhere with Charter litigationr the 
overall assessment would be quite different. Conversely, 
as Judy Anderson of REAL women remarked, under different 
circumstances . should REAL Women perceive cases 
to be going 
its way, they might not be offering criticisms -, so loudly" 
(interview). 
32 Gwen Brodsky describes herself as a "thoughtful 
realist,, (personal communication to author). See also 
Brodsky and Day (1989) where the authors, whilst critical 
Of many aspects of the Charter, nevertheless see in it the 
promise of better things. 
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argued at the beginning of this chapter,, the 
debate is not so much about rights, or charters, or codes, 
but about underlying political analyses and visions and 
about who has power to def ine the terins of equality. For 
socialists, it is not the Charter that is the problem, but 
the prevailing liberal ideology of courts and legislatures. 
This is how I read the point made by Joel Bakan (1991) in 
his reply to those who w-rite about how the Charter could 
potentiall be interpreted; quoting an old Yiddish aphorism 
Bakan notes,, "if my grandmother had wheels she would have 
been a trolleycar" (1991). Certainly, socialists could 
give rights documents any number of interpretations - 
unfortunately, the Charter is in different hands (see also 
Chapter 7). 33 
However, it could also be argued that feminism, at 
least certain 'brands, of feminism, have colonised liberal 
ideology with much greater success than have marxist class 
perspectives. This would not be the case for all 
capitalist democracies, but it may well be true for Canada, 
where the state has been for some years, formally at least, 
a partisan player in feminist politics, providing funding, 
ministry resources, and making public statements about the 
need to combat women's oppression. How 'women, and 
'oppression' have been defined are, without doubt, not to 
33 As I explain in Chapter 6, however, the New 
Christ ian Right would vehemently disagree with this 
statement. They argue the courts are controlled by 
socialist feminist gay rights advocates. 
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the satisfaction of many feminists (see T. Williams, 1990); 
nevertheless, the dominant definitions certainly owe more 
to the feminist movement than to, for example, REAL Women 
and its conservative Christian brethren, or even, indeed, 
to traditional liberal ideas of 'womanhood'. 
To illustrate this more specifically, in the Mossop 
case, a strategic decision was made by the Salvation Army 
(who largely controlled the litigation for REAL Women et 
al. ) not to argue the case as one about 'gay rights'. When 
interviewed, both Don Hutchinson, the Army's legal advisor, 
and Ian Binnie, the coalition's lawyer, consistently 
maintained that the case was about the definition of 
'family' and not about 'gay rights'. Similarly, both 
Hutchinson and Judy Anderson, of REAL Women, repeated 
several times that they had no wish to "gay bash" or to be 
perceived as "gay bashers" (interviews). What can we take 
from this? First, it seems clear that some Christian 
activists feel that gay rights' has gained a certain 
institutional legitimacy; publicly, some conservatives 
Christians have acknowledged that, at this point in time in 
Canada, it is not acceptable' to deny lesbians and gay men 
some ambiguously defined measure of 'human rights'. 
Indeed, the Salvation Army categorically did not wish to 
fight the Mossop case using rights rhetoric at all 
(Hutchinson and Binnie interviews). The impact of a 
'Culture of rights' has, thus, imposed constraints upon the 
expression of conservative Christian politics. Even within 
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the Bill 7 struggle, the Coalition For Family Values felt 
compelled to state it supported "basic rights and freedoms,, 
for "homosexuals". 
34 
And, yet, at the same time, rights rhetoric can play 
a more positive role for the right. Helvacioglu (1991) has 
argued that, in the United States, the New Christian Right 
has turned to a strategy of local protest in which rights 
rhetoric is increasingly deployed. Helvacioglu (1991: 121) 
suggests that this will prove profitable for conservative 
Christian activists, given the social power of rights 
claims and a constitutional history of protecting religious 
minorities. 35 In Canada, it seems evident that attempts to 
shock and appal Canadians with tales of homosexual 
depravity are increasingly unsuccessful. It thus seems 
probable that the Canadian NCR will soon learn to re- 
articulate its demands in a different register. However, 
will the same process occur for them as has occurred for 
their opponents? In other words, what will be the 
contradictory effects upon their social movement for 
conservative Christians deploying a politics of liberalism? 
And, how "effective' might such strategies prove? As I 
explain in Chapter 5, conservative Christians prefer to 
34 Open letter from CFV to Fellow Ontarians, 4 
October, 1986, Gay Archives of Canada. 
35 Taylor and Condit (1988) have shown how religious 
conservatives used equality discourse to their advantage in 
battles over the teaching of evolution in schools. See 
also Kaplan's study (1989) of Jehovah Witness struggles for 
civil rights. 
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constitute themselves as the 'moral majority'; however, by 
claiming their own 'rights,,, they implicitly accept the 
liberal paradigm which constitutes them as a fminority, in 
need of 'protectionf. 
In the case of lesbian and gay rights claims in 
Canada, in the 1980s, the relative strength of the lesbian 
and gay rights movement, and its support from other 
movementsf meant that rights-related law reform strategies 
were viewed by participants as having been largely 
successful, even when actual litigation was not. How 
lasting, however, are these effects? If, as Fudge (1989) 
and Milner (1986) have argued, rights rhetoric inhibits 
consideration of substantive political issues, and is 
capable of being used to advantage by any social group in 
a specific instance, the gains won may easily be eroded. 
The experience of abortion rights in the U. S. is a case in 
point, where the same state government can swing from 
liberalisation to criminalisation over a relatively short 
period of time. 
Furthermore, human rights legislation is only one 
legal regime amongst many. Governments may enshrine 
lesbian and gay rights in one code, whilst at the same time 
ensuring the continued privileging of the heterosexual 
nuclear unit in family, tax, pensions, property, and other 
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areas of law. 36 Adding grounds to pre-existing human rights 
documents is relatively easy; giving those rights real 
meaning in terms of the distribution of resources is quite 
another. As I argued above, the support of Fthe public, 
for lesbian and gay rights also erodes as specific demands 
are formulated. I have also suggested that demands for 
inclusion within pre-existing human rights frameworks are 
complicated by how the 'minority subjectf is constructed 
within liberal equality discourse, that liberalism's 
hegemony in this area makes it nearly impossible to 
challenge prevailing Inormst around gender and 
heterosexuality. 
On the one hand, I agree with Brian Mossop and Ken 
Popert that 'rights, are not the issue. Rather, the agenda 
of lesbian and gay rights activists is to "get on the 
radio", I'mobilise", and other such things, not acquire 
" rights I. And, to a large and growing extent, rights 
claims and rhetoric have proved successful in this way for 
lesbians and gay men in Canada. Furthermore, Brian Mossop 
would disagree that he has been unable to discuss 
substantive issues. As I illustrated above, his litigation 
has allowed him the opportunity to appear on phone-in shows 
to talk about homosexuality and coming out, not 'rights'. 
36 This is, of course, the advantage of Charter- 
litigation, which provides an opportunity to challenge such 
legislation in the courts. 
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In the process of engaging in legal struggle, I would 
further argue that notions of normality, equality, rights, 
and so on do shift. This is evident in the Bill 7 story 
itself, where over a period of fifteen years the Coalition 
For Gay Rights in Ontario . and the lesbian and gay movement 
as a whole, achieved a significant impact upon defining the 
terms of human rights. It is not trite to make the 
observation that what you could say about lesbians and gay 
men "publicly, fifteen years ago, you cannot as easily get 
away with saying now. This is important, and not something 
to be derided or dismissed. 
Shifts in meaning over time (Gusfield, 1981), are also 
evident in other areas. Law initially offered male 
homosexuality no 'private' realm whatsoever. The Wolfenden 
reforms, won through the campaigning of early thomophile 
rights, organisations, constructed a narrow arena in which 
homosexual (usually male) sex was to be de-criminalised. 
More recently, demands for lesbian and gay rights in the 
areas of adoption and fostering, reproductive technologies, 
and a whole host of other 'f amily sphere,, areas, have 
confronted the liberal Wolfenden consensus (Cooper and 
Herman, 1991). The 'pubiic/private, distinction is no as 
longer tenable - practically or conceptually. 
The analyses and strategies adopted by lesbians and 
gay men in legal arenas are, to some extent, shaped by the 
activities of their formidable opponents. In the next two 
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chapters, I turn my attention to the movement leading the 
opposition to lesbian and gay legal equality in Canada - 
the New Christian Right (NCR). I have discussed some 
aspects of conservative Christian activism in these last 
two chapters. I now wish to deepen this analysis by first 
providing a detailed interpretation of this movement "s 
conception of gender and sexuality (Chapter 5). 1 then 
consider the intervention of three NCR organisations in the 
Mossop case (Chapter 6). 1 conclude Chapter 6 by assessing 
the relative Feffectivity, of the NCR in Canada. 
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CHAPTER 5 
"NORMALCY ON THE DEFENSIVE"': 
NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT SEXUAL POLITICS 
A. Introducto]a Comments 
In the 1980s, 90% of Canadians claimed a- Protestant or 
Catholic religious identity. 
2 Of these, approximately 7% 
could be described as "born againf conservative, 
3 
evangelical Protestants. Despite relatively small numbers, 
it is this latter constituency, together with conservative 
Catholics, that has provided the "army" (to use their 
terminology) in the fight against lesbian and gay equality. 
Leading this army are several organisations comprising 
Canada's New Christian Right (NCR), a social movement I 
consider below. 
In this chapter, I have accorded a rather high degree 
of determinism to conservative Christian theology. By 
focusing upon the role that conservative Christianity plays 
in relation to lesbian and gay law reform I suggest that 
this theology lies fa-ý the root' of the most vocal 
opposition to lesbian and gay equality. This focus is not 
intended to suggest that other factors are not also 
important; rather, my aim is to counter-balance the 
1 From Dobson and Bauer (1991: 223). 
2 1981 Census data, cited in Bibby (1987: 48). 
3 Ibid., p. 114. 
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majority of feminist analyses of the 'new right', which may 
mention, but tend not to explore or highlight, the impact 
4 
of Christian beliefs . Yet it is New Christian Right 
activists who have led the opposition to the fgay rightsf 
struggles which form the substance of this thesis. For 
example, during the Bill 7 episode, the Coalition For 
Family Values was composed almost entirely- of Christian 
organisations, whilst during legislative debates almost 
every MPP speaking against the amendment indicated their 
opposition was also based upon Christian tenets. 5 In the 
Mossop case, as I go on to show in this and the following 
chapter, the key organisations fighting Mossop Is claim were 
and are members of the New Christian Right. 
To date, little detailed research on the NCR in Canada 
has been undertaken. 6 Lorna Erwin (1988b), whose research 
4 Eg: Dubinsky (1985); Luker (1984); Ginsburg (1984); 
De Hart (1991); Petchesky (1984: 245). But see Erwin 
(1988b) and Klatch (1987). 
5 See speeches of: McKessock, Ontario Hansard, 25 
November 1986,, 3629; Haggerty, Ibid.,, 3640; Johnson,, 26 
November 1986,3668; Runciman, Ibid., 3673; Davis, Ibid., 
3682; Barlow, Ibid., 3689; Pope, 1 December 1986,3787; 
McCague, Ibid., 3795; Wiseman, Ibid. r 3798; Leluk, 
2 
December 1986,3836; Taylor, Ibid. , 3841. Note that all of these politicians explicitly relied upon "Christian 
morals', and/or discussed the dangers of 'secularisation'. 
There is reason to believe that atheism is an important 
f actor leading people to support lesbian and gay equality 
(Bibby, 1987: 155). 
6 Other than Lorna Erwin (1988a; 1988b), whose 
research I draw upon greatly, one of the few other sources 
on the Canadian NCR is Haiven's (1984) journalistic 
account. Barrett (1987) has written on the %extreme, right 
in Canada, a movement also very much shaped by a sense of 
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provides one of the few sources, has shown that members of 
Canadian NCR organisations maintain an impressively 
coherent position on 'moral issues'. Furthermore, their 
membership is extremely homogenous, in social position and 
moral outlook. Ninety-four percent of the respondents to 
Lorna Erwin fs' pro-f amily movement 1 study named religion as 
one of the most important f actors in their -lives (Erwin, 
1988b). An astounding 99 percent attend church at least 
once a week. This contrasts sharply with the 8 percent 
comparable figure in the general Canadian population. 7 Over 
ninety percent expressed concerns about feminism and gay 
rights, identifying these movements as "serious threats" to 
the family (Erwin, 1988b). 
The NCR membership is also extremely socially 
homogenous. The majority of respondents were relatively 
well-off, educated, middle-class professionals (Erwin, 
1988b). This pattern is consistent with American research 
indicating that the stereotypical portrait of the 
evangelical Christian as a poorly-educated, rural 
southerner is far from the case these days. As Lechner 
(1990) has argued, NCR activists are very much fmodern 
subjects" reacting against the secularisation of the 
modernity which produced them. 
religious destinY, but one I do not consider here. 
7 Statistic given in A. Rauhala, "'Religion is key for 
anti-abortionists, study finds, Globe and Mail (2 April 
1987). 
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At this point in time, Erwin's results constitute one 
of the few sources of knowledge on the Canadian New 
Christian Right. However, her data ought not to provide 
conclusions regarding the belief-systems of Canadian 
conservative Christians generally. For example, Reginald 
Bibby (1987), who has conducted the most comprehensive 
surveys of religious attitudes available in -Canada, found 
that whilst conservative Christians did disproportionately 
disapprove of pre-marital sex, homosexuality, and 
communism, 8 in contrast to the 90% of 'pro-family, 
organisation respondents who viewed gay rights as a 
"serious threat" (Erwin, 1988b) over 50% of conservative 
Christian individuals indicated to Bibby (1987) that they 
approved of gay rights. Bibby's studies also indicate that 
conservative Christians are no more (or less) racist than 
the general population, no less disapproving of 'working 
women", and no less in favour of universal rights to 
healthcare and adequate income than Canadians overall-9 
8A 1985 study revealed that, whilst Canadiants 
overall disapproval of pre-marital sex stands at 22%, 
conservative Christians disapprove at a rate of 61%. 
Similarly, the figures for homosexuality disapproval are 
comparatively 70% and 89%. Additionally, 73% of 
conservatives are "uneasy" at the thought of meeting a 
lesbian or gay man, compared to 62% of the national 
population. In all areas, those individuals professing 
agnostic or atheist positions were by far the least 
disapproving, see Bibby (1987). 
9 However, they are considerably less concerned about 
Poverty, unemployment, etc., listing drugs and pornography 
near the top of their "social concerns agenda", Bibby 
(1987). 
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This chapter is about the Canadian New Christian 
Right, and not about conservative Christianity generally. 
I explore the sexual politics of three organisations active 
in the coalition legally known as I REAL Women et. al. I. who 
came together to adopt a strategy of legal intervention 
following the human rights tribunal"s "pro-gay rights" 
decision in Mossop (see Chapter 2). Individually, and then 
together, they chose to hire lawyers, apply for official 
intervenor status and, when this was granted, prepare legal 
submissions arguing against the tribunal's 'sociological' 
definition of family. Despite the differences between the 
individual organisations, and there are many, they are 
nonetheless united by their adherence to a profoundly 
conservative expression of Christianity. 
Whilst the NCR addresses itself to a wide range of 
concerns and issues, for the purposes of this thesis I have 
directed my attention towards the question of how these 
organisations conceptualise gender and sexuality. By doing 
this, I hope to shed light, not only upon the movement 
forming the most significant opposition to lesbian and gay 
equality, but also, in turn,, upon the politics of the 
lesbian and gay movement itself. For, as I elaborate in 
the conclusion to the next chapter, an understanding of, 
and familiarity with, the rhetorical terms and politics of 
the NCR assists in explaining lesbian and gay social 
struggle. Finally, this chapter provides a context and 
introduction to the following one, which explores how 
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, 'insider' sexual politics are translated into the language 
of law. 
Background 
f1l Theology 
New Christian Right activists are,, as I mentioned 
above, evangelical, 10 conservative Christians. They are 
largely, although not exclusively, Protestant. " I use the 
phrase "conservative Christianity" following Steve Bruce 
(1984: 4-8), who suggests two primary characteristics 
distinguishing this faith. First, and perhaps foremost, is 
an insistence on the literal truth of the Bible 
(particularly the Gospels), a belief known as 'biblical 
inerrancyF. Whilst liberal Christians allow for the 
possibility of interpretation and the cultural construction 
of biblical meanings, conservatives find such a thought 
abhorrent. For them, each word is God's Truth. 12 Hence, 
10 Within the sociology of religion literaturer a 
distinction is sometimes made between "evangelicals" and 
'fundamentalists', see Ammerman (1991). This distinction 
is not important for my purposes, and I use the word 
, evangelical' to mean proselytising or missionary. 
11 One of the distinguishing characteristics of this 
movement, what partly makes it, perhaps, *new, has been 
the forging of a Christian alliance between Protestants and 
Catholics. Given the historical anti-Catholicism of 
conservative Protestantism, however, this has not been 
without conflict, see Wilcox and Gomez (1989-90). 
12 See also, Chandler (1984); Lienesch (1982). 
Chandler discusses how certain Truths are selected for 
observance, and others ignored. 
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for example, their efforts to compel the teaching of 
creationism in public schools (see La Follette, 1983; 
Peshkin, 1986; Rose, 1988). 
Second, conservative Christians believe that the Bible 
prophesies the second coming of Christ and the arrival of 
the 'millennium, (not necessarily in that order). There 
are various versions of this scenario, more popularly known 
as Armageddon. Broadly, in order for Christ to reappear, 
the Jews must return to Palestine, whereupon the Beast and 
the Anti-Christ will engage in battle (the 'great 
tribulation'). Just before the battle begins, the saved 
Christians will be 'raptured' up from earth to meet Christ. 
Once the forces of darkness have all been eliminated, 
Christ and the Isavedf - now called saints - will return 
to reign on earth for 1,000 years (Chandler, 1984; Diamond, 
13 1989) . 
At various points, key figures have predicted the date 
upon which the 'great tribulation' would begin. For 
example, the creation of Israel was said to constitute 'the 
Jews" return' , whilst 'the Beast' was represented 
by the 
Soviet Union (Diamond, 1989: 131). Armageddon would thus 
begin with a nuclear attack (in modern scenarios) upon 
13 There is some disagreement over whether Christians 
will reign for 1,000 years before or after the second 
coming. The majority of North American conservative 
Christians are pre-millenialists - meaning Christ returns 
first. This eschatology (belief about how the world will 
end) is known as dispensationalism. 
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Israel by the USSR (Chandler, 1984: 43-4). In a different 
version, the Beast is represented by Arabs, Africans, 
Asians, and Russians, who first fight it out amongst 
themselves (again, in Israel). All Jews, with the 
exception of 144j, 000 who convert to Christianity, 14 are 
killed (along with many other unsaved) in the process. As 
the 'saved, Christians are raptured away, - the 144,000 
converted Jews take on their missionary work as the final 
battle looms. Western civilisation, led by the Anti- 
Christ, meets the Asian Beast, led by China, and all-out 
destruction ensues. Eventually, Christ and the raptured 
army of saints descend to usher in the millennium. 15 
Conservative Christian eschatology inf orms many of the 
political positions adopted by the NCR movement. For 
example, the American NCR's enthusiastic support for 
Israel, particularly in light of continued NCR antisemitism 
(Bruce, 1990). makes little sense without an understanding 
of the role Jewish people play in Armageddon. Similarly, 
the NCR's pro-defence stance is linked to the pre-ordained 
role the United States is destined to play in leading 
Western forces against the Beast from the East. However, 
it is also important to recognise that theology is not, 
despite NCR protestations, a static, unchanging world- 
14 12,000 for each of the 12 tribes of Israel - see 
Revelations: 7: 4-8. 
15 This version is put forth by Hal Lindsey in his book Late Great Planet Earth which has sold over 18 million 
copies, see Bruce (1990: 87). 
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view. The assignment of dif f erent nations to play the Beast 
and Anti-Christ roles, and the construction of a dependency 
upon specific weapons technology, is a historically 
contingent process. Biblical inerrancy and 
dispensationalist eschatology, then, is the "religious 
lens" (Klatch, 1987) through which conservative Christians 
view the world. 
F21 Politics 
Before moving on to a consideration of the New 
Christian Right organisations involved in the Mossop 
challenge, I wish to broadly outline what could be 
considered the North American NCR 'platform'. 16 Whilst 
different analysts emphasise particular constituents, the 
NCR agenda can be said to consist of the following 
positions: anti-abortion; anti-af f irmative action; anti- 
communism; anti-feminism; anti-gun control; anti- 
lesbian/gay; anti-welfare; pro-defence; pro-family; pro- 
foreign intervention. 17 Many, but not all, of these issue 
positions, overlap with a general New Right agenda; the 
16 1 can not here * trace the history of the NCR Is 
emergence, nor explain its organisation and structure. Two 
comprehensive accounts, which offer different assessments, 
are found in Steve Bruce, (1990) ; and Sara Diamond, (1989). 
The edited collection of Liebman and Wuthnow (1983) is also 
useful as is Allen Hunter's prescient analysis (1981). 
Jerome Himmelstein's (1990) book is more analytical than 
some others, and also considers the *-new right' as a whole. 
17 See Bruce (1990); Chandler (1984); Diamond (1989); 
Hunter, (1981); Jorstad (1987); Lienesch (1982). Needless 
to say, NCR activists might choose to describe their 
Political platform using different terminology. 
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American NCR was one of the most vocal proponents of the 
nuclear arms race, accompanied by strident anti-Soviet 
rhetoric (recall that both nuclear weapons and the USSR 
play key roles in the inevitable battles of Armageddon). 
Further, as Diamond (1989: 147) has shown, NCR organisations 
have actively supported right-wing groups and even death 
squads in Central America, the Philippines,, - and Southern 
Africa. NCR leaders have been amongst the severest critics 
of welfare state programmes, including affirmative action 
policies. "' With some exceptions, the Canadian 
organisations I go on to discuss adopt most of these 
positions. 
-f3l 
Organisations 
I have set out above the basic theological and 
political contours of the New Christian Right in North 
America. Now, I wish to localise this analysis, focusing 
upon specific organisations active in Canada today. I have 
chosen to examine three of these - the Salvation Army of 
18 The relationship between some of these positions 
and foundational conservative theology is not always clear, 
indicating both the NCR's absorption of a general New Right 
agenda, and the distancing of NCR leaders from their 
constituency. For example, evangelical Christianity has, 
in the United States, a large Black following, particularly 
in the south. Many of the political positions adopted by 
NCR organisations and their leaders would by no means 
reflect the beliefs of this religious constituency. An 
inquiry into the relation between the New Right and the New 
Christian Right is beyond the scope of this thesis. Whilst 
there would be much agreement between the two, areas of 
conflict include the role of religion and ideas about civil 
liberties. 
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Canada, REAL Women, and Focus on the Family (Canada) 
Association. Each organisation. is particularly active in 
anti-lesbian and gay initiatives; I have chosen them 
specifically for their involvement as legal intervenors in 
mossopj, a "gay rights' case which plays a central role in 
this thesis . 
19 The organisations which comprise the Mossop 
coalition share the aspirations of their American cousins. 
Indeed, organisations such as Focus on the Family and REAL 
Women take their inspiration, and in the former case their 
f unding, f rom similar American manifestations. 20 
Furthermore, each of these organisations, like their 
American counterparts, are primarily urban-based and 
professionally-dominated. Whilst their politics very much 
embody a reaction against 'modernist thinking', their own 
leadership, strategies, and structures are products of the 
society they wish to transform (see Lechner, 1990). 
19 In Chapter 2,1 outline the background to this case 
and in Chapter 7 analyse its judgments. There are two 
other organisations intervening with these three: the 
Evangelical Fellowship-of Canada,, an umbrella organization 
to which most of the others belong, and the Pentecostal 
Assemblies of Canada, an association of Pentecostal 
churches with a long history in Canada. For reasons of 
time and space, I have not been able to devote attention to 
these two. In Chapter* 6, F I explain what 
it means to 
'intervenef in litigation. 
20 The three other coalition members, however, are 
harder to place. The Pentecostal Assemblies, the 
Evangelical Fellowship, and the Salvation Army all have a 
long history, stretching back decades, even to the last 
century in the latter case. Their participation in the 
MO-SMS02P litigation can be seen to reflect the new agenda of 
old evangelical Christianity. Focus on the Family and 
Realwomen, on the other hand, are organisations with clear 
links to the New Right generally. 
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Them, Salvation Army 
The Salvation Army, with a history of 'social purity, 
activism (Valverde, 1991), has a mission, among other 
things, to "preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ',. 21 According 
to Don Hutchinson, the Army's legal advisor and key figure 
in the NCR Mossop intervention, 
The long term goal would be that the whole world 
come under the sway of Jesus Christ, I can't 
apologise for that... (interview) 
Nevertheless, as I go on to show, the Army remains, to some 
extent,, a reluctant member of the "New Christian Right 
movement'. Salvationists share few non-family-related 
policies with other NCR organisations, and leaders wish to 
maintain the Army"s identity as distinct from those with 
whom it joins in "short term coalitions" (Hutchinson 
interview). " 
Focus on the Family Association (Canada) 
Focus on the Family Association (FFA), a branch of a 
much larger American Christian corporation, is a relative 
newcomer to the Canadian political scene. Focus' 
"statement of faith" reads: 
We believe the Bible to be the only infallible, 
authoritative Word of God. We believe that there 
is only one God, eternally existent in three 
persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. We believe 
in the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, in His 
21 The Salvation Army Positional Statementst Canada 
and Bermuda Territory, 1990. 
22 For historical information on the Army see Coutts 
(1974); Handy (1976) ; Valverde (1991). See also Submission 
Of the Salvation Army to the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, January, 1991. 
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virgin Birth, in His sinless life, in His 
miracles, in His vicarious and atoning death 
through His shed blood, in His bodily 
resurrection, in His ascension to the right hand 
of the Father,, and in His personal return to 
power and glory. We believe that for the 
salvation of lost and sinful man, regeneration by 
the Holy Spirit is absolutely essential.... 23 
The organisationts structures, resources, and strategies 
are modelled on FFAI s American parent,, which, in turn, 
emerged out of the explosion of 'new, Christian groups in 
the 1970s. 24 Focus on the Family advises parents and their 
children on how to maintain Christian life in a secular 
world, 25 and, increasingly, seeks to influence the public 
26 
policy-making process. The organisation publishes a wide 
variety of magazines geared to different audiences, and has 
established a network of radio stations across the 
continent. 
27 
23 Focus on the Family, with Dr. James Dobson, Special 
Introductory Issue, 1990. 
24 FFA (U. S. ),, in addition to maintaining its 
telecommunications empire, operates the Washington-based 
Family Research Council, *a right-wing think-tank. 
25 Books published include, Guiding Your Family in a 
Migggided World and How to Know God's Will. 
26 For example, in 1991 Focus urged the Canadian 
government to delay ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as 'parental rights' 
were not recognised within it, see Letter from J. Sclater 
to Friends, FFA, 14 June 1991. 
27 See generally, Focus on the Family in Canada: 
Purpose and Services, Vancouver, 1991. 
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RF, AL Women of Canada 
REAL Women is an all-Canadian organisation, formed in 
1984 as part of a right-wing backlash to the perceived 
gains of those RW terms "radical feminists', (Anderson, 
interview; see also Erwin,, 1988a). The organisation "s 
activities consist predominantly of contesting every demand 
made by their feminist adversaries ; 28 they have also 
maintained a vociferous opposition to lesbian and gay 
rights. 29 
REAL Women is also an organisation of the New 
Christian Right, a connection often overlooked as the 
organisation itself chooses not to publicise this fact. 
Nevertheless, Lorna Erwin's (1988b) research, referred to 
above, indicates that conservative Christianity is the 
common bond of REAL Women supporters. Consider also, the 
words of Judy Anderson,, current president of the 
organisation. 
28 REAL Women is against: publicly-funded feminism, 
pornography,, liberal divorce laws, equal pay for women, 
publicly-provided universal childcare, and tax policies 
which are perceived to encourage family breakdown. They 
are for: The Family, heterosexuality, marriage, motherhood 
and homemaking. See, for example, Position Papers, 
Pamphlet, REAL Women,, n. d.; Who We Are: Brief to the 
Members of Parliament, 19 November 1985, REAL Women, Pub. 
No. 6; Pornography In Canada, Pamphlet, REAL Women, n. d.; 
Easy Divorce?, Pamphlet, REAL Women, n. d.; Equal Pay For 
UnEcfual Work, Pamphlet, REAL Women, n. d.; Child Care: Whose 
Responsibility, Pamphlet, REAL Women, n. d.; and various 
issues of REAL Women's newsletter Reality-Up-Date. 
29 Laws Protectinq Homosexuals or so-called "Sexual 
Orientation" Legislation: How it will affect Canadians, 
Pamphlet, REAL Women, 1985. 
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e9. [f or] those of us who are Christians, 30 
religious faith is very important... [but] one of 
the last things Im going to do unless asked 
about it is talk about my f aith ... Christianity is low man on the totem pole, anyone can give a kick 
at Christianity and get away with it .... an amazing amount of people would totally dismiss 
me, oh, she"s just a Christian, she"s just a 
fundamentalist, so, I don't go out there and talk 
about my faith - why would I? It"s the whipping boy now ... we're pretty careful about putting our faith on the front burner ... wefre all going to be 
pretty careful about where and when we talk in 
those terms. (interview )31 
I do not consider these three organisations as a 
monolithic bloc; on the contrary, in the ensuing pages 
have tried to distinguish their perspectives and politics 
as often as possible. Nevertheless, their vehement, 
oppositional position to lesbian and gay equality has 
facilitated their coming together as a 'legal coalition'; 
this opposition, rooted in their theology, is their common 
bond. 
These, then, are the organisations whichr together 
with the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada, and the 
Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, make up the Mossop 
30 According to Erwin's data (1988b), all REAL Women 
members are Christian. Although the organisation claims to 
have Jewish and Muslim members, every one of the RW 
respondents to Erwin's survey identified themselves as 
Christian, and she has found no other evidence to 
substantiate RWIs claim to religious diversity (Erwin, 
personal communication to author). 
31 The significance of conservative 
the lives of anti-feminist women is also 
Himmelstein (1986) in his research into ani 
He concludes that common religious beliefs 
what, more than anything else, such women 
Klatch (1987) and Erwin (1988). 
Christianity in 
noted by Jerome 
: i-ERA campaigns. 
and networks are 
share. See also 
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coalition partners. In total, they present a rather 
comprehensive picture of right-wing 'moral (and economic) 
reform' politics in Canada today. Their leaderships are 
comprised of teachers, lawyers, psychologists, and other 
professionals, their memberships are relatively well-off, 
and deeply Christian. 
Sexual Politics 
I have chosen to draw out the four themes I consider 
most prevalent from my review of these organisations, 
texts. 32 First, the conceptualisation of 'the family, as 
the fundamental, God-given unit of society, including a 
narrow and limited definition of what 'the family, can be. 
Intimately related to this is the NCR's construction of 
traditional gender roles as pre-ordained and absolutely 
imperative to social well-being. Second, the construction 
of homosexuality as sinful, diseased behaviour. The NCRfs 
analysis is focused on the perceived activities of gay men; 
'the lesbian' is almost completely absent from these 
discussions. Third, the depiction of a homosexual fifth 
column', an enemy within' conspiring to subvert the family 
using various techniques, including mind-control The 
furthering of the 'homosexual agenda, is related to the 
perceived power of the , secular humanist" (or "radical 
feminist") conspiracy generally. Fourth, the articulation 
32 In Chapter 11 discuss some of the problems 
relating to the selection and analysis of these "texts". 
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of children with risk, vulnerability, and moral health. 
Ultimately related to their views on Family, children are 
constituted as simultaneously pure, and extremely 
vulnerable to a process of corruption. The fear of losing 
children (to the secularist culture) lies deep within NCR 
discourses. 
33 
Underlying and emerging within these themes is the 
NCR, ' s construction of sexuality itself , as something fluid, 
changeable, and vulnerable to persuasion. The 
organisations considered here take pains to deny any 
biological factors in producing homosexuality; indeed they 
attribute such explanations to gay rights opportunists 
seeking state protection. The NCR's perspective on 
sexuality is intimately related to its construction of 
gender. Male and female 'opposites', whose purpose is to 
procreate within marriage, are viewed as God-given Truths. 
NCR opposition to lesbian and gay equality cannot be 
understood without taking account of how this opposition is 
rooted in their desire to strengthen, model, and reproduce 
patriarchal gender relations. And, furtherr how the 
inspiration and authority for this desire is taken, 
literally, from the conservative Christian tradition. 
33 There is a fifth theme - that of rights versus 
responsibilities. I have discussed the politics Of rights 
extensively in Chapter 4. 
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_f 
11 "The fainilyff 
Whilst coalition members give different emphases to 
other themes, all consistently reiterate the primacy of 
"the family, . 
34 According to Focus on the Family 
Association, "the family is a God-ordained institution and 
not just something that evolved in the human race,, . 
35 
"The 
family",, states the Salvation Army, is "the primary social 
unit in society". 36 According to Judy Anderson, REAL Women 
president, the family is "the cornerstone, the basic 
building block of society" (interview). 
Above all, what defines 'the family, is marriage. It 
is not an abstract conception of "family" that is God- 
given. 
... God"s intention for mankind is that society 
should be ordered on 'the basis of lifelong, 
legally sanctioned, heterosexual unions. Such 
unions (marriage) lead to the formation of social 
units (families) which are essential to human 
personal development and 
37 
therefore to the 
stability of the community . 
Marriage is for life, that is Godfs Plan. 
34 Concern for "the familyf is not the sole province 
of conservative Christians. other Christians, and many 
liberals generally, prioritise the family, and define it in 
various ways. What distinguishes the Christian 
conservatives are the perceived threats to the family, as 
well as a particularly exclusive definition of the unit, 
for discussion of conservative and liberal approaches to 
'the familyr, see Cooper and Herman (1991). 
35 Letter from J. A. Sclater to Studentr FFAI 20 March 
1991. 
36 The Salvation Army Positional Statements, Canada 
and Bermuda Territory, 1990, p. 18. 
37 The Salvation Army Positional Statementsf Canada 
and Bermuda Territory, 1990, p. 12. 
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We believe that the institution of marriage is a 
permanent, life-long relationship between a man 
and a woman, regardless of trials, sickness, 
financial reverses or emotional stresses that may 
ensue. 38 
These ideas are consistently reiterated throughout the 
materials of REAL Women as well. As Erwin (1988b) has 
documented, the Canadian pro-family movement is 
fundamentally concerned with perceived threats to marriage, 
such as divorce, alcoholism, and, of course, homosexuality. 
This rigid prescription of gender roles is 
characteristic of NCR family discourse generally. 39 The 
organisations of the Mossop coalition, for the most part, 
do not diverge f rom this pattern. According to Jim Sclater 
of Focus on the Family, 
We know that God designed women to have a 
nurturing ef f ect on children, male and f emale, we 
know that men are supposed to have not only a 
nurturing effect but to demonstrate the more 
aggressive role of the hunter, down through 
various civilisations ... (interview) 
In keeping with this, a Focus on the Family magazine 
directs women to "make the home a haven" for their 
38 Focus on the Family, with Dr. James Dobson, Special 
Introductory Issue, 1990, p. 2. 
39 The theo logical ly-based NCR prescription for f amily 
and gender roles is discussed in Diamond (1989: 104-10); 
Erwin (1988) ; Hadden (1983) ; Hunter (1981: 129-130) ; Jorstad 
(1987: 79-80) ; Klatch (1987) ; Mathews and De Hart (1990: 163- 
4 and Chapter 8). For a critical discussion of New Right 
conservative theory on gender, see David and Levitas 
(1988). 
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husbands, and be his "helpmate". " Erwin's (1988b) survey 
data shows that an overwhelming majority of REAL Women 
respondents believe that women should not undertake full- 
time employmenti, that motherhood has been devalued by 
feminism, and that liberal divorce laws and public child 
41 care provision undermine the family. Women and men, 
according to REAL Women, Focus on the Family, and the NCR 
generally, are not the same, and thus 'equality" is an 
inappropriate goale 42 
At the same time, however, the NCR explicitly urges 
Christian women to action; they are not to become 
completely 'family focused'. On the contrary, the 
publications of Focus and REAL Women exhort women to 'take 
up arms I in the struggle. One Focus magazine explains how 
43 you can "lobby Congress from your kitchen" . Dobson and 
Bauer (1990: 261) do not idly state that "women are the key" 
to Christian battles. The REAL Women organisation's own 
40 M. Hodgson, "'10 Ways Wives Can Say "I Love You"', r 
Focus on the Family Magazine, June 1991, p-11. 
41 1 stress again that these are not necessarily the 
views of conservative Christians generally, just those of 
the organisational memberships. 
42 See also, RealitV UP-Date, November 1984, p-5 and 
the contributions of Laura McA-rthur and Gwen Landolt, two 
Canadian anti- feminists, to Rowland, ed. (1984). Once 
again, however, the Salvation Army is somewhat of an "odd 
L man I out,, in this debate as it tends not to directly 
engage in prescribing strict gender roles; indeed, the Army 
has been seen as a religious pioneer in breaking down work- 
related gender discrimination. 
43 V. 5(9) Citizen, 16 September 1991. 
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success is necessarily predicated upon the politicisation 
and activation of women cadres, 
44 
The NCR's construction of gender and the family is 
thus a contradictory one. On the one hand, underlying the 
NCRI's anti-lesbian and gay agenda is a conception of God- 
ordained family structure, based on life-long marriage 
between a man and a woman, each of whom knows their place. 
At the same time, the 'subservient, woman is constituted 
through Christian rhetoric as a political actor, an 
important member of the 'army of saintsf; her role being 
to assist in the preservation of the God-ordained family 
unit. I now wish to consider how the NCR represents 
homosexuality as a threat to fThe Family's' moral order. 
-f2l 
FThe homosexual" 
Consider the following statement, released for public 
consumption by REAL Women during a 1986 federal 
parliamentary debate on lesbian and gay equality. 
The homosexual seeks sex in the young age group. 
As he ages, when he begins to lose his 
attractiveness, he resorts to buying sex. That 
need has given rise to a subculture or [sic] 
prostitution of boys and younger men in inner 
cities ... 
44 Studies of conservative Christian communities show 
how women negotiate power, rarely feeling completely 
k Powerless'. The women emphasise how, whilst gender roles 
are necessarily different and rigidly circumscribed, within 
the religious community neither is necessarily valued more highly than the other. See, for example, Ammerman (1987); 
Rose (1989); McNamara (1985). 
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The new findings on AIDS have destroyed the idea 
that the "gay rights" movement doesnlt injure any 
one, and that what they do is their "own business". Homosexuals are a medical threat to 
their own sex, to those who require blood 
transfusions, to the promiscuous and their 
unknowing spouses. Homosexual food handlers are 
a frequent source of hepatitis outbreaks. 
Homosexual spouses expose their mates to a wide 
variety of diseases ... The damage to homosexuals themselves goes far beyond their medical 
problems. Their conduct leads to devastating 
psychological consequences ... 
Many homosexuals, because they cannot procreate, 
must recruit - often the yo , ung. 
They promote 
recruiting "straights". With new legislation 
such seduction becomes permissable and 
acceptable. 45 
One of the first notable aspects of this Fanalysis, is that 
it is entirely male-focused. REAL Women conjures up the 
familiar spectre of the sick, depraved, predator, seeking 
out young boys to "buy" (presumably, fthe homosexual' is 
too ugly and disgusting to get sex for free) in order to 
engage in assorted perversions. The reader's mind is 
immediately filled with images of filth and rotting flesh, 
a kind of 'Dorian Gray' picture of ugliness and depravity. 
Their victims, in contrast, are innocent, pure, young boys. 
These activities do not, however, take place on a 
purely individual level. A "subculture of prostitution, 
exists, implying a network of homosexual paedophilia in the 
heart of the "inner cities". Inner cities, themselves, 
45 Laws Protecting Homosexuals Or So-Called "Sexual 
Legislation: How it will affect Canadianst 
Pamphlet, REAL Women,, n. d.. The spectre of ", homosexual 
rights% was invoked in similar language by anti-feminist 
campaigners during the American ERA battlesf see Mathews 
and De Hart (1990: 166-7). 
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seem to represent the corruption of innocent (male) youth. 46 
logical chain of I self-evident' assertions is established 
in the excerpt: homosexual men seek sex with young boys; 
as homosexuals age they "lose their attractiveness,,; they 
then must "buy" sex with young boys; initiating the boys 
into a "culture of prostitution". 
Related to REAL Woments construction of the predatory 
paedophile, is the organisationts implication that 
homosexuals are insinuating themselves into the fabric of 
traditional society. Their 'diseased tentacles, are 
grasping at young men and boys, not simply for sex, but in 
order to "recruit" them. Here, REAL Women evokes both 
anti-communist and antisemitic imagery. On the one hand, 
homosexuals seek recruits for an ever-expanding network of 
subversion. At the same time, their self-reproduction 
threatens a 'take over', a rat-like infestation and germ- 
spreading reminiscent of Nazi propaganda 
f ilMS. 47 
Interestingly, homosexuals recruit because they 
"cannot procreate" - Leaving aside the 
biological 
inaccuracies, REAL Women seems to be suggesting that 
heterosexuals do not need to recruit because they do 
procreate. Homosexuals require, RW argues, a 'Pool' Of 
other homosexuals to have sex with, hence they 'recruit', 
46 The portrayal of the "corrupt inner cityf also 
has 
deep racist implications in NCR ideology, see below. 
47 
1 discuss these links further below. 
191 
encouraging others to become homosexual - this is their 
means of reproduction. The implication that can be taken 
is that sexuality is Political - it can be inculcated, like 
any other ideology. I discuss this point further,, in 
relation to child sexuality, below. 
413 
Lesbians are notably absent from the discussion It 
is, in this case, unlikely that "he,, was meant to imply Fhe 
and she'. The image is a familiar one, often evoked with 
respect to gay men. 49 More recently, as Ross (1988) has 
argued,, REAL Women has increasingly directed its fury at 
lesbian feminists. One of the organisationfs chief 
villains has been the federal Secretary of State Women's 
Programme, which has, from time to time, provided minimal 
funding to lesbian groups. REAL Women's efforts to stop 
this happening, and win its own grants, has encouraged the 
production of a specifically anti-lesbian rhetoric. 
However,, Judy Anderson, when interviewed, explicitly 
48 The current president of REAL Women, Judy Andersonr 
took pains when interviewed to distance herself from the 
% predatory paedophilial theme. Speaking, as she put it 
"personally", Anderson does "not" see the abuse of children 
to be the key problem around homosexuality - "I don"t see 
the general homosexual population going after kids like 
that". However, as the discussion continued, she began to 
associate gay attempts to reform the criminal law of 
consent with paedophilia. She noted that, as we spoke, her 
"tune was changing", and that she needed to "keep her eye 
on people". 
49 See Conservative comments during Bill 7 struggle, 
Chapter 3. See also, speech by Lord Halsbury during 
British parliamentary debate on sexuality, where lesbians 
are explicitly distinguished from the predatory, diseased 
'homosexual,, quoted in Cooper and Herman (1991). 
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excluded lesbians from any Potential threat to children 
posed by homosexuality. 
Themes of sex, disease, and depravity are most clearly 
expressed by Focus on the Family Association. Indeed, this 
organisation's fascination with the explicit details of 
homosexual sexual practices is profound. I will use two 
texts as illustration: an American Focus publication 
entitled The Homosexual Agenda, and my interview with Jim 
Sclater, National Director of Public Policy for the 
Canadian branch. 
Brad Hayton"s The Homosexual Agenda: Changing Your 
Community and Nation is primarily a community action manual 
for Christian activists. It is directed at individuals who 
have likely not as yet been involved in anti-gay 
campaigning, and Hayton offers helpful suggestions on 
drafting letters, influencing school boards, conducting 
meetings, and selecting appropriate prayers. The bulk of 
the manual contains a series of , secular" arguments and 
" facts, ' about homosexuality that activists can write in 
their letters, say on radio shows, and generally arm 
themselves with. 
You know that homosexuality is wrong, and you 
believe it is wrong because the Bible says so. 
'Because the Bible says so' is the bottom-line 
argument for the Christian. And yet using the 
Bible does not always convince your 
representative, city councilman, or friend of the 
soundness of your opinion. They probably donft 
believe in the Bible. You need other arguments 
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for your beliefs--arguments that they are more likely to hear and accept (9). 50 
After briefly reviewing arguments about conflicting 
rights, Hayton narrows his discussion to the theme which 
dominates the book - disease. According to Hayton, 
"homosexuals have many more sexually transmitted diseases 
than heterosexuals 11 (12) . Referring to several articles 
from reputable medical journals, Hayton argues that, ""Gay 
rights' laws merely protect and promote STDs ... In the case 
of AIDS, it is a licence to kill" (12). Citing newspaper 
articles from 1979 and 1980, he states that, in San 
Francisco, the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases 
increased after the passage of gay rights laws. 51 The 
footnotes to this section of the manual explicitly discuss 
syphilis, rectal infection, 11 gay bowel syndrome",, 
gonorrhoea, herpes, and assorted other conditions to which 
'homosexuals, are presumably prey. Again, the primary, 
almost the sole, object of scrutiny is the gay man, 
although this is rarely made explicit. 
The manual then goes on to claim that 'homosexuals' 
molest children regularly, and, in a statement of 'fact' I 
have not seen reported elsewhere in NCR literature, that 
50 In the following chapter, I consider more closely 
the relationship between Christian, and other forms of 
knowledge. 
51 Such laws barely existed during the period to which 
Hayton ref ers. 
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Out'of all the mass murders in the U. S. over the 
past 17 years, homosexuals killed at least 68% of 
the victims, were implicated in at least 41% of 
the sets of crimes, committed 70% of the 10 worst 
murder sets, and were involved in five of the 
eight murder sets perpetrated by two or more 
people (15). 
The authority for this claim is a publication entitled 
'Murder, Violence and Homosexuality,, published by the 
Institute for the Scientific Investigation of Sexuality, a 
right-wing Christian research facility. 
Quickly, howeverr Hayton returns to his f avourite 
theme - the specific sexual practices which 'cause, 
specific diseases. Male homosexuals have higher incidences 
of every possible disease than their heterosexual 
counterparts, including lice (16). Lesbians make an 
appearance here as well. 
In comparison to heterosexual females, lesbians 
are 19 times more apt to have had syphilis, 2 
times more apt to have had genital warts, 4 times 
more apt to have had scabies, 7 times more apt to 
have had an infection from vaginal contact, 29 
times more apt to have had an oral infection f rom 
vaginal contact, and 12 times more apt to have 
ever had an oral infection from penile 
contact(16). 
Again, the authority f or this statement is a publication of 
the Institute for the Scientific Investigation of Sexuality 
(fn. 12). The other reference for these 'facts' is to an 
article entitled, 'National Case-Control Study of Kaposils 
Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Carnii Pneumonia in Homosexual 
Ment - one can not but doubt that information on lesbian 
diseasesf would have been found here. 
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Hayton then moves on to detail the specific behaviours 
that cause I these conditions - Readers are advised that 
"only adults" should read on as "graphically detailed 
homosexual behaviour" is depicted. We are then presented 
with a series of homosexual sexual practices (some 
differentiation between the practices of men and women is 
occasionally made): "the insertion of the penis into the 
rectum of sex partners" causing "fecal material,, to "enter 
through the urethral,; "inserting the tongue into or licking 
the anus"; "eating and/or rubbing themselves with the 
faeces of partners" ("homosexual men ingest, on the 
average, the fecal material of 23 different men per year"); 
"urinating or defecating on their partners"; 
"sadomasochism"; "handballing or fisting where the hand and 
arm are inserted into the anus up the rectum"; "drinking 
urine"; this is only a selection of what Hayton offers the 
reader as linformationt and Fargument'(16). Most of this 
section is not footnoted. Hayton continues by giving 
statistics on the number of sex partners "homosexuals" have 
in an average year (hundreds) (16), concluding that "sodomy 
laws protect communities and the nation from disease" 
A subsequent section on fthe homosexual agenda in 
education " begins by disputing the data about how many 
homosexuals there are in the U. S. (the 1 in 10 figure), but 
quickly lapses back into discussions about "anal 
intercourse, eating faeces, drinking urine, engaging 
in 
fisting, and pouring urine over one another" (22). Another 
I 
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section, about 'domestic partnership, legislation, 
discusses a number of issues, including parental rights, 
role modelling, and so on, but again concludes with fdatal 
about child molestation, "f ecal and urine ingestion, sado- 
masochism, fisting, fellatio, etc.,, (27). The manual,, s 
final section, ""Gay Pride" Demonstrations /Parades F, once 
again details all these things, and the accompanying 
'question and answer' sheet does so over again. ; L- 
For Jim Sclater, public policy director of the 
Canadian Focus branch, homosexuals are typical of an 
"everything goes" society, that has extended "sexual 
licence" well beyond acceptable limits. "You wouldn't 
believe", Sclater constantly repeated, "what these people 
get up to 11 (interview) . 
... homosexuality is destructive of the image of 
god that was put into the person and is medically 
destructive. My own doctor, years ago, said that 
if anybody were to see the wreckage of human 
flesh that comes into his office as a result of 
homosexual, particularly male, practices they 
wouldn't be very impressed with it as a 
lifestyle... it's a chemical addiction, any sexual 
activity generates that chemical and people don't 
want to go for long without it ... they need 
another hit... 
... we agree that any human being should 
have 
housing, but I'll tell ya some of the homosexual 
practices that take place in housing, it would be 
hard to be on the side of the tenants ... I can't 
even talk about some of the stuff these landlords 
have to put up with... (Sclater, interview) 
Sclater's focus on the health aspects of homosexual 
behaviour is typical of the organisation which has, 
strategically,, chosen to develop this line of argument 
instead of the deeper biblical prohibitions which shape 
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their selection of authoritative 'scientific data'. It was -t 
Sclater who gladly provided me with a copy of Brad Hayton's 
The Homosexual Agenda. 
I have presented the perspective of Focus on the 
Family Association in some detail for two key reasons, 
first,, as an illustration of a predominant- theme in NCR 
literature - that of homosexual disease and depravity. 
Various writers have considered how sexuality and the body 
have been conceived and regulated in different historical 
periods; the articulation of sex with disease, death, 
cities, and sin is not new. 52 More recently, much 
theoretical work has been done on the cultural production 
53 
of a specifically AIDS-related medical-moral discourse . 
For many conservative Christians, AIDS was a portent, a 
sign of the great tribulation to come (Palmer, 1990). In 
the popular, and particularly the Christian, imagination 
AIDS has signified the revenge of God, the contamination of 
the race, and the pollution of the nation. AIDS-inspired 
rhetoric of disease and blood has provided a modern 
expression of old metaphors (Gilman, 1985,1988; Sontag, 
54 1988) . 
52 See Foucault (1976); Weeks (1981); Mort (1987); 
Walkowitz (1980); Valverde (1991). 
53 Altman (1986) ; Patton (1985, r 1990) Crimp, ed. (1988); Sontag (1988); Williamson (1989). 
54 Interestingly, the recent texts of Focus on the 
Family, REAL Women and other similar organisations, are not 
AIDS-obsessed. Whilst HIV remains an important symbol of 
the consequences of homosexual activity, other illnesses, 
infections, and disease syndromes play an equally important 
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The New Christian Right has available to it 
ChristianityFs historical construction of devils, of which 
, Jews' form the first, and forever recurring, leitmotif. 
Within different historical periods,, this enemy" also 
takes other forms - witches, communists, homosexuals, and 
so on. 5' of ten, adversaries display characteristics common 
to several Christian devils; for example, the association 
of Jewish men with effeminacy, or the articulation of 
communists with homosexuals and Jews during the McCarthy 
witch-hunts. Indeed, much of the rhetoric deployed by the 
NCR against 'homosexuals, (and communists before them) is 
directly traceable to Christian antisemitic discourses. As 
Mosse (1985) and Gilman (1985,1988) have shown, Jews were 
historically associated with disease, corruption, child 
abuse, madness, criminality, filth, sexual degeneracy, and 
56 
urban decay (c-unong other things) . 
Within the Christian tradition, the power of 'devil 
construction, is immense. It binds Christian communities 
discursive role. 
55 See re historical Christian anti-communism: Speer 
(1984) and Wilcox (1987-88). See re articulation of 
communism with homosexuality, L. Edelman (1992); D'Emilio 
(1989); Faderman (1991), and re homosexuality and anti- 
semitism, Mosse (1985) and Gilman (1985,1988). 
56 In Canada, a central Christian **devil' has been 
Henry Morgentaler, the Jewish doctor who pioneered abortion 
practice and services. He has played the historical role 
Of 'Jewish baby killer I, and his experience as a Holocaust 
survivor has also played a complex role within anti-choice 
rhetoric. 
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together in a common purpose; in addition, as Murray -- 
Edelman (1988: 68-87) has noted, the identification of 
"enemies" is central to the self-identities of those 
pointing the finger. Just as there can be no 'saved, if 
there are no 'unsaved', the 'diseased, depraved homosexual' 
is a necessary figure for the self-constitution of morally 
pure, Christian soldiers, 
57 
New Christian Right activists are no doubt aware of 
the resonances this rhetoric has within collective 
consciousness; whilst the authors of these texts no doubt 
"believe, their own claims, Hayton, Sclater, and others 
also explicitly acknowledge that their deployment and re- 
articulation of this 'old' discourse is strategic. They 
perceive it as a way of communicating, a language to convey 
their politics to a wider audience. 
In addition to presenting this continuity of loathing, 
have, in this section, also sought to show the extent to 
which lesbian and gay lives, or, more accurately, 
perceptions, speculations, and imaginings about lesbian and 
gay lives, play a pornographic role in NCR discourse. The 
relish with which these activities are related, and 
endlessly repeated, in graphic detail, complete with 
57 During the Bill 7 struggle, a Catholic anti- 
communist organisation produced a newsletter identifying 
homosexuals with communism and the destruction of a 
'Christian Canada'. See 'Where is Canada Heading', 
Canadian Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and 
Property (January-February 1987). 
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explicit descriptions of various body fluids (and solids) 
reveals the ways in which, arguably, conservative 
Christians express their own sexual needs and fantasies, 
and in so doing, produce pornographic text. 
This is not a novel point. Various writers have noted 
how, for example, the details of Flesbian sext are related 
by fascinated judges during lesbian custody decisions (eg: 
Eaton,, 1991). Others have deconstructed the rape trial as 
a form of pornography for the attending male voyeurs 
(Smart, 1989). NCR authors, whilst seemingly intending to 
induce shocked horror in their audiences, at the same time 
provide their constituency with tapproved, pornography - 
objectifying, degrading, and explicitly sexualising 
lesbians and gay men in the process. 
Alone amongst the three, the Salvation Army refrains 
from participating in this 'devil construction', perhaps 
because the Army's history has ensured that its perspective 
on 'the city, is a more sensitive one, attuned more to the 
social factors which shape individual behaviour. It has 
refused to become publicly embroiled in what, according to 
Don Hutchinson, their legal advisor, might be perceived as 
"gay bashing" (interview). The Army consistently 
reiterates the biblical prohibitions, and the Christian 
basis of their opposition to certain elements of the 
lesbian and gay rights agenda. Yet, images of debaucheryt 
disease, orifices and their contents, and sex itself are 
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notably absent from their texts. The Salvation Army has 
thus chosen to join forces with organisations that engage 
in what even Hutchinson might agree is virulent "gay 
baBhing "- 
58 
[31 Secular humanism and the homosexual lenem v within, 
Nothing short of a great Civil War of Values 
rages today throughout North America. Two sides 
with vastly differing and incompatible worldviews 
are locked in a bitter conflict that permeates 
every level of society. Bloody battles are being 
fought on a thousand fronts, both inside and 
outside of government. open any daily newspaper 
and you"ll find accounts of the latest 
Gettysburg, Waterloo, Normandy, or Stalingrad. 
Instead of fighting for territory or military 
conquest, however, the struggle now is for the 
hearts and minds of the people. It is a war over 
ideas. And someday soon, I believe, a winner 
will emerge and the loser will fade from memory 
(Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 19-20) (emph. orig. ]. 
The theme of anti-Christian conspiracy has a long 
history -from the betrayal of Jesus, to the more modern 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and continued in recent 
years through Cold War rhetoric. It is, of course, the 
' devils I, described above, who conspire together to f urther 
Satanic agendas. Conservative Christians, despite their 
relative religious hegemony and imperialist conquests, have 
created a self-culture of heroic resistance to 
58 It is my view, however, that Hutchinson and the 
Army, and the coalition"s lawyers McCarthy Tetreaultr 
remain uninformed (perhaps deliberately so) about Focus's 
Politics, see Chapter 6. 
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conspiratorial attack - historically from Jews, Muslims, 
and communists, amongst others. For the NCR, the 'secular 
humanist conspiracy' is a central ideological tenet . 
59 For 
evangelicals, secular humanists are any people who do not 
accept biblical truth and the divinity of Jesus (among 
other things) - thus,, the phrase is not used solely to 
refer to atheists. Rather, secular humanists can be, and 
often are, other Christians - those who deny the literal 
truth of the bibles, 'revisionists, who re-interpret 
doctrine, and so on. They are, of course, anyone who seeks 
to upset god-given categories of gender and sexuality as 
well. In recent years, the chief villains have appeared as 
"radical feminists" and "homosexual activists". 
A recent book by James Dobson (1990), the American 
founder of Focus on the Family, and co-authored with Gary 
Bauer, an ex-Reagan advisor, details the extent of the 
secular humanist conspiracy, and the role of the lesbian 
and gay movement within it. Following the Civil War of 
Values quote reproduced above, Dobson argues that Christian 
tradition and belief (upon which the United States was 
founded) have, in the last thirty years, come under 
increasing attack from a value-system advocating a "new 
morality" namely, --secular humanism" where 
59 For discussions see, Bruce (1990); Diamond 
(1989: 84-5); Heinz (1983: 134-5); Jorstad (1987: 28-34). On 
the role of conspiracy theories generally, see Davis 
(1971). 
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"prohibitions dissolved, rules changed, restrictions f aded, 
and guilt subsided" (Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 20-21). 
It would be inaccurate to call the social 
reorientation of American thought and behaviour 
a 'conspiracy' per se, because it was not 
centrally coordinated. No high level czars 
determined society's course in some mysterious 
smoke-filled room. On the other hand, we are 
convinced that those who despise the Judeo- 
Christian system of values - and there are many - 
worked on a hundred independent fronts to 
produce a common objective. 
As the civil war grows more heated in recent 
years, they have laboured much more closely to 
accomplish their goals. Can there be any doubt 
that the ACLU, National Organisation for Women, 
the National Abortion Rights Action League, 
People for the American Way, political liberals, 
and others have joined forces to drive for final 
victory? (Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 108-109) 
(emph. orig. ] 
Throughout the text, 'secular humanists, are also 
referred to as a "cultural elite" that has established 
itself in positions from which are produced 
expressions that invade and destroy "the homeland" 
and Bauer, 1990: 43). 
cultural 
(Dobson 
With continual propaganda injected into the 
culture,, the centre f inally caves in. Good 
people become afraid or unwilling to stand in 
front of what appears to be an on-rushing train. 
Tradition yields - the old beliefs recede. What 
was unacceptable and offensive becomes the norm 
(Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 115-116). 60 
In this way, Focus 11 activists identify, as does REAL Womeni, 
large urban centres, particularly those on each American 
coast,, as sources of contagion. Nationalist and anti- 
60 One edition of Focus's political magazine was 
entirely devoted to media bias during an anti-abortion 
%rescue, operation, see V. 5(11) Citizen, 18 November 
1991. 
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modernist rhetoric are mixed to tell a story of increasing 
moral crisis, intended to inspire Christians to action. 
However, the battle won't be easy. 
While all of this is going on, many of us in the 
church go about our business and pretend not to 
notice. The great army of believers could still 
turn the tide of battle if it awakens in time, 
but thus far only a courageous minority has been 
willing to defend the beloved homeland with their 
lives (Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 22-23). 
The word "homeland" has familiar ethnocentric connotations 
within ideologies of nationalism ; 
61 
elsewhere in the book, 
not-so-subtle racist language and imagery is used when 
discussing 'the Black Family', drug use, and urban poverty 
(Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 29). The word also conjures up the 
" land of the home I - the f amily - f or it is here, 
particularly in the realm of child and adolescent 
sexuality, that the authors perceive one of the greatest 
threats to the Christian mission. I pursue this further in 
a subsequent section. 
In attempting to defend the "homeland"j, the realm of 
'culturef, as a terrain of ideological struggle, is 
identified as key. Dobson and Bauer's book contains an 
entire chapter devoted to 'The Battle over Words'. 
"Words,,, they argue, "do matter, [they] are the currency of 
discourse,, (1990: 217). Words are the "bullets" of "war" 
used to "advance the modernist agenda" (Dobson and Bauer, 
19 90 :2 18) . 
61 See generally, Mosse (1985); Parker et al., eds. 
(1992); Seidel and Gunther (1988). 
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More recently, and no doubt partially as a result of 
the decreasing significance of the 'Soviet threat', the NCR 
is focusing its energies and its fears upon the lesbian and 
gay movement, one of , in their view, the key players in the 
conspiracy. 
Today there are few political and social 
movements as aggressive, powerful, or successful 
as 'gay rightsf advocates. Homosexuality is no 
longer considered a dysfunction but rather an 
orientation or a sexual preference". If you 
oppose homosexuality or condemn it from a moral 
perspective, you risk being labelled I homophobic I 
-a 'sickness' described as a fear or loathing of 
homosexuality (Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 107). 
In the authors F view, the lesbian and gay movement has been 
tremendously successful linguistically. Their cultural 
advances in re-defining and re-interpreting traditional 
concepts have been enormous. 
This brings us to yet another verbal phenomenon - 
the recreation of new words - new weapons to be 
used in the civil war. If homosexuality is not 
considered abnormal, something else called 
homophobia is. Homophobia is an abnormal fear of 
and revulsion to homosexuality. The word is 
routinely levelled at anyone who opposes the gay 
rights agenda. It is now commonly used in the 
leading newspapers in the country and by trendy 
talk show hosts ... 
This redefinition of an old word homosexuality 
- and the creation of a new word homophobia - 
is not a minor event or a mere curiosity. 
Through these semantic changes, normalcy is put 
on the defensive (1990: 223). 
Dobson and Bauer's analysis here is reminiscent of 
'Postmodern' approaches to social struggle, which emphasise 
the significance of language. Unlike many marxist critics, 
who minimise the significance of linguistic reforms' (see 
Chapter 4), these conservative Christians argue that 
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current social struggles are nothing more, nor less, than 
contests over meanings and interpretations. Thus, the 
, success" of "homosexual activists' has, for Dobson and 
Bauerr Irealff Imaterialf consequences. 
In I proving f the f homosexual conspiracy f, Focus on the 
Family Association points to the perceived infiltration of 
the "homosexual agenda" into schools, media, and 
government. 62 In newsletters directed at their own 
readership, quoting heavily from American publications like 
Dobson and Bauer,, s book discussed above, the Canadian 
branch draws attention to an immediate and serious threat. 
Focus goes so far as to argue that "virtually all 
materials presented in the public school system endorse the 
gay and lesbian lifestyle as a legitimate option". 63 The 
organisation's president argues that a "conspiracy" exists 
to "separate the students totally from the values 
inculcated in their homes" - 
64 Focus's political magazine 
, 
Citizen consistently links "homosexual activism" with 
62 See, generally, ", How Homosexuals Push Their 
Agenda', V. 5(6) Citizen, 17 June 1991. 
63 This infiltration has occurred ostensibly in a 
covert manner. Teachers have been the victims of 
"desensitisation techniques", including being "exposed to 
graphic depictions of perverted sexual acts" (Newsletter 
from Geoffrey Still, President, Focus on the Family to 
Friend, April 1991). Thus, the homosexual agenda has even 
infected teacher training. A newsletter quotes one teacher 
complaining of "psychological manipulation" during training 
classes (Ibid. ). See also Heinz (1983); Rose (1989); and 
Cooper (1989) re the U. K.. 
64 
Ibid. 
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"radical feminism" - together these two currently pose the 
greatest conspiratorial threat. 65 
The view that major institutions are run by a 
"cultural elite" is echoed by REAL Womenfs Judy Anderson. 
For this organisation, key conspirators are clearly 
identified as "radical feminists". 
... feminism has a lot of clout politically these days, the media certainly supports feminism 
almost 100% ... we can't even get our point of view into the media most of the time ... CBC [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] won't touch us with a 
ten-foot pole ... Mossop has his cheerleaders in the media, 99% of the media are on his side ... the CBC is just one left-wing, socialist, feminist 
point of view, newspapers are little better. 
(Anderson, interview) 
"Feminist ideology" (Anderson,, interview) has infiltrated 
into government and the courts as well. Thus, REAL Women 
attributes its public funding difficulties to the placement 
of "radical feminists" in key governmental positions. 
... the Secretary of State's Women's Programme is 
mainly run by feminists ... LEAF [Women"s Legal 
Education and Action Fund] gets all the money, 
we're strapped for cash always ... the radical 
feminists got $11 million dollars from the 
Secretary of State last year, we got $6,900 ... one 
ideology is given amazing amounts of government 
funding to promote their agenda through the 
courts and people like us are out in the 
cold... feminists have gotten control of funding 
65 See,, for example,, B. Mitchell, 'Radicals Intimidate 
Christians on Campus', V. 5(10) Citizen, 21 October 1991. 
Conspiracy and mind-control are not, however, themes 
stressed in FFA's public expressions. For example, a 
letter from Jim Sclater, FFA Policy Director, to a student 
requesting information, contains no allusions to civil war 
or conspiratorial infiltration (March, 1991). On the 
contrary, this letter, whilst describing the threat posed 
by the success of cases like MossOP, offers to lesbians and 
gay men a few words of sympathy and understanding. 
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at all sorts of levels and theyfre pretty keen to 
hold onto it ... the Prime Minister's appointments 
secretary is in that network, his access is very 
much cut off to people like us ... (Anderson, 
interview)" 
The courts, as well, have replaced legal analysis with 
"sociological treatises" best exemplified by the "feminist 
ideology" of Bertha Wilson (Anderson, interview). " 
I have to give the radical feminists credit, they 
saw all this, they were involved in bringing the 
Charter in, men lay down and put their legs in 
the air - said, okay, you can have what you want 
- they got section 15 in there behind closed 
doors, I have to give them credit politically, it 
has changed the face of society, they got into 
the seat of power and grabbed it (Anderson, 
interview)" 
For Anderson,, "radical feminists" have achieved levels of 
power REAL Women members can only dream about. The 
membership's experiences with funding applications and news 
coverage have taken on a life of their own; "radical 
feminist" power is identified as the cause of the 
organisation Is political marginalisation, media " trashing I, 
and legal losses. The "radical feminists" have been 
constructed as the primary enemy; during my interview with 
Judy Anderson, we were ostensibly discussing the Mossop 
case, however very little of Anderson's anger was directed 
66 See, also, Who We Are, 
'Campbell panders to feminist 
Law Times. 
REAL Women,, n. d. and C. Hoy.. 
forces' (11 November 1991) 
67 Bertha Wilson was a Supreme Court Justice popularly 
identified as having '-feminist sympathies' (now retired). 
68 1 consider REAL Woments view of law and the 
legal 
system more fully in the next chapter. 
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at the flesbian and gay rights movement'. For her, 
feminism and 'gay rights, seemed one and the same. 
A number of LEAF lawyers are lesbians, theyfre 
f ree to be lesbians, but I think there fsa bit of 
a conflict of interest with their cases, getting 
my tax dollars to intervene in something very 
close to their own backyard. (Anderson, 
interview) 
Anderson seems only able to consider lesbian activism in 
the context of LEAF, an organisation which, along with the 
National Action Committee, 69 iS one of REAL Women"s chief 
"radical feminist" power-holders and conspirators (LEAF has 
never intervened and is not intervening in Mossop). 
Focus on the Family, on the other hand, does not 
personalise the conspiratorial politics to such an extent. 
Perhaps because the organisation has a significant pastoral 
component, which REAL Women does not, and secure funding 
sources from its readership and sponsors, which REAL Women 
may not, Focus does not appear as personally threatened (as 
an organisation) by "secular humanism" as REAL Women does 
by "radical feminism". For FFA, the conspiracy's greatest 
threat is to children, and it is to that theme that I turn 
in the following section. 
The Salvation Army is, once againr a relative non- 
contributor to the theme of conspiracy. Don Hutchinson, 
when interviewed, was careful not to imbue the federal 
69 The National Action Committee on the Status of 
Women is the Canadian national umbrella organisation of 
feminist groups (like the American NOW) - 
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Justice Department with conspiratorial motivations with 
respect to its involvement in Mossop, and at no point did 
he indicate that the media or the courts were under the 
influence of a particular "cultural elite". Hutchinson 
did, howeverf express the view that it was publicly 
acceptable to vilify Christianity (I discuss this further 
in the following chapter). Furthermore, whilst not using 
the war terminology of Focus on the Family, Hutchinson 
nonetheless does believe that there are "two value systems 
in conflict" (interview). However, rather than suggesting 
conspiratorial theories as to why one is pre-eminent, he is 
more aware that lesbians and gay men f eel equally unable to 
adequately influence public policy in their interests. 
Unlike Anderson or Sclater, Hutchinson, speaking for 
the Salvation Army, is far more sensitive to how many 
others in society perceive Christianity - as a "powerful 
oppressorf (see also Chapter 6). For Focus and REAL Women, 
the "conspiracy" is powerful and deliberate, and often 
included within it are groups of people who themselves 
usually feel as marginalised, despised, and ignored as 
these evangelical Christians. Hutchinson is more willing 
to explicitly acknowledge this, going so far as to 
recognise that Brian Mossop's reasons for engaging in gay 
rights litigation are based on experiences Hutchinson 
himself has never had to "endure" (Hutchinson, interview). 
Having said this however, it should be remembered that 
Hutchinsonrs comments to me in an interview 
do not 
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necessarily represent the views of the Armyls membership. 
For example, an editorial on the Mossop case in the Armyrs 
newsletter does appear to raise the spectre of a possible 
conspiracy between the 'homosexual agenda' and public 
institutions. 70 
Whether the conspiracy is called "secular humanism", 
"radical feminism", or "homosexual activisw, both Focus on 
the Family and REAL Women clearly believe that it dominates 
all the major social institutions; the marginalisation of 
their own perspective leaves them feeling, as Anderson put 
it, "down a dark hole" (interview). As is characteristic 
of those who believe there is only one Truth, most views or 
actions which do not support the tenets of conservative 
Christianity are taken as being indicative of the 
conspiracy's power. 
In this thesis, I do not wish to investigate the truth 
or falsity of this perception; I do not think that 
conservative Christians lie when they describe the world 
they see. What is important is the role conspiracy 
theories play in social movement politics, and the 
particular continuities the NCR constructions have with 
Christian fears historically. The NCRFs secular humanist, 
or radical feminist, conspiracy fulfils an important role: 
it finds the source of perceived problems 
in an 
70 See ", Commentary: What Happened to the Family', The 
War Cry, 27 May 1989, p. 2. 
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identifiable 'enemy, (see M. Edelman, 1988), and proposes 
an all-out battle to the death as solution. NCR 
constituencies are thus (the leadership hopes) 
simultaneously terrified, mobilised, and activated. 
Concurrentlyr The Family, marriage, and gender distinctions 
are built up, buttressed, and fortified. 
Indeed,, The Family, the "homeland", increasingly 
becomes the bulwark, the 'last stand' against utter 
destruction - As "the conspiracy' controls 'the state', 
only the family' can lead the battle. Like the economic 
new right, conservative Christians condemn big 
government'; for the latter movement, however, their 
condemnation is related to the state's perceived 
advancement of the secular humanist agenda, its intrusion 
into the family sphere, and its perceived usurpation of 
church and familial authority. In other words, a new right 
commitment to laissez-faire capitalism is only part of 
their motivation. 
Fields (1991) has argued, drawing from Habermas 
(1987b), that the New Christian Right is a "new' social 
movement, like many others, attempting to assert the 
values, structures, and traditions of civil society against 
encroaching state and professional domination. Such a 
perspective is helpful to understanding how the NCR 
associates lesbian and gay legal rights with state 
interference and the undermining of familial authority. 
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The advancement of lesbian and gay equality is articulated 
with other developments, such as desegregation and 
af f irmative action, as part and parcel of government out of 
control, of state interference in the domains of church and 
f aMily. 71 For example, both Don Hutchinson and Judy 
Anderson, during the course of my separate interviews with 
them, discussed what they perceived to be the excessive 
politicisation of 'race relationsf. 72 
It is here,, in the expression of a general "anti- 
statistf politics, that conservative Christians meet the 
economic 'new right'. However, it would be misleading to 
suggest that the NCR is anti-statist per se. On the 
contrary, evangelicals desire nothing less than the 
establishment of a Christian society with individual 
behaviour governed by the perceived teachings of Jesus and 
the apostles. It is the secular state which they oppose, 
and, in the understanding that the Second Coming might be 
some way off, they have opted for the next best solution of 
asserting local autonomy and decrying state interference - 
all, in the name of the children. 
71 During my interview with himr Don Hutchinson drew 
a diagram of three circles, representing this encroachment . 
72 For a discussion of right-wing articulations of 
race, gender, and sexuality during anti-ERA campaigns . see 
Mathews and De Hart (1990: 173-4,224). Allen Hunter (1981) 
also discusses the racist content in New Right thinking. 
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f41 "The childf 
Late that evening after returning home from the ABC studios [after appearing on a programme about gay rights], I quietly slipped into each of my children's bedrooms to watch them as they slept. My wife, Carol, and I always performed this 
ritual when our children were very young, just as 
millions of other parents do. We would tiptoe in, pull up the covers, check for a fevered brow 
and just reassure ourselves they were alive and 
well. 
But that night I was looking for a different kind 
of reassurance - one I couldn't find merely with 
my eyes or ears or touch. I wanted to know that 
the world my children would grow up in would 
still embrace and honour the love and commitment 
between a man and a woman united before God in 
marriage. I wanted to know that they could have 
their own children and raise them in a free 
society that knew the difference between virtue 
and vice, good and evil, right and wrong. 
That night, more than ever, I 
wasn"t just invisible microbe, ý 
the health of my children and t] 
of Americans. Their futures, 
dreams, were also threatened 
ideology that seemed each day 
our society, pushing aside the 
guided civilised men and WOME 
centuries. 
realised that it 
5 that threatened 
ie next generation 
and our hopes and 
by an invisible 
to encroach upon 
truths that have 
.n throughout the 
No number of death threats, no amount of media 
criticism, no amount of pressure would stop me 
from fighting for these children, or for the 
millions of others who depend on us to leave them 
a legacy of freedom and hope (Gary Bauer,, in 
Dobson and Bauer, 1990: 118). 
For the New Christian 
conspiracy is directed at 
children" (Dobson and Bauer, 
the children, they' will, 
generation, have won. 
Right, the secular humanist 
"the hearts and minds of 
1990). If I theyf can steal 
by controlling the next 
Children are the prize to the winners of the 
second great civil war. Those who control what 
young people are taught and what they experience 
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- what they see, hear, think, and believe - will determine the future course of the nation. Given 
that influence, the pre-dominant value system of 
an entire culture can be over-hauled in one 
generation, or certainly in two, by those with 
unlimited access to children (1990: 35). 
The hottest and most dangerous confrontation to 
date -and the battle that may well establish the 
eventual winner - is being fought over child and 
adolescent sexuality and the policies relevant to 
it. It is here that the secular humanists have 
made their most audacious invasion of the 
homeland (1990: 43). 
. child and adolescent sexuality are seen as 
cýitical to the survival of the Judeo-Christian 
ethic, and indeed, to the continuance of Western 
civilisation itself. We human beings are sexual 
creatures. God made us that way. We recognise 
our sex assignment as boys or girls from our 
earliest moments of self-awareness, and that 
identification will influence everything we do to 
the end of our lives ... 
It follows, then, that stability in society is 
dependent on the healthy expression of our sexual 
nature. If this energy within us is siphoned of f 
in the pursuit of pleasure; if it is squandered 
in non-exclusive relationships; if it is 
perverted in same-sex activities, then the 
culture is deprived of the working, saving, 
sacrificing, caring, building, growing, 
reproducing units known as families. 
Robbed of sexual standards, society will unravel 
like a ball of twine... (Dobson and Bauer, 
1990: 54-55). 
Focus on the Family's founders here articulate child 
sexuality itself as the "homeland" - Schools, day caresr 
virtually any publicly-funded institution become centres of 
anti-Christian indoctrination, encouraging, indeed 
compelling, children, specifically boys (although this is 
unstated), to Fspill their seedf in the pursuit of 
pleasure. 
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Dobson and Bauer take a different approach to the 
disease-ridden rhetoric of Brad Hayton (discussed earlier); 
monogamous heterosexual marriage is here represented as the 
lynch-pin of capitalism. Sexual regulation is essential to 
the reproduction of the workforce itself. Foucault's 
(1976) analysis of sexuality as a regulatory regime is here 
confirmed in the articulation of child (hetero)sexuality 
with economic prosperity and the need for a disciplined 
workforce . 
73 However, what is, ultimately, "at stake" for 
NCR activists,, "is nothing less than the faith of our 
children. Our ultimate objective in living must be the 
spiritual welfare of our sons and daughters" (Dobson. and 
Bauer, 1990: 53). Once again, the bottom-line fear is the 
loss of children from Christian belief. 
The need to keep fhomosexuals, away from children is 
at the heart of much anti-lesbian and gay activity. The 
chief victim of the homosexual fifth column is the child'; 
this is a theme constantly recurring in conservative 
Christian discourse. Human rights protection will 
legitimise this sinister "seduction". Both Focus on the 
Family and REAL Women express profound fears about losing 
children to an alien culture. Underlying these fears is 
73 As Valverde (1991) has argued in her study of 
social purity movements in Canada, Christian conservatives 
do not advocate the wholesale repression of sexual 
expression; on the contrary, they seek to contain it within 
'healthy, channels (see also Petchesky, 1984: 263-4). 
Dobson himself is something of a sexual guru to Focus on 
the Family subscribers, he has authored a number of books 
purporting to advise married couples on improving their sex 
lives. 
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the view that children's sexuality hangs in the balance; 
without the fright' influences, they will renounce 'God's 
design' (heterosexuality) in the pursuit of pleasure 
(homosexuality). 
Children, above all, are innocent; however, their 
sexuality, while God-given, is, for reasons rarely 
explained (perhaps to do with temptation doctrine), 
seemingly easily capable of being corrupted. One of the 
"secular' arguments that NCR activists consistently deploy 
is that of the need to fmodell appropriate gender 
behaviour. Jim Sclater, for example, argues, 
We know that young guys have to see what a male 
looks like or they won't figure it out for 
themselves. There's a period, particularly for 
male adolescents, where they're not sure what 
direction they're going. We think it's important 
that families be constituted by a father and a 
mother. We know that God designed women to have 
a nurturing effect on children, male and female, 
we know that men are supposed to have not only a 
nurturing effect but to demonstrate the more 
aggressive role of the hunter, down through 
civilisations. Without that, that's the classic 
development of homosexuality where the mother is 
the main figure. Thatts been proven over and 
over and over again. Where the father is absent, 
even when he's present. That can be very 
confusing for a male child (interview). 
The "modelling,, argument is presented constantly in NCR 
opinion ; 74 1 do not wish to discuss its finer points. What 
is interesting for my purposes, is the extent to which the 
fear of inappropriate modelling is rooted in a belief in 
the precariousness of childhood sexuality. Parents might 
74 See Cooper and Herman (1991) for its manifestation 
in British politics. 
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wake up one morning and find their children have been 
hijacked by homosexual body snatchers - They will then have 
to watch in agony as their child embarks on a life of 
unbelievable sexual degeneracy, probably culminating in 
their early death from AIDS. 
REAL Women, as I have discussed, also puts forward the 
heterosexual, child or adult, as a person capable of being 
seduced, and thus not at all fixed in their sexuality. At 
the same time, the suggestion is made that homosexual 
behaviour, despite its assorted horrors, is indeed 
extremely seductive, and therefore desirable. The appeal 
of homosexuality, the implied 'once bitten forever smitten' 
logic, is evident. Despite articulating homosexuality with 
death and disease, the NCR paradoxically and simultaneously 
constitute it as pleasurable and addictive. Jim Sclater 
argues that people, particularly men, need restraining; too 
much "sexual licence" and too little Gospel leads men to 
pursue sexual pleasure at whatever cost (interview). 
In contrast to nazis, neo-nazis, and fascists 
generally,, the modern NCR tends not to attribute 
75 homosexuality to genetic causes. To do so, given biblical 
75 It could be argued that the Salvation Army takes a 
different position, regarding the "origins of a homosexual 
orientation as a mystery"; however, according to them, some 
people are clearly "disposed" to homosexual behaviour and 
others are not (The Salvation Army Positional Statements, 
Canada and Bermuda Territory, 1990, p. 13). This may partly 
account for why the ", fifth column" theme plays such a 
limited rhetorical role for Salvationists. Arguably, as 
the Army becomes more involved in NCR coalitions, these 
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prohibitions and punishments, might entail advocating 
practices such as sterilisation, imprisonment, or even 
death for lesbians and gay men. The mainstream NCR is 
distinguished from the extreme right by virtue of its 
relative acceptance of concepts of equalityr universal 
citizenship, and rights. The organisations studied here 
are not overtly racist, in the sense of preaching race 
superiority (although they do express a strong element of 
anti-affirmative action backlash) and tend not to indulge 
in biological explanations for structured inequality 
(although other sections of the NCR may do so). Indeed, 
Judy Anderson, Don Hutchinson, and Jim Sclater all 
expressed, to varying degrees, their support for basic 
human rights, including those for lesbians and gay men. 76 
NCR activists also express the view, as do many 
sexuality theorists, that homosexuality and heterosexuality 
are sets of practices, rather than innate essences. 
However, for the former, one set of practices is condemned 
by Scripture while the other is God's design. Judy 
views may change. See also, the Salvation Army newsletter 
War CrV, 27 May, 1989, p. 2. Note also, that the Army's 
head office in Britain publishes a more severe statement 
on homosexuality, describing it as an "innate tendency" in 
need of suppression, see "Homosexuality' , The Salvation Army -A Positional Statement, International Heritage 
Centre, London, n. d. When interviewed, however, Don 
Hutchinson appeared to contradict this opinion. In 
response to a question asking whether he agreed with the 
sexuality views of Jim Sclater, Hutchinson, whilst 
expressing some reservations, stated that "no one is born 
gay". 
76 1 discuss in Chapter 4 the problems around defining 
what is meant by "-rightst. 
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Anderson argues that "sexual orientation" and "lifestyle" 
are two separate issues (interview). 
I'm married, I've been attracted to other people 
in my seventeen years of marriage, I made a 
choice,, I I'm either true to my husband, and my 
vows -I make a choice ... we're talking lifestyle (Anderson, interview). 
For NCR activists,, it must be difficult to imagine 
that children could possibly be born homosexual - that is 
not God "s plan. God created male and f emale . to complement 
each other, and created heterosexual union through marriage 
as the forum through which this complementarity is to be 
expressed (Hutchinson, interview). For Don Hutchinson of 
the Army, and in contrast to the public utterances of Focus 
and REAL Women,, the key issue is "what is and what is not 
sin" (interview). Whilst humans suffer recurring 
punishments as a result of sin, "deformities" must be 
acknowledged as just that - indications of the fall from 
grace , not f celebrated I in f pride days I and condoned by the 
state. 
77 
Jim Sclater argues, 
We all know that there is a huge spectrum of 
homosexual roles, let alone a spectrum of 
activity. There's the effeminate male, the 
classic concept of the homosexual, but that's 
only one tiny portion of it. Or the butch gal, 
or whatever -. just one tiny segment of the 
lifestyle. All humans are on some spectrum 
between male and female, in birth certain 
hormonal things can create hermaphrodites. It is 
a spectrum, where you fit is partly determined by 
genetics or hormones, but there's no genetic 
marker or key that's ever been found that would 
dispose a person to gay or lesbian lifestyle. 
77 1 am not concerned here with analysing possible 
'illogicalities, in this formulation. 
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The hormonal thing has never been proven in 
humans. 
just as there are accidents in birth, not 
everyone is born perfectly or at the right end of 
the scale I the Christian answer to that is that 
all of creation is suffering under the Fall, we 
have fallen away from God's perfect design and 
the whole universe is suffering ... homosexuality 
may occur in some ... the Christian answer is if it 
occurs because they're too close to one end of 
the spectrum by hormonal causes or whatever, to 
us that's in the same category as someone being 
born with a clubfoot ... it"s not 'God"s design (interview). 
Those who may be somehow near the 'wrong" end of the 
sexuality spectrum, and who insist on living "the 
homosexual lifestyle", must therefore be prevented from 
proselytising their "lifestyle" to others, in the same way 
that 'well would not allow people with "clubfeet" , or 
alcoholism, to encourage others to adopt their disability. 
Those needing the greatest protection are those with the 
most malleable sexual identities - children. 
One way for the New Christian Right to offer such 
protection is to stem the tide of lesbian and gay legal 
equality. How successful have they been at doing this? In 
the following chapter, I explore the Canadian NCR's attempt 
to challenge 'gay rights, in the Mossop case. I consider 
the relationship between their 'insider' sexual politics 
and their public legal argumentation, and conclude the 
chapter by assessing 'NCR effectivity, at a broader level. 
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CHAPTER 
THE SAINTS GO LITIGATING 
This chapter explores the process by which the three 
Canadian organisations discussed previously, Focus on the 
Family, REAL Women, and the Salvation Army, expressed their 
sexual politics in the legal arena and, in particular, 
their attempt to intervene in Mossop. I review how the 
organisations of the REAL Women et al. (as it is flegallyf 
known) coalition came together as intervenors in the case, 
and explore the relationships between coalition members and 
their lawyers, and between the different members 
themselves. I also use interview material to consider how 
organisational leaderships perceive law, courts, and the 
Charter. The second section then explores the specific 
question of how the themes discussed in the previous 
chapter - God-given f amily structure, homosexual depravity, 
anti-Christian conspiracy, and vulnerable child sexuality - 
were expressed, or not, within the coalition"s legal 
intervention. I conclude by considering the 'effectivity' 
of the New Christian Right in Canadian politics. 
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Courts, LawVers, and the Legal Process 
Perceptions of law and the charter 
As discussed in Chapter 5, evangelical Christians have 
never shied away from engaging in Political struggle. On 
the contrary, influencing social policy has always been at 
the forefront of their agenda. Historically, such activism 
took place around a number of different issues. In the 
last decades of the twentieth century,, their activities 
have centred on constructing counter-movements to those 
waged by socialists, feminists, antiracists, peace 
activists, and lesbian and gay communities - these are the 
new threats to 'Christian society'. 
For conservative, evangelical Christians, social 
activism is justified theologically. In contrast to strict 
Calvinists for example, North American evangelicals do not 
believe in the concept of the 'elect' - that one's post- 
judgment status has already been decided. Saving 
themselves, others and society as a whole is absolutely 
necessary. 
This is not the time to pull back and say that we 
seem to be relatively ineffective in our attempts 
and therefore we must "leave the outcome to God". 
I believe that He has called our organisations 
into being in order to speak effectively into our 
culture and to prayerfully put our best efforts 
into stemming the tide of anti-family ideals and 
material. May He strengthen all of us as we 
attempt to be faithful to that calling. 
1 
1 Letter from James Sclater,, Director of Public 
POlicy, FFA, to "Friends', 14 June 1991. 
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political action is God, s "calling", the very reason for 
the organisation's existence (see also Valverde, 1991). 
where, however, does law reform fit in? 
In the United States, the relationship between the NCR 
and legal processes is a contradictory one. Initially, the 
perceived 'liberal excessesr of the Warren and Burger 
Courts played a key role in motivating the NCR's activism, 
particularly its decision to focus on electoral politics. 
The litigation experiences of the NCR, for example around 
creationism or school prayer, were not positive ones. The 
"legal system", far from being viewed as a friend, was 
perceived as being controlled by the secular humanist 
conspiracy. In 1981,, a document produced by one of the 
foundational American NCR organisations, Religious 
Roundtable, in tones possibly reminiscent of rhetoric that 
one might imagine fuelled the medieval crusades, reflected 
the general view. 
The born-again Ayatollahs of Paganism, enrobed as 
federal court judges, with unchecked power, in 
violation of the Constitution, have established 
their religion of Paganism upon us, imposing its 
barbarism and corruptions, demanding the modern 
materialist gods of consumerism and careerism be 
2 sated with children's blood . 
Yet gradually, the American NCR began to realise that they 
could influence the composition of the courtsr wresting 
them away from the Godless "barbarians". The judicial 
appointment process, therefore, became a prime site of NCR 
activity, the goal being to fill the courts with 
Quoted in Jorstad (1987: 34, see also 226-7). 
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conservative judges eager to find the 'original intent, of 
the constitutional fFounding Fathers', 
In contrast to the highly legalised culture of the 
United States, conservative Christians in Canada have been 
slow to mobilise around law-related issues. However, 
within an increasingly Charter-litigious society, this is 
quickly changing. In the mid-1980s, the National Citizens 
Coalition (NCC), a right-wing business lobby with ties to 
the conservative Christian movement, funded Charter 
litigants attempting to overturn progressive labour law. 
During the same period, the NCC, along with the 
Pentecostals, Real Women, and others, participated in the 
campaign against Bill 7 in Ontario. 4 The NCR has also been 
moderately active in election-related activities. 
More recently, as lesbians and gay men increasingly 
engage in human rights litigationf under the statutory 
codes and the Charter, so too have the evangelicals 
explored the possibilities of legal intervention. At the 
3 In American constitutional interpretation, a 
conservative judicial approach is usually noted by 
adherence to the doctrine-of "original intent', rather than 
the 'living tree' approach of liberal justices. The latter 
approach interprets the U. S. Constitution in light of 
modern developments and social change, whilst the former 
insists upon "reading the minds, of its 18th century 
writers. 
See Chapter 3. 
5 For example,, during the 1988 federal elections, NCR 
groups ranked candidates on their abortion stands, and 
publicly sought, and to a small extent succeeded, in having 
their chosen candidates elected. 
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1991 pro-family conference in Ottawa, a workshop was held 
on how to develop the newly incorporated 'Foundation For 
Legal Education and Justice', an umbrella body to fund and 
strategise around legal intervention. 6 According to jim 
Sclater, this organisation will be "less overtly 
Christian", andf in so being, will hope to attract the 
support and funding of other organisations that "do not 
necessarily agree with all of our family agenda" 
(interview). 
In explaining their decision to litigate, NCR leaders 
point to the increasing use of Canadian courts by other 
interest groups seeking to further political agendas. Don 
Hutchinson argues, 
We live in a very litigious society now, a lot of 
people are becoming more aware of their rights 
before the courts. A number of special interest 
groups have proceeded before the courts to seek 
changes in how certain issues are viewed which 
parliament might not have been prepared to grant. 
So too the church has become more aware that its 
positions can also be presented before the 
courts ... a number of religious groups, and in this particular instance [the Mossop coalition] 
you could classify the groups as evangelical 
Christian groups, have gained a realisation that 
we have the ability to stand before the courts 
and make presentation in the same way that other 
special interest groups do, and try and preserve 
and promote our point of view. (interview) 
More than the other organisations, REAL Women has 
identified participation in Charter litigation as a key 
campaigning strategy. judy Andersonr president of REAL 
Ottawa Conference on the Family, 1991, Agenda. 
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Women,, argues that "courts are now the main avenue for 
social change since the Charter" (interview). However for 
Anderson, participation in litigation is hindered by the 
"radical feminists" who control the funding sources 
(interview). For example, the Court Challenges Programme, 
a federally-funded, arms-length body that awarded Charter 
litigation funds to applicant groups, refused REAL Women 
funding on the basis that the organisation, sought to 
restrict, rather than enhance, equality. The Programme 
was, for Anderson, part of the "radical feminist" 
conspiracy: "all the people who administer the funds are 
quite partisan" (interview). 
REAL Women"s construction of a bias in Charter- 
litigation funding is also found in various right-wing 
media commentaries. " Recently, two Canadian political 
scientists co-authored a study which claims that a "court 
party" has arisen in Canada-9 They argue that left-wingersr 
feminists, and others with similar politics, have succeeded 
in obtaining federal funding in order to fuel social change 
7 The Programme was cancelled subsequent to this 
interview, see discussion in Chapter 4. 
8 See, for example, G. Koch, *, Rise of the Court 
Party', (18 November 1991) Western Report 10-11; 1. Benson, 
'Claims about LEAF popularity must be viewed with caution', 
11-17 March 1991, Law Times; C. Hoy, 'Campbell Panders to 
feminist forces' (11-17 November 1991) Law Times. Copies 
of these articles were given to me by Judy Anderson. 
9 See 'Rise of Court Party', Ibid.; A. Strachan, "The 
hidden opposition', (11 January 1992) Globe and Mail. The 
authors of the study have written against ", equal 
opportunity" policies for many years,, see, for example, 
Knopf (1985). 
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through the courts. The authors maintain that these 
forces, frustrated in their attempts to install a socialist 
government through democratic processes, have created their 
own political "court party". The conclusion of these 
academics, that democratic process is being fundamentally 
subverted by lef t-wing judicial activism,, has provided 
welcome 'evidence, for the NCR, who have quoted liberally 
from the study. 10 
Partially as a result of this perceived bias, REAL 
Women views the Charter as an unqualified evil which they 
only argue about because they have to: "instead,, we say,, 
get rid of the Charter" (Anderson, interview). For 
Anderson, the Charter is undemocratic, providing 'If ive 
10 Eg: See note above. It is worth noting, again, 
that the ", lef tIsI perception of the Charter and the courts 
is similarly critical, although for different reasons, see 
also Chapter 4. 
I am simply presenting the views of the NCR here; not 
debating the issue. Whilst it is no doubt true that 
feminist groups receive far more in litigation funds than 
REAL Women, S. 15 of the Charter ostensibly exists to assist 
"disadvantaged" groups seeking equality. Federal 
administrators decided that REAL Women did not meet this 
qualification, and, no doubt, given the intentions of the 
section, they were right. The Court Challenges Programme 
was not set up to assist, battles between social movements 
with different societal visions; if it had beenj, then 
%equalityf might require the funding of REAL Women. 
Rather, the Programme was meant to assist "disadvantaged 
groups" seeking to challenge potentially discriminatory 
legislation. It is, therefore, assumed that the government 
will mount an effective defense of the legislation; 
however, the NCR has identified, in cases like Mossop, the 
governmentfs failure to do this. If this is so, then the 
assumptions upon which Section 15, and the Court Challenges 
Programme, are based are undermined. This, however, is a 
different issue to REAL Women's not receiving %equal' 
rights to Programme funds. 
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people" (a majority of the Supreme Court) with "no 
accountability to the public" the opportunity to "in one 
fell swoop change the whole force of Canadian jurisprudence 
and social norms" (interview) - Echoing many of the Charter 
criticisms made by marxist legal academics (discussed in 
Chapter 4) , Judy Anderson argues for "more grassroots 
participation" (interview). Anderson's comments are based 
upon her perception that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
adopted the "radical feminist" agenda. When asked whether, 
should the Court be staffed by judges more to her liking, 
she would still have the same views about the Charter she 
replied that whilst the process would continue to be 
undemocratic 11 if things were going our way we might not be 
saying it quite so loudly" (interview). Nevertheless, were 
it not for the funding problems, REAL Women would happily 
make litigation "one of our primary strategies" (Anderson, 
interview). 
Don Hutchinson of the Salvation Army has a similar 
critique of Charter-based legal struggle, arguing that a 
'rights-orientedf culture loses sight of the importance of 
social responsibility aAd the blessing of being granted 
privileges (interview). " However, for the Army, litigation 
is increasingly being seen as another way of expressing a 
Political message. The Mossop coalition, Hutchinson 
argues, is a "wise investment",, a form Of "stewardship",, 
have discussed these views more fullY in Chapter 
4. 
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"what the Salvation Army does is invest in people rs lives,, 
(interview). 
Law is one of the many ways to indicate your 
concern. Our primary concern is to share the 
gospel, in our words and in our deeds. That 
sharing and coming to positional statements on a 
number of issues on which there is a biblical 
perspective takes place in a number of different 
ways ... lobbying the government ... appearing before the courts ... the Sunday morning Holiness 
meeting ... providing soup to people commonly 
referred to as street people ... ministering to teenagers. There are a number of varieties and 
a number of ways which we try to minister. Law 
is one of them. (Hutchinson, interview) 
The Army now "budgets 11 for litigation and Hutchinson 
insists that no other area of Army service suffers as a 
result (Hutchinson, interview), 12 
Finally, it is worth noting that Brian Mossopfs legal 
claim, while it may ultimately raise issues relevant to 
Charter adjudication at the Supreme Court, does not 
explicitly do so. His action,, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 2, is under human rights legislation that pre- 
dates the Charter considerably. Nevertheless, Don 
Hutchinson, Judy Anderson, and other conservatives situate 
the Mossop case within a perceived modern 'rights claiming' 
culture, which, in their viewr the Charter typifies. 
12 Hutchinson's comments echo a point I have made at 
various stages in this thesis and echoed by the work of 
Gusfield (1981). Social movements struggle on a number of 
fronts, some of which may even be incompatible with each 
other. Focus on the Family remains a primarily pastoral 
agency, and the Salvation Army remains predominantly a 
community social service. REAL Women, on the other hand, 
is almost entirely a political lobby. 
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These three NCR organisations all, to varying degrees 
and for diverse reasons, share the belief that we live in 
a overly rights-focused culture. Courts and judges are 
hopelessly biased against 'traditional morality,; the 
Charter (and, by implication, all human rights frameworks) 
has been a tremendously successful tool in the hands of 
"the left'. Because of this, they are forced to 
participate in activist litigation in which they would not 
choose otherwise to engage. 
r2l Creating the REAL Women et al. coalition 
The impetus to f orm a Christian intervention coalition 
in Mossop came initially from Jim Sclater and Focus on the 
Family. 13 Following the publication of the Tribunal 
decision in Mossop, and the indication that the Government 
would appeal, Focus decided the issue was significant, and 
that they, and others, should get involved in some way. 
Jim Sclater called the Justice Department and spoke to 
Barbara McIsaac, senior counsel on MOSSOP, who indicatedf 
he states, that the "government didnlt have much of a case" 
(interview) . Focus , who. believed that a strong argument 
against the re-definition of ffamilyf to include gay 
couples could surely be made, began to contact fellow 
Christian activists. 
13 The following account is based upon interviews with 
Jim Sclater,, Don Hutchinson,, and Ian Binnie, coalition 
lawyer (with McCarthy Tetreault). 
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Af ter discovering that a number of other organisations 
were already involved in legal interventions, and thus 
could not play a leading role in Mossop, Sclater, who had 
been referred to the prestigious Bay Street firm McCarthy 
Tetreault, decided that Focus's resources permitted them to 
act as instigator. Focus and REAL Women had worked 
together in the past, and were at that time involved in 
setting up the Legal Defense Fund; RW was thus a natural 
partner for Focus to contact. The Salvation Army became 
involved through McCarthy Tetreault; the firm was the 
Armyfs general counsel, and had relayed to them Focus"s 
interest in Mossop. Eventually, the other two members, The 
Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada and the Evangelical 
Fellowship of Canada, both with active histories in 
opposing lesbian and gay equality, joined up as well. As 
various interviewees expressed it, activists wished to have 
a mix of organisations 'knownt to the courts as intervenors 
(eg: REAL Women) but also with long, respectable histories 
(eg: the Salvation Army). 
The intervening organisations never met as a group, 
although there was some phone contact between individual 
leaderships, and Focus and REAL Women met at their pro- 
family conference in the spring of 1991. Whilst Don 
Hutchinson of the Army stated he was "aware of the 
doctrinal beliefs of the other organisations" (interview), 
it was clear to me, in conversation, that his knowledge of 
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Focus on the Family, in particular, was extremely limited. 14 
He expressed his own, guarded reservations about the 
politics of REAL Women, commenting (Off-tape) that "they 
were the ones we have the most problems with" (interview). 
It was, however, REAL Women"s "faith" which provided, for 
Hutchinsont the key common ground (interview). 
Despite not being able to meet and discuss the case, 
both Don Hutchinson and Jim Sclater expressed satisfaction 
with how McCarthy's was handling the matter. Hutchinson 
and Ian Binnie, counsel from McCarthy's, had worked 
together to ensure that the legal submissions did not 
engage in "gay bashing"; each took great pains to insist 
that the case had "nothing to do with gay rights" 
(Hutchinson,, interview). Of all the organisations, then, 
it is the Salvation Army that played the most instrumental 
role vis a vis the legal submissions. Don Hutchinson felt 
that the factum, was "a good reflection of our [ie: the 
Army's] position" (interview). Jim Sclater, on the other 
hand, acknowledged having very little input into the 
drafting of the factum, and neither did Judy Anderson 
(although neither expressed dissatisfaction) (interviews). 
14 Interestingly, Ian Binnie, McCarthy's lawyer on 
the case, similarly knew very little about Focus on the 
Family. He noted, however, that the participation of the 
Salvation Army gave the entire coalition credibility with 
the courts which they might not otherwise have 
had 
(interview). 
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15 In contrast to the Egale et al. coalition, which was"' 
funded by the Court Challenges Programme (thereby 
confirming the NCR "court party" and conspiracy theses) the 
REAL Women et al. intervention was funded by the 
organisations themselves; McCarthy's has agreed a ceiling 
for each intervention (at the Federal Court, it was 
approximately $17,000). According to Jim Sclater, primary 
funding comes from the Salvation Army, with the 
Pentecostals and the Evangelical Fellowship assuming a 
certain amount as well (Sclater, interview). Judy Anderson 
did hot know how the litigation was being funded 
(interview). Don Hutchinson, of the Army, insisted that 
the Army"s share was not being funded out of publicly 
raised monies; when pressed to say where the money came 
from, he suggested that sources included income from Army 
property and investments (interview), (clearly sources 
which were, at some point, raised through public donation 
or state subsidy). 
Interestingly, then, the Salvation Army, a somewhat 
reluctant and anomalous member of Canada's New Christian 
Right, was the directing hand behind the submissions and 
provided, it seems, the bulk of the funding. Indeed, the 
Army, despite its divergence f rom much of the sexual 
ideology represented in the previous chapter, could be said 
15 This is the coalition of progressive groups 
intervening on Mossop's behalf. See Chapter 2 for brief 
discussion of the social movement organisations involved in 
this coalition. 
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to be "fronting' the litigation publicly. Their 
participation has contradictory implications. On the one 
hand, the Army"s name,, as Ian Binnie himself noted when 
interviewed, provided the coalition with public credibility 
they might not otherwise have had. The Army is well- 
known, and well-respected. Their reputation for a more 
"caring' Christianity mutes the "new right" politics of 
Focus and REAL Women. At the same time,, their overt 
Christianity, in the context of the two other organisations 
not being 'known, as conservative evangelicals, risks the 
coalition itself being publicly considered as a group of 
"Christian fundamentalists'. 
For the Army itself, the contradictions ought to be 
more severe. Based on shared biblical understandings of 
homosexuality, they have joined with groups politically far 
to the right of themselves, funding and legitimising these 
others in the process. Don Hutchinson was sensitive about 
this, repeating that the coalition was a "short term thing" 
only,, and that the Army had no desire to "gay bash" 
(interview). Nevertheless, their participation with the 
other organisations will no doubt have a more long term 
effect upon the Armyfs po litics and future moral activism. 
Unfortunately, other than expressing vague reservations 
about REAL Women"s politics (and indicating he knew very 
little about Focus's), Hutchinson was not willing to 
discuss this dilemma further. 
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B. The Process of Legal Translation 
In this section, I consider the ways in which the 
sexual politics of Focus on the Family, REAL Women, and the 
Salvation Army, were expressed, or not, within the 
coalition's legal submissions in Mossop. In agreeing to 
intervene as one party, coalition members consented to 
representation by one law firm, and, whilst able to submit 
separate affidavits, to the presentation of a joint factum 
(statement of argument and authorities). The documents I 
refer to include: affidavits of organisational leaders and 
the Federal Court of Appeal factum. 
The phenomenon of third party intervention is a 
relatively new one in Canada, achieving increasing 
prominence in the post-Charter era. 16 In the United States, 
third party briefs filed by f amicus curiae, (friend of the 
court) are common, and have been a significant form of 
social movement legal struggle in that country. In Canada, 
there is no 'right, to intervene. Applicants must 
establish, through submissions, that they possess specific 
skills and knowledge that will prove valuable to the court 
in rendering its decision in a particular matter. in 
practice, this burden may not be a heavy one (depending on 
the case) , and it has become common-place, 
f or example, f or 
LEAF, the feminist legal action organisation, to intervene 
in significant cases affecting twoments rights' 
(see 
% 
16 
The process is a similar one to achieving 
standing'. 
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Razack, 1991). Such activities on the part of lesbian and 
gay organisations, and by the right in Canada, have been 
less noticeable (the latter has tended to fund individual 
litigants). 
In Mossop,, the NCR coalition thus had to achieve 
intervenor status before being able to make their argument 
to the court. The documents produced to enable this were 
affidavits from organisational leaders, and the Application 
For Leave to Intervene. The former establish the 
individual credentials and expertise of the coalition 
partners, the latter condenses the information and argument 
the coalition believes constitutes a unique and important 
contribution to the debate. Whilst, formally, each 
organisation must establish its own 'right' to intervene, 
f or unknown organisations or those with dubious 
credentials, this will be facilitated by the involvement of 
well-known and well-respected groups, such as, in this 
case, the Salvation Army. once having been granted status, 
the Application For Leave will form the basis of the factum 
- the submission that presents the coalition's argument to 
the court. I now go on to explore a selection of these 
materials. 
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The Af f idavit of Lt. C01 - William Speck, Salvation Army of 
Canada (in the Federal Court of Appeal) 
William Speck, the officer responsible for the Army's 
intervention before Don Hutchinson Is involvement (Speck has 
since retired), purported in his affidavit to establish the 
basis f or granting intervenor status to the Salvation Army. 
The document begins by setting out the history of the 
organisation; its bulk consists of repeated statements 
about Salvationists" view of 'the family,,, interspersed 
with references to the Army"s service role vis a vis 
, broken" families. The affidavit does not suggest that 
, 'the family, and marriage are God-ordained; instead, Speck 
argues that children receive advantages through being 
raised within "traditional" families. 
Indeed, the words "God" or "Jesus" do not appear at 
all; as an aside, Speck refers once to the Army's goal of 
"promoting Christian values" (para. 7). There is, therefore, 
no context provided or explanation given for the Army's 
perspective on familial and sexual issues. Whilst it could 
be argued that most readers would know the Army was a 
Christian organisation, a decision was clearly made to find 
'secular' substantiation for the Army's religiously- 
Motivated intervention. The affidavit suggests that 
Salvationistfs primary concern is with the welfare of 
children (paras. 12-15). Whilst this is certainly one of 
their concerns,, it is not the principle that motivated 
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their attack on homosexuality - namely, sin (see Chapter " 
5). 
One of the most revealing passages from the affidavit 
is the f ollowing. 
The Salvation Army recognises the inherent 
difficulties in defining with precision the term 
"family" in today's society, and - 
in adopting a 
single or unified vision of the limits of what 
may constitute a "family". As a result,, we do 
not necessarily disagree with the approach of the 
Human Rights Tribunal in this case of examining 
the function of families in today's society 
rather than focusing entirely on family 
structure. Nevertheless, we were profoundly 
distressed to learn that the federal government 
had neither adduced relevant evidence nor 
submitted pertinent argument in opposition to the 
Complainant's "functional" approach (paras. 13, 
14). 
The tone and argument of this passage could not be further 
from those expressed in an editorial in War Cry, the Army's 
newspaper, following the tribunal decision. The editorial 
argued that the adjudicator had "grossly offended most 
people and ignored the whole of human history" in its 
"attempt to legislate immorality" (May, 1989). The writer 
suggested that a "homosexual rights" domino effect would 
occur - "life as we know it has been changed irrevocably" 
(War C May, 1989). Far from pleading for "relevant 
evidence,, to be "adduced'', the War Cry went on to call for 
the dismantling of "unregulated bodies" (meaning the 
federal Human Rights Commission) that were engaged in 
"undermining the foundations of this society" (May, 1989) - 
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Despite Mossop being about the legal recognition of a 
gay male couple, and despite the Salvation Armyls own views 
as to the immorality of and danger posed by homosexual 
practices, Speck's affidavit mentions homosexuality itself 
only once, on the final page (8). The Army neither 
explains that homosexuality is contrary to Godfs plan nor 
that "the marriage of one man with one woman is a sacred 
institution ordained by God". 17 Instead, the affidavit 
simply reiterates the importance of 'the familyt for the 
welfare of children and society as a whole, emphasising the 
"reproductive function" of traditional families (para. 15). 
The "reproductive function" is not 
explicitly argued within Salvationist po tics. 
something 
It could 
be assumed that the Army would agree that traditional 
families serve a freproductive function, which, given their 
understanding, lesbian and gay families do not; however, 
the Army's positional statements on "homosexuality" and 
'family, do not make this argument. 18 it thus seems 
probable that its incorporation within William Speck's 
affidavit was urged by legal counsel, aware that past fgay 
rights, cases had centred upon this distinction (see 
Chapter 2). Similarly, the deployment of the 'child 
welfare" principle was encouraged by lawyers, confident 
that such rhetoric would be a language the court would 
17 The Salvation Army Positional Statements, Canada 
and Bermuda Territory, 1990, p-18. 
18 
Ibid. , pp. 12-13,18. 
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understand. When interviewed, the coalitionts lawyer quite 
confidently told me what could, and could not, be 
communicated to judges (Binnie, interview). 
The Affidavit of Constance Gwendolyn Landoltr Vice- 
President, r REAL Women of Canada (in the Federal Court of 
Appeal) 
Gwen Landolt, long-time REAL Women vice-president and 
herself a lawyer, began her affidavit somewhat defensively. 
Paragraph two claims the organisation is "inter- 
denominational whilst three and f our emphatically 
announce REAL Women's commitment to woments equality. 
Landolt suggests that the differences between REAL Women 
and other woments equality groups lies only in the means 
used f or social change. 
nV 
REAL Women"s primary argument is similar to that of 
the Salvation Army's. The traditional family is the most 
important social unit, defined through the marriage of a 
man and a woman. Marriage, RW argues, is a "social" as 
well as a personal "contract" (para. 9). The social 
contract consists in the couple"s reproduction of 
"successive generations" (para. 9). Landolt goes on to 
suggest that the Attorney-General's office (responsible for 
appealing against the gay rights judgment) is unable 
to 
perform its legal duty due to bias. According to REAL 
Women, the federal government's favouritism towards 
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"radical f eminist, lesbian and homosexual groups,, 
disqualifies it from properly performing its role to argue 
on behalf of the traditional family (para. 12). Hence, the 
need for intervenors such as REAL Women. 
It could be argued, however, that the affidavit is 
rather deceptive. Whilst the meaning_ of "inter- 
denominational" may be somewhat ambiguous (referring 
popularly to either a range of Christian denominations or 
different religious faiths), the word is no doubt intended 
to suggest that the group has no 'one, religious 
orientation, or that religion itself is not necessarily the 
organisation's raison dietre. However, whilst there are 
some Catholic members, there is no indication that 
Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, and so on either belong 
or are welcome. As I noted in Chapter 5, REAL Women's 
president quite clearly stated that, whilst the 
organisation was fundamentally Christian, this was not an 
element of RW's politics leaders chose to share with the 
public (Anderson, interview). 
It is as well rather dubious for RW to suggest that it 
"supports policies for women that provide equal opportunity 
in all areas, including education, employment, and 
retirement, - (para. 3). REAL Women adamantly opposes 
universal child care, equal pay legislation, sex education, 
human rights provision, and an assortment of other 
Fequal 
Opportunity, initiatives (see Chapter 5). Whilst they 
243 
might argue that the policies they do advocate would 'helpf 
many women, particularly those who solely work in the home, 
they remain opposed to what are commonly understood as 
'equal opportunity policies, for women. 
What is both interesting and yet, perhaps . predictable 
about RW's claims is that the organisation's legal strategy 
so earnestly attempts to render RWIs politics compatible 
with liberal equality discourse. REAL Women has accepted 
that, with respect to its public involvement in litigation, 
the dominant liberal ethos must be adopted. Thus, the REAL 
Women legal submission, whilst remaining 'true' to the 
organisation's perspective on 'the family', seeks to 
conceal both its 'new right, and Christian politics. 
Yet, it does not do this completely. The "radical 
feminist" conspiracy theme makes its appearance in 
Landolt"s discussion of government bias. I would argue 
that Landolt's views here are an honest, and to some extent 
accurate,, assessment of why the REAL women coalition has 
something different to offer the court. She is right that 
the Department of Justice seems to have put little effort 
into its case; they called no witnesses at the Tribunal, 
and their factum makes its arguments in a perfunctory 
fashion. Whether or not justice bureaucrats are conspiring 
with gay rights activists is beside the point; f or whatever 
reason, it remains the case that the government's 
defense 
was, arguably, half-hearted and ill-planned. 
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The Affidavit of James A. Sclater, Assistant to the F- 
President for Public Policy and Researchr ]Focus on the 
Family Association (In the Federal Court of Appeal) 
Jim Sclaterf (subsequent to this promoted to fNational 
Director of Public Policy, ), combines the 'Child welfare, 
rhetoric of William Speck with the government bias thesis 
of Gwen Landolt. Sclater first claims that 
- 
the "primary 
function" of Focus on the Family is to provide assistance 
to "families" (para. 4). Focus, he states, "believes 
strongly" that the welfare of children requires "a mother 
and a father", 
... in order that they may attain a strong sense 
of self, and a healthy ability to relate to 
others, and in order that they may, in turn, 
fulfil a normal male or female role... (para. 5) 
The recognition of "same-sex relationships" as families 
poses a "serious threat to the structure of society and the 
health and viability of future generations" (para-6). 
Only once does Sclater identify Focus as a "Christian 
organisation" (para. 4). As with the Salvation Army and 
REAL Women affidavits, Focus on the Family's submission 
renders almost invisible the conservative Christian 
theology animating every -facet of the organisation's work. 
Sclater discusses the servicing role Focus plays for 
"families", but does not note that only Christian families 
are welcomed. Furthermore . Sclater Is af 
f idavit contains no 
mention of the appalling' sexual practices "homosexuals 
get up to,, (Sclater, interview). In contrast to Focus's 
internal documents, which highlight the diseased' and 
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"predatory" "homosexual lifestyle" (see Hayton: n. d. ), r or 
allege the covert infiltration of the "homosexual agenda,, 
into institutional life (see Chapter 5), Jim Sclater's 
legal construction of homosexuality is most notable for its 
lack of def inition. 
Factum of the Intervenors,, The Salvation Army, Focus on the 
Family Association Canada., r REAL Womenr The Pentecostal 
Assemblies of Canada,, and the Evangelical Fellowship of 
Canada (in the Federal Court of Appeal) 
The coalition"s factum,, their joint submission, is 
perhaps most remarkable for its paucity of argument and 
contribution to debate. The primary purpose of the factum 
appears to be to cite and quote from precedent. A variety 
of previous I gay rights I cases, all decided negatively, are 
listed in support of the basic premise that family, means 
a heterosexual marriage (pp-3-5). The public, argues the 
coalition, has an interest in the preservation and 
continuing state privileging of the traditional familY. 
This interest is due to the family's role in procreation, 
and in providing societal stability (para. 3). 
The document takes issue with the -, sociological 
definition" Of family adopted by the tribunal (pp-5-8). 
Whilst the coalition acknowledges in this document that the 
Popular meaning of , family' may have changedi, it argues 
that the leqal meaning has not. Using a variety of 
legal 
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rhetorical techniques, such as the 'slippery slope' 
analogy, the factum. urges the court to adopt the "plain" 
meaning of the word, which, it suggests, can be discovered 
by reading dictionaries (para. 12) - The intervenors further 
argue that parliament did not intend, when enacting the 
Canadian Human Rights Act, to protect homosexual relations, 
and it is not for the court to usurp the role of Parliament 
(pp. 8-9). There is little else to the factum but this. 
Has the conservative Christian coalition made a unique 
contribution towards the judicial appraisal of this case? 
I would argue that the factum offers no hint of the actual 
expertise and knowledge the coalition members possess. 
Legal precedent has replaced God"s word as Truth,, the 
dictionary supplanting the authority of the Scriptures. 
What the coalition had to offer was their Christianity, 
their world-view as to the imminent and serious threat 
posed by the conspiracy to further the "homosexual agenda" - 
Instead, the legal process appears to have subverted these 
beliefs, rendering them invisible. The homosexuals who 
"eat and rub themselves with faeces", "defecate on their 
partners", and "drink urine" (Hayton, n. d. ) are nowhere to 
be found. References to the homosexual "sub-culture of 
prostitution" flourishing in the "inner cities"19 are 
notably absent. 
19 'Laws protecting homosexuals or so-called "sexual 
orientation" legislation: How it will affect Canadians", 
Pamphlet, REAL Women of Canada, 1986. 
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Instead, the factum, offers an exercise in legal logic 
that provides only a faint echo of the coalition's 
politics. In fact, there is little to distinguish the 
factum of REAL Women et al. from the factum of the 
Attorney-General . 
20 The same arguments are made, the same 
cases cited. The A. G. 's factum does not, however, discuss 
the function of family and marriage in society, nor does 
it of f er as much in the way of legal rhetoric (f or example, 
the government does not make a fslippery slope' argument). 
In these respects, the intervenors have presented 
additional legal knowledge, and, perhaps, Landolt 11 s and 
Sclater's argument, with respect to a lack of governmental 
commitment to defending 'the family', justified. 
Nevertheless, a review of the coalition's legal 
submissions in Mossop shows the extent to which the right- 
wing, evangelical Christian politics of these organisations 
has been muted. This phenomenon can be evaluated in 
different ways. On the one hand, it could be argued that 
the NCR's agenda has been marginalised (or co-opted), its 
leaders, evangelism usurped by its lawyers, legalism. On 
the other hand, I could suggest my own version of a 
'conspiracy thesis arguing that the NCR has deliberately 
chosen to hide its politics beneath a cloak of 
respectability. In this way, judges and others are 
Potentially deceived, remaining unaware of the real 'New 
20 See Factum of the Attorney-General of Canada, 
Federal Court of Appeal, Mossop v A. G.. 
248 
Christian Right Agenda ". Or, is a more accurate view --- 
somewhere in between -a mixture of legal colonisation and 
pragmatic politics? 
Feminist legal submissions do not necessarily reveal 
the radical politics of, for example, the many lesbian 
feminists who work for feminist legal action groups and 
participate in the drafting of documents. Is this a 
deliberate strategy of deception or an example of pragmatic 
political struggle (or both)? What is interesting about 
this process, are the specific ways in which legal 
discourse compels the adoption of a particular pragmatic 
politics (liberal legalism) and that it appears to affect 
social movements on either side of the political spectrum. 
Further, as I discuss in Chapter 7. even when alternative 
perspectives are submitted to courts, they tend then to be 
simply ignored. 
It is worth considering NCR leaderst own explanations 
for the process of legalisation that occurred for the 
coalition members in Mossop. According to Judy Anderson, 
Jim Sclater, and Don Hutchinson, there could never be any 
question of submitting an overtly Christian document to the 
courts (interviews). They and their organisations view 
Society as profoundly anti-Christianf and hence their 
political communication must be informed by other knowledge 
sources in order to be publicly credible. Judy Anderson, 
or example, argues that, 
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Christianity is allowed to be lambasted at every opportunity ... things can be said about us you can't even say about gays any more ... Christianity is low man on the totem pole, anybody can give a kick and get away with it. We're at the back of the bus now ... everywhere Christianity is derided 
and treated with disrespect (interview). 
As I left her house following this interview, Anderson 
pointed to a Christian prayer she had hanging in her front 
hallway. She told me that every time someone came to 
interview her she considered whether or not to take this 
prayer down and hide it, knowing that this symbol of 
religion could lead journalists and researchers to "totally 
dismiss" her. She likened her feelings to those of 
closeted lesbians and gay men, who "were" (in her view) 
once reduced to similar Isterilisation procedures' (my 
interpretation) in their homes. Now, she feels the tables 
have turned. According to Anderson, neither group should 
be in such a position (interview) (although she was perhaps 
unable to understand how REAL Women"s potential success 
could substantially reduce the possibility of lesbians and 
gay men being out). 
Don Hutchinson, the Salvation Army's legal advisor, 
has a similar, although somewhat more complex analysis. 
... in todayfs 
. society there's a sense that 
Christianity was or is the f aith of the majority, 
that the majority has imposed its will on others, 
and that we are in an era where minority rights 
should be recognised as much as 
possible ... there"s a perception 
that Christianity 
is responsible for the abuse of rights, rather 
than any kind of recognition that the Christian 
faith works hand in hand with societal 
development. 
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There"s a societal backlash if you stand up and say I I'm speaking f rom a Christian perspective ... there Isa tendency in the church to be fearful ... or to wisely temper their Christian 
perspective with the appropriate supporting documentation from other sources (interview). 
Hutchinsonfs last comment captures what conservative 
Christians feel to be the pragmatic reality they f ace when 
attempting to communicate publicly, whether within law or 
any other discursive field. For Focus on the- Family, a key 
activity is gathering together certain 'scientific truths' 
and disputing others (see Hayton,, n. d. ). Unlike 
fundamentalists, these Christians do not hesitate to engage 
the secular world on its own terms. 
Jim Sclater, National Policy Director for Focus on the 
Family, asks, 
Why waste our words? The truth is that we are 
not in a Christian society and we don't believe 
that it is even necessarily appropriate to appeal 
to our Christian theology. Our only argument 
that has validity in our society is whether it 
benefits our society and the individuals in it. 
We argue on the f acts , we argue out of our 
conviction, we're there because we believe that 
the Christian scripture gives us an agenda and 
because that's who we are. But we'll argue the 
facts, as we think they're relevant in law. 
We also believe that all truth is God's Truth. 
The truth about my body as a sexual being is 
truth. Christians shouldn't view the body or the 
mind as separat: e from what we can f ind out about 
it through other means. When we talk about the 
family, we understand it psychologically as well 
as theologically. We know, from the history of 
psychology and human history that males that 
arenft raised by a mom and dad donft always turn 
out the same way as those who are. Modelling 
happens. maleness is picked up. Of course the 
men"s movement right now in North America and 
around the world is based on the idea that men 
need a father, and if they don't have one they 
need a surrogate father. If they don't have a 
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surrogate father at least they need male bonding, 
- because men are finding out that the nature of their manhood is that is needs affirmation from 
other males, particularly from preceding 
generations. 
Those are 'facts, that can be discovered by 
studying the social sciences, we don't need to bring our theology into court to prove that. If 
we did, most people would turn of f immediately 
anyway (interview). 
In this way,, the discourses of Psychology, sociology, and 
the modern Fmen's movement, can be woven together to form 
a coherent, non-religious public statement. Internally, 
the effort can even be justified theologically - "all truth 
is godIs truth" - meaning, presumably, that god creates all 
lecritimate forms of knowledge, not just those contained in 
the bibles. Knowledge perceived to conflict with biblical 
pronouncements however, such as evidence, that children 
are not harmed by being raised in father-less homes, would 
presumably be viewed as false knowledgef rather than god's 
truth. 
The ways in which conservative Christians tailor 
argument to audience is reiterated by Judy Anderson. 
I can write f rom a religious point o view, my 
own faith, or I can take the same thing and say 
it not using the code words for religion... if I'm 
going to talk to the Catholic Women"s League, 
sure, I'll talk about faith there because we all 
understand it, but if Ifm talking to the Royal 
Canadian Yacht Club, I can say the same thing, 
but without using my own particular faith 
language (interview) . 
There is nothing particularly startling or unusual about 
this. Academics and activists alike, feminists, lesbians, 
Socialists, we all give different speeches to 
different 
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audiences. What is interesting about Judy Anderson and 
RF, AL Women is the extent to which their conservative, 
evangelical Christianity has deliberately been so 
completely submerged and unspoken when it is their ffaith, 
which clearly underlies much of their political agenda. 
Even the Salvation Army, an organisation very publicly 
identified as Christian (although perhaps, mistakenly, no 
longer as evangelical), feels unable to present its 
biblical position to the court (Hutchinson, interview). 
Thus far, I hope to have shown how the sexual politics 
of the New Christian Right, as evidenced within the 
movement texts of three organisations active in Canada 
today, was considerably altered, and indeed cut out of the 
legal submissions in one particular intervention. I have 
suggested a partial reason for this - namely, the views of 
leaders as to what can be publicly communicated. Quite 
clearly, an initial period of self-censorship took place, 
as it does for many movements on the left (see Chapters 3 
and 4). 
It would be misleading to suggest that something 
called 'Lawt was necessaiily responsible for this. Social 
movement actors are no doubt aware of the conventionsr 
practices,, and rhetoric of legal discourse; as a result, 
many may feel that litigation is a particularly fraught 
exercise. At the same time, however, those who believe 
themselves to hold marginalised perspectives on social 
life 
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often feel that any engagement in 'the public realw 
necessitates the translation of their radical politics into 
a more acceptable (liberal) form. What is interesting 
about the case of the New Christian Right is that, in 
engaging with law, they have lost nearly all the key 
elements in their sexual politics. Right-wing activists 
have had to concede that the ideology of 'formal equality 
between the sexes" dominates and that support for gay 
rights is a relatively wide-spread phenomenon. Despite 
their 'real' belief that homosexuality is dangerous 
precisely because it is 'sick', 'sinful', and 'seductive', 
coalition members have chosen not to present such a 
perspective. And, except for brief references to 
"modelling ", NCR analyses of the relation between gender 
and sexuality also remained unspoken. 
How seriously should we take the New Christian Right 
in Canada? This is the question which I move on to now. 
For those who refuse to accept the authority of Scripture 
and the Second Coming of Jesus, New Christian Right 
Politics is a politics of hate,, death, imperialism, and 
destruction 
. The theoloqy motivating the 
NCR and its I army 
of saints, is frightening (even more so if you are one of 
those condemned to the hell-fires of Armageddon); the 
relatively measured tones of the individuals I interviewed 
should not obscure this 'reality'. 
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Analvsing NCR 'Effectivitvr 
Academics are divided over whether the NCR can be said 
to be a vibrant or a dying force in North American 
political struggle. In Canada, for example, some feminist 
writers have attributed a great deal of success to REAL 
women. Dubinsky (1985) cautions that the Canadian new 
right has "not yet reached its zenith", and there is a need 
to pay REAL Women "close attention" - Erwin (1988a, 1988b) 
alerts us to their increasing influence, Gill (1989) argues 
they have achieved a re-orientation of media discourse on 
feminism, and Ross (1988) credits RW with forcing the de- 
funding and increased policing of lesbian projects by the 
Secretary of State Women's Programme. others, however, 
such as Razack (1991), find REAL Women barely worth 
mentioning. 
In the United States, various studies undertaken in 
the 1980s show that NCR practical successes were limited, 
consisting of electoral victories that were few and often 
momentary, and a legislative agenda that made little 
progress (Lipset and Raab, 1981; Johnson and Tamney, 1982; 
Zweir, 1984). Steve Brýice (1990: 175) goes so f ar as to 
suggest that the NCR, far from being a Idisciplinedr 
21 
charging army,,, is, rather, a 'motley crew" (1990: 175) . 
This view, however, is not shared by Sara Diamond (1989), 
who sees in the NCR's world-wide network a formidable enemy 
21 See also Hadden (1983); and, re: abortion, 
Petchesky (1984: 259-61). 
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to progressive social change. Others suggest the American 
NCR is re-groupingr re-directing its energies locally, and 
most certainly not "withering away" (Helvacioglu, 1991). 
Further, the NCR was initially mobilised by economic new 
rightists, and has continued to play an important role in 
facilitating new right politics generally. So long as 
there is a "right", there will likely be -its Christian 
component. 
In suggesting that the NCR remains an important social 
actor, one could also argue that the activities of an 
organisation like Focus on the Family imply, perhaps, a 
growing, imperialistic, American $mission, in Canada. NCR 
foreign intervention and agitation, so thoroughly 
researched by Sara Diamond (1989), is unfortunately ignored 
by many writers. American Christian corporations are 
active all over the world 22 , often engaged in propping up 
brutal dictatorships. Whilst these activities are more 
common to American-based organisations, it is imperative 
for Canadians as well to view the NCR's agenda in its 
entirety. Lesbians and gay men are not the only targets; 
attempts to combat NCR influence in the realm of sexuality 
must take account of the connections between domestic and 
foreign activities. 
22 Most recently, in the former communist countries. 
See re Albania, for exampler E. MaCDonaldo, 'IýUS BaptistS 
Corner a Muslim Market' (18 October 1992) Independent on 
SundaV. 
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Thus the NCR' s agenda needs to be examined in its 
entirety -their views in one area are of ten linked to their 
views in others. For example, as I briefly discussed in 
the previous chapter, the representation of the 11 inner 
city, as a den of homosexual iniquity is intimately 
connected to the construction of it as a centre of non- 
white (predominantly Black) criminal (including illicit 
sexual) activity. Furthermore, the opposition of NCR 
constituencies to Fgay rightsf is rooted not only in their 
Christian beliefs, but also in the white backlash to 
perceived anti-racist initiatives. This is consequential 
because it can help explain the appeal of the NCR agenda to 
people who may not completely share all the tenets of 
conservative Christianity. 
It is also important to note that most social 
movements are active on several fronts at once. It does 
not follow from the NCR being weak in one, for example 
'winning, legal cases, that it is therefore weak in all. 
In the United States, the NCR and its legislative 
representatives (eg: Jessie Helms) have recorded a number 
of successes in the f ield of arts censorship, achieving the 
public de-funding of individual artists and progressive 
arts organisations. Many American feminist, lesbian, and 
gay artists would find Bruce's (1990) analysis, that the 
NCR is dead",, inaccurate and offensive (as would pro- 
choice activists). 
257 
With respect to law, the arguments made in this 
chapter suggest that the legal process, be it legislative 
or judiciall, is a key site of social movement struggle. 
whilst individual battles can be seen to be 'won, or 'lost, 
(such as Bill 7, or the MOssop case itself), the relation 
between legal discourse and social movement politics is 
something more complex than a simple fresults tally, would 
indicate. For example, the REAL Women coalition may well 
, 'lose, ' the Mossop case at the Supreme Court of Canada; 
however, it would be misleading to view such an outcome as 
an indication of NCR 'powerlessness F. 23 It was just such a 
hostile climate that fuelled the American NCR eruption in 
the 1970s. The Roe v Wade abortion decision was 
instrumental in fostering NCR mobilisation in that country; 
the more recent judicial erosion of the Roe privacy 
principle has, paradoxicallyr put anti-abortion forces on 
the defensive and facilitated pro-choice mobilisation. 
The effects of Mossopts eventual outcome at the 
Supreme Court of Canada can be suggested, but in no way 
predicted. Will a 'pro' gay rights decision by Canada's 
highest court mean substantive changes in the lives of 
lesbians and gay men? Will the fury of the New Christian 
Right be even more unleashed? will lesbian and gay 
communities lose political momentum and rest easy in our 
Official status as a IminorityF deserving of public 
23 This is David RaYside's (1988) conclusion vis a vis 
the right following their 'loss' of Bill 7. see Chapter 3, 
and 4. 
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protections? Will the knowledge and skills gained by NCR 
organisations and leaders as a result of unsuccessful legal 
struggle be significant, perhaps providing that movement 
with a better base from which to launch the next battle ? 24 
Whatever the result of Mossop, the success of NCR 
organisations in achieving legal intervenor -status should 
not be underestimated. Whether they win or lose, these 
organisations have been granted an official, public 
platform from which to preach. Whilst their legal 
submissions may be innocuous and uninteresting, and only a 
handful of people will ever read them, the organisations, 
official legal status confirms the NCR as a legitimate 
party in more popular debates around sexuality and family. 
In the pages of the mainstream media, there may be other 
considerations related to effective communication, but NCR 
activists will not be so constrained by the imperatives of 
legal discourse. 
Despite their dissatisfaction with the courts and the 
Charter, many NCR organisations are turning more and more 
to these forums as waysý of communicating their beliefs 
(Hutchinson, interview) . The culture of 
Charter- lit igat ion 
has played an important role in mobilising not only 
progressive forces but, as Fudge (1989) has suggested, the 
right (at least in terms of formal organisations and 
24 Note that I have discussed some mobilisation issues 
in Chapter 4. 
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leaderships) as well. Indeed, the inauguration of jim 
Sclater"s Legal Defense Fund, with its stated goal of 
attracting money from groups that might not approve of the 
entirety of Focus's or REAL Women's agenda (I believe the 
main groups in mind here are the anti-abortion lobbies) 
could be a rather significant event. The intention is for 
the Fund to facilitate broad-based NCR legal initiatives 
(Sclater, interview). 
The Canadian New Christian Right is, in a sense, a 
novice at legal struggle. It is only beginning to flex its 
muscles, to extend its reach into this arena. The 
experience of organisations such as Focus on the Family, 
REAL Women, and the Salvation Army in a case like Mossop is 
a learning one for them. Win or lose in the short-term, 
they have gained valuable contacts, achieved a degree of 
mainstream respectability, and, perhaps most significantly, 
further supplemented their own 'Truths, as well as arming 
themselves with legal knowledge, strategies, and 
argumentation. In addition, they have succeeded in making 
the Mossop case a three-way site of struggle between the 
lesbian and gay rights movement . the government, and 
the 
New Christian Right. This last point means that both the 
lesbian and gay movement, and various state actors, must 
respond in some way to them. An evaluation of NCR 
effectivity must, therefore, also consider the ways 
in 
which that movement af f ects the discourse and strategies of 
others. For example, the NCR's relentless attack upon 
the 
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Charter may mean that left-wingers, who might otherwise be 
similarly critical of Charter-culture, instead defend its 
limited achievements - This phenomenon, whereby progressive 
academics and activists feel compelled to defend minimal 
policies and programs, rather than seek substantive changes 
to them, is one of the most significant ways in which the 
right shifts the battleground. 
Having said this much however, it is important not to 
over-emphasise the NCR threat. Social movement 
, effectivity" is an elusive concept. For example, some 
writers suggest that the American NCR managed to infiltrate 
the Republican Party. Whilst their candidates were 
somewhat unsuccessful in securing Republican nominations, 
the Party was forced to respond to the NCR agenda, taking 
on board a number of evangelical Christian positions 
(Diamond,, 1989). Others, however, suggest that Republican 
support for the NCR agenda was largely rhetorical and, 
further, that the very process of linfiltrationt was a co- 
opting one, altering the NCR agenda as much as the 
25 
Republican Party's (Bruce, 1990: 149-54) . 
25 Furthermore, this process should not be analysed 
solely as "history'; the early 1992 battles for the 
Republican nomination between Bush,, Buchanan, and Duke 
reminded us both that the right is divided,, and that 
conservative Christianity remains a potent political f orce. 
At the same time, the latter stages of the 1992 
presidential campaign suggested that the Republicans 
courting of the Christian right had backfired. Re Canada, 
see m. Cernetig, 'Preston Manning and his faith', (2 
December 1991) Globe and Mail. 
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Neither can the NCR be said to be an instrument of 
corporate America. Much is sometimes made of the funds 
corporations contribute to the American NCR (eg: Diamond, 
1989). However,, other research shows that the major 
American corporations have rarely contributed to NCR 
coffers, preferring instead the old-fashioned Republican 
Party,, often against NCR factions (Bruce,, -1990b: 54-5)). 
Furthennore, I would suggest that, these days, for every 
corporation giving funds to right-wing organisations one 
might find another adopting a 'sexual orientation, human 
rights policy or selling its products at Lesbian and Gay 
Pride festivals. 
26 
Furthermore, the conservative Christian movement is 
itself disparate and divided. Those active in NCR politics 
agree to put aside theological differences in order to 
unite around 'shared values' (Wuthnow, 1983). However, in 
the process, those shared values are compromised, 
organisations become unwieldy, and leaders increasingly 
removed from the concerns of grassroots constituents 
(Lienesch, 1982; Wilentz, 1990). 27 In the United States, 
several studies indicate. that those who share a number of 
'pro-family" values often neither support NCR organisations 
26 See, for example: "Advertisers j, Gays March 
With 
Pride' (24 June 1991) 96 Marketing 8; T. A. Stewart, ", Gay in 
Corporate America' (16 December 1991) Fortune 42. 
ally 
27 Chandler (1984) discusses how the NCR's attempts to 
with earlier-reviled Catholics and Mormons caused 
Problems for the movement; see also Wilcox and Gomez 
(1989- 
90) re alliances with Catholics. 
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nor endorse the NCR agenda (Simpson, 1983,1984; Shupe and 
Stacey, 1984). 1 have previously shown how Bibby's (1987) 
Canadian data indicates a discrepancy between NCR 
organisations and the belief -systems of those they claim to 
represent (see Chapter 5). 
In this way, the setting up of structures such as the 
Legal Defense Fund may have effects contrary to those 
intended. For example, the increasing desire of the 
Canadian NCR to 'work together",, and develop political 
coalitions, may succeed in achieving a similar atmosphere 
of conflict, and consensus break-down as has been 
experienced in the United States. Indeed, Don Hutchinson, 
the Salvation Army's legal advisor, expressed the view that 
an evangelical Christian movement could never really 
succeed in Canada, given the extent of internal division 
(interview; see also Cuneo, 1989). 
It is important, however, to problematise our notion 
of 'success#. Fields (1991) has argued that right-wing 
movements do not need to mobilise large constituencies or 
gain 'control of the state' in order to achieve a 
significant impact upon public debate. Her analysis, 
drawing from Habermas (1987b) , suggests that the 
'power' of 
the New Christian Right lies in its ability to explain the 
social world, to confidently identify problems and 
solutions, and to communicate these ideas as an alternative 
vision (see also Heinz, 1983). Fields (1991) argues that 
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the NCR is one oppositional social movement amongst many, 
but one with significant powers Of social interpretation 
(see also Susan Harding, 1991). 
Although Fields does not discuss law specifically, 
would suggest that legal cases can provide the right, as 
well as the left, with opportunities to contest dominant 
frameworks of meaning. However, the success, ' of this 
struggle may be related to how well the case affords access 
points into other fields (such as media or politics) rather 
than what is written down for judges in legal submissions. 
With respect to Mossop, it would seem that with regard to 
these considerations the case has been far more successful 
for the gay litigant than the NCR organisations. For 
example, Brian Mossop argues that his litigation achieved 
his prime objective - getting on the radio to talk about 
sexuality (interview), whilst Judy Anderson maintains that 
the "radical feminist" media has conspired to deny her an 
opportunity to speak on the matter at all (interview). 
In analysing the 'success' of the three organisations 
studied here, there is little indication that REAL Women, 
for example, is gaining political ground. Whilst the 
organisation has made friends in the Conservative Party, 
activists, language has, at times, been too, extreme', too 
hateful, for the organisation to make much impact upon the 
'liberal centre I (see also Chapter 4) - Judy Anderson quite 
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rightly noted that RW spokeswomen often sound foolish and 
'hysterical, ' when quoted in the media (interview), 28 
The election of Anderson to the presidency signalled, 
perhaps, an attempt by REAL Women to soften its tone, and 
change its image. Anderson is a full-time teacher, married 
to a divorced man, primary income provider for her family, 
with children in day care (interview). Whilst she firmly 
believes in the "radical feminist" conspiracy,, she is 
somewhat sensitive to the position of lesbians and gay men, 
"has gay friends', believes gay teachers should have job 
protection, and expresses no wish to "gay bash" 
(interview). Thus, as I argued in Chapter 4, r were REAL 
Women to substitute its language of homosexual disease and 
depravity for the more muted and popular tones of, for 
example, rights rhetoric, they may have more communicative 
success. 
Focus on the Family Association is an organisation 
likely to play an important, but behind the scenes, role in 
NCR Canadian activity. Focus is, perhaps, too American, 
and, again, too tover the top', for it to be a public NCR 
leader in its own right. on the other hand, during recent 
battles over telecommunications licensing and the portrayal 
of lesbians and gay men in public broadcasting, Focus did 
28 As I discussed in Chapter 4, the mere f act of entry 
into media texts says little about how activists' views 
will be represented. 
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play an important role. 29 The success of Focus on the 
Family may partially depend on its ability to appear 'pro- 
family", whilst disguising its fundamental religious 
theology. The creation of the Legal Defense Fund will 
assist in this. 
And, what of the Salvation Army? I have previously 
suggested that the Army finds itself in a paradoxical 
position vis a vis the Mossop case. On the one hand, 
whilst they oppose homosexuality on biblical grounds and 
believe in the ultimate necessity of saving souls for 
Jesus, Salvationists, to a large extent, do not support the 
NCR agenda of organisations like Focus and REAL Women. 
Yet, they appear in this intervention as primary funders 
and legal directors. Don Hutchinson was clearly 
uncomfortable with this role; he insisted that the 
coalition did not signal the Army's intention to join 
forces with Focus and REAL Women in the long term 
(interview). 
One of the things we have made quite clear is 
that this association or coalition is strictly 
for the purposes of intervention in this case, it 
is not a long-term arrangement ... The Salvation Army assesses its involvement with these matters 
on a case by caýe basis. We do not tend to throw 
our hat into the ring with coalitions that 
operate on a long-term basis. Principally 
because it's very important to us that we have 
some degree of control over what words are put 
into our mouth, and prefer to speak for 
ourselves ... (Hutchinson, interview) 
29 See also, D. Todd, "Evangelical Christians argue 
gay bashing a God-given rightf (30 November 1991) Vancouver 
Sun. The title of this article would seem to confirm NCR 
constructions of media bias. 
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The Salvation Army would appear to be a weak link in 
this particular NCR chain. The leadership is clearly 
uncomfortable both with their own involvement with some of 
the other organisations, and with how this will be publicly 
perceived by those who support and appreciate the Army's 
work in other areas. Again, their continued role in 
similar struggles may depend on the extent to which their 
participation is invisible -a fsolutionf that would seem 
to render the participation itself questionable. 
In Canada, f or the moment, it would seem worthwhile to 
consider NCR politics, neither awarding it more attention 
than it deserves, nor dismissing it as the absurd ravings 
of "religious fanatics'. Rather, opposing activists should 
perhaps be informed about this movement, its history and 
practices, examining the, perhaps unnecessary, 'self- 
policing" responses they make to it. It might also be 
useful to consider adopting a strategy of the u. S. anti- 
NCR organisation, People For The American Way (PAW) . 
30 That 
group has waged several successful campaigns exploiting the 
'liberal consensus' in the United States. PAw 
has 
actively sought to publicise the internal documents, 
speeches, and so on of NCR organisations and 
leaders, 
thereby revealing the underlying rpolitics of armageddon' 
behind NCR public expressions. 
30 Discussed, for example, in Bruce (1990: 178-9) and 
many other NCR analyses. 
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A strategy such as this (partly used, for example, by 
the Coalition For Gay Rights in Ontario during Bill 7), is 
only appropriate for certain political climates; the 
presence of aI liberal consensus,, which would f ind NCR 
religion extreme, dangerous, and alienating must be 
apparent. However, in North America, we do seem to live in 
such a climate today; indeed, this is recognised by the NCR 
itself, and PAW's campaigns have tended to be well- 
received. Thus, progressive movements might consider such 
an approach, particularly in a case such as Mossop, where 
the content of NCR legal submissions in lesbian/gay 
equality cases is as far removed from NCR sexual politics 
as NCR sexual politics is from the sexual politics of the 
'general population'. 
We must also remember, however, that fthe general 
consensus, can always change. There are enough historical 
examples of societies that quickly dispensed with concepts 
of equality and justice to prescribe and enforce 
hierarchies of race, religion, and so on. Knowing the 
beliefs and goals of conservative Christians may make some 
Of us more appreciative of liberalism - this is not an 
unimportant point. At the same time, one ought not to 
lose 
sight of the ways in which the 'liberal centrel 
is 
susceptible to pressure from the right, and from the 
left. 
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D. Concluding remarks 
It is, perhaps, worth stating what has so far been 
implicit: both the NCR, and its opponents (feminists, 
lesbiansi, gay meni, socialists, etc. ) share similar yet 
irreconcilable views of their social worlds. Both believe 
the other (or some 'other') controls society's major 
institutions - Both share a fear and distrust. of the other, 
each vilifies the other in internal communication. We each 
perceive our adversaries as constituting a networked, 
formidable obstacle to social transformation. To varying 
degrees, we have also linked the state' to our opponents' 
agenda. For example, left-wing academics have long 
suggested that judges have a conservative agenda, and 
decide cases based on the values and politics of the 
privileged classes from which they are drawn. 
Interestingly, this is a view echoed by REAL Women. They 
argue that, 
The ultimate decision of the courts has a great 
deal to do with the judge's own personal 
perspective of life and society ... the Supreme 
Court of Canada... is in fact imposing a liberal 
interpretation of the Charter on our country.... 
31 
Thus, only the liberal centre, insists on maintaining 
notions about law's neutrality, or judicial impartiality. 
How can these two very different 'right, and left' 
I 
interpretations be reconciled? There seems little doubt 
that Judy Anderson, Don Hutchinson, and Jim Sclater express 
31 'Charter of Rights - Effects on Women and 
the 
Family,, Pamphlet, REAL Women of Canada, n. d. 
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a 'reality' in saying that conservative Christian theology 
is presently not given mainstream social credibility as a 
source of knowledge and action. Similarlv. feminist 
perspectives which challenge notions of gender and seek to 
question compulsory heterosexuality are also marginalised. 
REAL Womenfs "radical feminist" is "really", someone like 
myself might argue, a "liberal feminist", -and, perhaps, 
part of a "liberal feminist conspiracy". Nevertheless, 
feminist groups probably do receive more public funding 
than conservative Christianity; Brian Mossop does perceive 
himself to have had access to and success with the media, 
and Judy Anderson claims neither (interviews); the movement 
for lesbian and gay legal equality has made enormous 
strides within the last ten years. And, yet, as I have 
already indicated, the NCR has had its impact, althought 
perhaps, in Canada, not as great - yet. 
The arguments I have put forward also suggest a 
complex and contradictory understanding of the role of 'the 
state,, and the concept of 'power'. For example, Brian 
Mossop, employed by the federal Treasury Department, could, 
in one sense, be seen to be making a claim against and a 
demand from 'the state,. Yet, the situation is somewhat 
more complicated than this. The Mossop case has seen one 
statutorily-created, government appointed body (the human 
rights tribunal) order a government ministry (Mossop's 
employer) to officially recognise a gay male couple as 
" family"; another government- appointed agency (the 
Federal 
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court of Appeal) overturned this decision; yet another (the 
Supreme Court) may well chose to uphold the tribunal, s 
original judgment. And, upon this terrain, opposing social 
movements struggle for interpretive authority. 
Within contemporary struggles around sexuality, the 
lesbian and gay movements, and the New Christian Right, 
each perceive 'the other' to 'have power'. Yet, the Mossop 
case, and I include the litigation's effects well beyond 
the conf ines of strict I legal processes I. reveals the ways 
in which power has shifted between liberal professionals 
(the tribunal adjudicator; the Court Challenges 
administrators), conservative judges (at the Federal 
Court),, Conservative politicians, and the irreconcilable 
32 
movements of diverse social actors. 
I am not here subscribing to liberal pluralist theory; 
nevertheless, the relation between social movements, legal 
processes, and 'state, agents is a complicated one. For 
example, I have suggested that the dominance of liberal 
equality discourse in Canada, and the gradual "success' of 
lesbian and gay movements for inclusion within its terms, 
has made it correspondingly difficult for right-wing 
movements to publicly express virulent homophobia. Rather 
than vilifying , homosexuals I, New Christian Right activists 
have focused their public rhetoric around child welfare and 
32 See also Beckford's (1990) understanding of 
the 
different forms of power potentially wielded 
by NCR 
movements. 
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general 'familyr principles. Interestingly, this has led 
to a "new" social phenomenon - the need to defend and 
justify heterosexual marriage -a task inconceivable in an 
earlier period of homosexual pathologisation. It is thus 
arguable that cases such as M-Ossop, regardless of outcome 
or possible negative effects, may succeed in putting 
heterosexuality on the defensive, or, at- least, into 
question, and that liberal equality's seeming ability to 
accommodate 'lesbian and gayr subjects has facilitated this 
process. 
Finally, whilst the New Christian Right may not be 
able to mobilise a massive constituency, or play a crucial 
role in the 'making, of political power, it is nevertheless 
important to avoid underemphasising the power Christian 
religion continues to exercise within the lives of many 
people. In the fight for lesbian and gay liberation 
particularly, the conservative Christian tradition poses a 
formidable obstacle. 
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CHAPTER 7 
JUDGES AND EXPERT-S 
In previous chapters, I have addressed several issues 
to do with the relationship between social movements and 
law reform. I have deliberately avoided prioritising what 
goes on 'in courtf and, instead, have explored how diverse 
texts, actorst strategies, and politics affect this 
engagement. Indeed, I have suggested that the outcome of 
particular cases, and the content of judicial utterances, 
are often not the most important elements in law reform 
struggles. However, I now wish to consider the role and 
politics of judges and experts within litigation -a site 
where many legal analyses often begin (and end). 
In this chapter, I am concerned with pursuing two 
related questions. What is the role of 'experts' within 
litigation? And, why do judges reach the decisions they 
do? I begin by considering the politics of expert 
witnessing Frf rom the witnesses I perspective. I then f ocus 
upon several Canadian lesbian and gay rights cases and also 
refer to other decisions, including an American case 
involving a claim of sex, discrimination. I provide a 
detailed analysis of the two judgements in MossoP to give 
a fuller picture. 
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of "Experts " 
Those seeking 
. 
both to advance and thwart social change 
through law reform have historically made use of expert, 
knowledges (Kargon, 1986). Often, as I have noted in 
previous chapters, this has involved the appropriation of 
professional discourses by social movements seeking to 
convince and persuade others. Within litigation, however, 
the 'expert witness', a person who is deemed sufficiently 
knowledgable by the court to give "opinions' (and not 
simply recount 'what they saw"),, is the only authority 
permitted to expound on professional matters. 
Many writers have analysed the difficulties 
encountered by professional 'expertsf, most focusing upon 
the tensions to do with , role negotiationt (scholar vs 
advocate). ' For feminists and others,, a more important 
concern has been the ability to communicate effectively the 
complexity of their politics within legal forums. For 
example, Alice Kessler-Harris (1987), a feminist historian, 
has written of her experience as an 'expert witness' in the 
Sears case, 2 compelled, given the adversarial proceeding, 
1 See, for example, 'Gothard (1986); Levine (1983); M. 
Rose (1986); Rosen (1977). 
2 The details of this American case are not important 
for my purposes. Briefly, the claim against the company 
was initiated by the human rights regulatory body on behalf 
of the class 'women'. The claim alleged that Sears had 
engaged in hiring and other practices which effectively 
prohibited women from taking up more lucrative sales 
Positions. One legal issue revolved around whether women 
% chose' not to take up such positions (eg: they preferred 
to work part-time, did not feel comfortable in high-powered 
sales jobs, etc. ), or were structurally prevented 
from 
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into adopting a rigid analysis to which she did not fully 
subscribe. 
One intuits the difference between working in a library and participating in a courtroom drama, but until one has experienced it, the disjunction 
between the two remains abstract. Accustomed to 
developing the subtle distinctions of an 
argument,, to negotiating about fine points of interpretation, the historian quickly discovers 
that thesis skills must be abandoned in 
testifying. Maintaining a position is as important as the position taken. Consistency is 
not merely a virtue but evidence of one's 
expertise.. -I got my first taste of the clear distinction made by the legal profession between 
learning the truth and constructing a case; 
between understanding and persuading. And there, 
I also learned for the first time, that precisely 
what I as a historian cared most about would 
surely destroy my testimony if I pursued it. My 
job, I was told, was to answer all questions, but 
to provide no more information than was 
demanded ... Any attempt I made to introduce 
controversy, disagreement and analysis merely 
revealed that history was an uncertain tool and 
invalidated both its findings and MY 
conclusions ... I found myself constructing a 
rebuttal in which subtlety and nuance were 
omitted, and in which evidence was marshalled to 
make a point while complexities and exceptions 
vanished from sight (Kessler-Harris, 1987: 61-2). 
Kessler Harris (1987: 64) expressed "surprise,, at how the 
lawyer for Sears often did not challenge the substance of 
her testimony but,, rather, the language in which it was 
phrased -a tactic that often resulted in her comments 
being presented as absurd or extreme. The structure of 
'yes i, or I no I 
respond. 
answers also 
I was nevertheless 
within the yes or 
complicated her ability to 
astonished at how easy it was, 
,- no 
f ormat demanded by the 
doing so as a result of Sears, discriminatory practices. 
The company won the case. For comment, see Kessler-Harris 
(1987); Scott (1988a; 1988b); Milkman (1986). several 
court documents are reproduced in Hall (1986). 
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court, to agree with statements simply because I 
could not deny them, not because they represented 
my understanding of the issues involved (Kessler- 
Harris, 1987: 64). 
Margrit Eichler also confesses to having rather 
ambivalent feelings about her part in Canadian lesbian and 
gay rights cases (interview). 
... [ it is ] very dif f icult f or someone who def ines herself as a scholar, in the sense of being 
involved in trying to generate knowledge, not 
just taking what's there and teaching it, to be 
put into a situation where you're under oath and 
where the attempt is to make scholarly research 
serve a purpose for which it was not 
created ... thatfs the basic problem (Eichler, interview). 
Eichler's evaluation of the different cases in which she's 
been involved is mixed. The Andrews case 3, for example, was 
not a "pleasant" experience for her; she recalls that 
Andrews F lawyers insisted upon maintaining complete control 
over questioning and legal strategy. Eichler felt like "a 
slot machine, different buttons are being pushed, if 
someone pushes the wrong button there Is very little you can 
do about it" (interview) - As I have discussed elsewhere 
(Herman , 19 9 1) 14 Eichler was "pushed" 
into making several 
statements that did not reflect the complexities of her 
analytical approach to 'family'. 
See Chapter 2 and later in this Chapter. 
4 In this article, I was not particularly sympathetic 
to Eichler fs intervention, and tended to underestimate the 
limitations within which her testimony was given. 
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On the other hand, Brian Mossopts counsel (lawyers 
with the Canadian Human Rights Commission) "took the time" 
to listen, and responded positively to Eichlerfs 
suggestions for re-orienting their legal argument (Eichler, 
interview). Eichler believes her contribution is far more 
valuable if she is allowed to formulate the questions 
lawyers will ask her in direct examination. (interview) . 
The assumptions underlying courtroom questions, and legal 
actors unwillingness to admit them, are, for Eichler, the 
key obstacle to a "successful" "expert' intervention 
(interview). In her view, the ideal 'expert' contribution 
is, perhaps, a written paper or report, rather than oral 
testimony made to appear absurd or ridiculous during 
5 
questioning from lawyers on both sides (interview). 
In many cases, then, the 'expert' witness is thus 
prevented from displaying the full breadth of knowledge 
they possess. Certain perspectives are excluded (by 
lawyers, legal conventions, and so on) from the legal 
process,, often prior to judges even hearing the case. 
What, however, happens to the "expert" evidence that is 
presented to the court? 
5 In Knodel, the psychiatric report was given in such 
a manner (see Chapter 2 and below). 
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Judges and E2g2prts 
Lawyers present 'expert' evidence to judicial forums 
for several reasons. In part, the production of an 'expert 
witness I has become a historical convention, each side must 
have at least one or risk being considered incompetent. 
Indeed, the f ederal government "sf ailure to present an 
'expert' in Mossop was partially responsible for the NCR 
deciding that the Attorney-General "s of f ice lacked the 
necessary commitment to defend the case. Primarily, 
however, , expert' evidence is offered to convince, 
persuade, and educate decision-makers (see Chesler et al., 
1988). In this way, legal forums often become complex 
battlegrounds between opposing experts and their respective 
fknowledges'. Judges respond to these interventions in 
different ways. 
[11 Knodel (1991) 
Timothy Knodel sought to have his health benefits 
extended to his partner. The legal battle was over whether 
the 'opposite sex' definition of fspouse' in the governing 
legislation infringed s. 15 of the Charter. The judge 
concluded that it did, and ordered that same-sex couples be 
included within the legislation's definition of spousef 
(Knodel, 1991). 
During the hearing of the case, Knodel's lawyer 
presented to the court the report of an 'expert' 
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psychiatrist. Michael Myers, "clinical professor of. ýý, i 
psychiatry at the University of British Columbia,,, 
concluded that homosexuality was innate and due to an 
"abnormality in brain differentiation of the developing 
fetus" (Knodel,, 1991). "Homosexuals" j, Myers argued, had 
"no control" over their sexual proclivities (Knodel, 1991). 
The psychiatrist also defined homosexuality for the court 
and stated its statistical incidence in "western culture" 
(Knodel,, 1991). He further presented a "psychological 
portrait,, of the homosexual (not dissimilar to the one 
painted of "Black children" in the Brown civil rights 
litigation nearly 40 years before, see Chapter 2), based on 
the concept of 'stigma'. 
By the time of puberty, most of these 
individuals, who have felt 'different' as 
children, begin to experience strong feelings of 
attraction to members of their own sex. They 
have no control over these feelings - they are 
not a deliberate choice. For most of them, this 
is very frightening and lonely, because they have 
come to believe that what they are experiencing 
is not considered normal by most of society. 
This then leads to isolation, unhappiness, self- 
loathing, and a sense of inferiority. I have 
listened to the life stories of hundreds of 
homosexual men and women and I can attest to the 
pervasive influence of discriminatory ideas, 
beliefs, and laws on the sense of these 
individuals. This indifferent or hostile climate 
not only damages one's worthiness but causes many 
people to lead <iouble or fragmented lives. They 
dare not be open for fear of further ridicule and 
rejection. Many attempt to pass as heterosexual 
people and do their best to conform. When they 
meet someone else, fall in love, and become a 
couple, they are usually much happier and find it 
easier to cope with life. (Knodel, 1991) 
Myers also testified, based on a personal interview with 
the claimants, that Knodel and his partner were just this 
type of happy couple. Adopting the analysis of Margrit 
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Eichler (the sociologist figuring prominently in the Mossop.. 7, 
litigation), the psychiatrist listed several factors 
, 'proving" that the two men were a couple "no different 
from" heterosexual ones, and that together they constituted 
a "family" (Knodel, 1991). 
In setting out the evidence, Rowles, the British 
Columbia Supreme Court judge hearing the case, reproduced 
several passages form Myers' report at length. Her 
decision, however, is not based at all on the 
psychiatrist 11 s def inition of homosexuality, or even his 
evidence of the harm caused by "stigma". Instead, in her 
resolution of the dispute Rowles refers only to Myers 11 
analysis of the two men as a "family", an understanding he 
acknowledged was borrowed from SoCiology. 6 Clearly, the 
psychiatric evidence played some role within Rowles' text, 
if only as a sign of her sympathy with 'poor unfortunates'. 
There is, however, little indication that Rowles was 
persuaded, educated, or informed by the 'expert' 
intervention. 
f2l Andrews (1988) 
Despite having a rather conservative litigation 
strategy,, 7 the lawyers acting on behalf of Karen Andrews' 
As is, I believe, the concept of stigma. 
7 Karen Andrews, Address (Osgoode Hall Law School, 
York University, 22 February 1989). 
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claim for 'family' health benefits presented several -ýý 46, 
'alternative' knowledge sources to the court. No 
psychiatric evidence was offered; instead, 'expert, 
contributions were solicited from three sociologists, two 
of whom had written extensively on lesbian and gay issues. 
These latter two, Barry Adam and Mariana Valverde, 
discussed in their affidavits historical persecution and 
the formation of sexual identities respectively. " Each 
scholar attempted, within the limits set by Andrews' 
attorneys, to offer the court elements of a Fsocial 
constructionist' approach to sexuality; however, the 
primary paradigm they each employed was the minority' one 
(see Chapter 3). Valverde's affidavit noted arguments for 
the immutability of homosexuality; however, she neither 
endorsed nor rejected such perspectives (nor did she offer 
a choice' analysis). Whilst both these 'expert' 
interventions sought to inject some alternative 
perspectives from feminist and lesbian and gay studies, 
their overriding effect was to suggest that lesbians and 
gay men were a fixed minority deserving of legal equality. 
Margrit Eichler, who submitted an affidavit and 
testified in court, argued on behalf of a "functional 
definition" of family (later adopted by the Tribunal in 
Mosspp) , and stated that Karen Andrews I relationship met 
8 Affidavits of Barry Adam and Mariana Valverde, 
Andrews v Ont. (Min. of Healthl. 
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the criteria for this (see Chapter 2). Offering the 
perspective adopted by Myers in 
-Knodel . 
Eichler argued that 
Karen Andrews and her partner displayed qualities Fsimilar 
to' those exhibited by heterosexual 'spouses'. 
In deciding Andrews I action, McCrae chose to ignore 
all, the " expert, interventions. From the 
_judgment, 
one 
would not even know that he had been presented with this 
evidence. The Andrews decision refers only to the 
authority of dictionaries; sociology is deemed so 
irrelevant as to be unworthy of mention. Thus, despite the 
manner in which Adam and Valverde fliberalised' their 
analyses9, and despite Eichlerfs attempts to offer a 
'modern' family analysis to the court,, these "experts" 
would appear to have played little or no role in the 
judge"s resolution of the complaint. 
f3l E. E. O. C. v Sears (1986,1988) 
Two feminist historians appeared as f expert witnesses I 
in this case - for opposing sides. 10 One, Rosalind 
Rosenberg, testified as to women's internalisation of the 
'cult of domesticity' (for the employer), the other, Alice 
Kessler-Harris as to how women have always performed non- 
9 Their own academic writings are f ar more complex and 
radical, see, for example, Valverde (1985), Adam (1987). 
10 See footnote above for description of the issues at 
stake in this litigation. 
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traditional labour yet suffer institutional discrimination 
(for the Commission). 
There were two decisions in Sears, the first at 
Illinois District Court, the second at the 7th Circuit 
Court of Appeal. In the initial judgment, the District 
Court judge issued an 89 page decision in favour of Sears. 
The bulk of the ruling condemns the E. E. O. C. 's statistical 
evidence and lack of direct witness testimony of 
discrimination. Under a section entitled 'Other Evidence 
of Interest', the judge devotes four paragraphs and three 
footnotes to the appearances of the feminist historians 
(E. E. O. C., 1986: 1314-15). 
In the District Court judge's words, Kessler-Harrisfs 
testimony consisted of "bald assertions" with "little 
persuasive authority" (E. E. O. C.,, 1986: fn. 63; 1314). She is 
accused of making "sweeping general is ations 11 from "isolated 
examples",, focusing on "small groups of unusual women" 
(E. E. O. C., 1986: 1314). The judge acknowledges that "some" 
women have always worked in non-traditional fields, but 
states that is not thq issue in this case, which is 
concerned with the history and practices of the Sears 
company (E. E. O. C., 1986: 1314). 
Rosenberg, on the other handf gave "convincing" 
testimony with "reasonable conclusions" (E. E. O. C., r 
1986: 1315). Whilst his discussion of her testimony takes 
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up no more than one paragraph of the decision, the District 
Court judge clearly uses Rosenberg's conclusions to attack 
the basis of the E. E. O. C. 's statistical evidence. 
In conclusion, EEOC's statistical analyses are 
dependent upon the crucial arbitrary assumption 
that men and women are equally interested in 
commission sales at Sears... the EEOC has provided 
nothing more than unsupported generalisations by 
expert witnesses with no knowledge of Sears to 
support that assumption ... All -the evidence 
presented by Sears indicates that men are at 
least two times more interested in commission 
selling than women (E. E. O. C., 1986: 1315). 
In the Circuit Court of Appeal decision, neither 
historian is mentioned by name, nor is their testimony 
referred to in any explicit way. In one paragraph (of the 
58 page majority judgement), the 7th Circuit affirms the 
District Courtfs view of womenfs interests (E. E. O. C., 
1988: 321). The 'experts' that really concern the Court of 
Appeal are the statisticians - their testimony receives 'LV 
serious consideration. The one dissenting voice argues 
against the notion that women were never "interested" in 
commission sales jobs; however, this judge never refers to 
Kessler-Harrisfs evidence directly (E. E. O. C., 1988: 360-2). 
Thus, the judgments in this case which occasioned so much 
feminist comment and distress, actually tended to ignore 
both the appearance of the historians and the primary 
intellectual debate in which they were engaged. 
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f4l-Mossop (1989.1990) 
In Mossop,, one of the f irst steps taken by the 
Tribunal adjudicator in her decision was to establish the 
authority of the 'expert witness', Margrit Eichler, upon 
whose testimony the Tribunal judgment rests. While 
"expert's, qualifications are often briefly reviewed in 
reasons for judgment, here Eichlerl's -academic and 
professional history was given in great detail. The reader 
is informed not only that Eichler holds a doctorate in 
sociology and is a "full" professor at the Ontario 
Institute For Studies in Education, but also that she holds 
two cross -appointments, has received "numerous research and 
development grants",, and "has published extensively" (1989, 
4.4). 11 We also learn she has written the only existing 
textbook on "families" in Canada, and that she provides 
consulting services to a host of public and private bodies 
(4.4). 
The tribunal adjudicator, Mary-Elizabeth Atcheson, 
then incorporated Eichler's perspective on family within 
her opinion. She began by establishing a lack of "standard 
definition" and "consensus" with respect to the "evolving" 
concept of family (4.7,, 4.5). She went on to search for 
sources of meaning,, f inding the parliamentary record of 
little assistance as the Minister responsible at the time 
simply commented on what the concept "should mean, or might 
11 Paragraph numbers in brackets refer to the report 
as noted in the case list appendix. 
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mean, as opposed to what it did mean" (4.56). Atchesonrs 
response to the Attorney General's argument that "the" 
meaning was "generally understood" was that Counsel adduced 
no evidence to support this contention and, further, that 
general understandings may be discriminatory and therefore 
not a valid source of meaning (4.59). The adjudicator also 
noted that law did not always reflect the reality of 
peoples' lives; simply because a relationship had not been 
heretofore recognised in law did not mean it should not be 
now (4.61). Atcheson further attempted to minimise the 
relevance of current legal provision specifically based on 
"opposite sex" relations (4.61). 
The tribunal adjudicator concluded that the term 
11 f amily status" was "not clear and unambiguous" - 
Dictionary definitions, she added, may be reasonably 
consistent but they are broad, and often include non- 
marital and non-biological relationships (4-63). The 
Tribunal, Atcheson argued, did not need to select "the" 
"all-inclusive meaning", but only "all "reasonable" meaning, 
one that "best accords with the Act" (4.67, orig. emph. ). 
Her f inal act of interpretation in this process was to 
find that the term "reasonable" was itself fluid, and hence 
"impossible of measurement" (4.70). She then put aside any 
formal "test of reasonableness'. 
As a practical matter, the Tribunal agrees with 
the Complainant that terms should not be confined 
to their historical roots, but must be tested in 
today's world, against an understanding of how 
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people are living and how language reflects 
reality. Dr. Eichler's evidence, as well as that 
of the Complainant, was helpful in making these 
assessments. Value judgments should play no part 
in this process because they may operate to 
favour a view of the world as it might be 
preferred over the world as it is. (4.70) 
Atchesonts dilemma was that of the progressive 
liberal, faced with a case where the 'law as it is' did not 
'go the way' that she wanted (see Kennedy,, 1987). She 
must,, therefore, develop a strategy that allowed her to 
ignore the range of prior cases and legislative provisions 
that clearly did not help Brian MOSSOP. 
12 
In the process, 
she articulated a broad liberal ideology that allowed her 
to over-ride and trivialise what had heretofore stood as 
'precedent' on the subject of homosexuality. There was 
really no basis 'in law" for her decision - she must 
actively create new law and rely on other sources of 
knowledge to support her finding of discrimination. 
Atcheson saw the Tribunal's task as one of performing 
"value-freef adjudication, not imposing any conception of 
'the good life' upon litigants (4.70). The Tribunal's 
society is a pluralist one, where the role of adjudicators 
is to protect the minority from I'majoritarian" tyranny. 
No one group should have the power to impose its morality 
12 See Chapter 2 for discussion of these cases. 
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on others, all people are equal and are due equal rights 
and benefits. 
13 
However, within this paradigm the "same-sex couple" is 
seen as equal to or the same as the heterosexual couple. 
Heterosexuality remains unchallenged as the unproblematic 
norm. The Tribunal adopted aI same as,, approach to counter 
the usual 'different than, analysis exhibited in earlier 
cases on sexual orientation. Atcheson recognised that 
these 'sameness' principles are what had animated Canadian 
liberal human rights law in the 1980s. However, these same 
principles had not yet been extended to the legal treatment 
of homosexuality. It was this failure of law, both judge- 
made and statutory (with some exceptions), that compelled 
the Tribunal to rely on the insights of sociology. 
Throughout Atcheson's decision, she underscored the 
compatibility of law and sociology. 
The evidence of Dr. Eichler was that the term 
does not have one definition for all purposes. 
Sociology and law appear to be similar in this 
regard. (4.65) 
In contrast, the Federal Court of Appeal, in 
judicially reviewing the Tribunal decisionr made every 
effort to distance law from sociology. "Status", Marceau 
stated, was a "legal concept" (674). The "f unc t iona 1 
13 See use of words and phrases like "harmony"(4.47) 
and "equal opportunity" (4.49). The Tribunal also 
expresses the liberal view that values "should play no 
part" in the adjudication process (4.70). For discussion 
of legal liberalism see R. Dworkin (1984); MacNeil (1989); 
Sagoff (1983); Sandler (1984). See also Chapter 2 and 3. 
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definition given by the sociological approach" was "ad hoc" 
and not "acceptable" (674). Marceau misrepresented the 
sociology of which he was critical, arguing that the 
"functional approach" had simply taken "some attributes 
usually ascribed to families" as being "the essence of the 
concept itself being signified,,. Eichler, on the other 
hand, had specifically maintained that family could not be 
reduced to an 'essence'. 
At times, the Courtls approach is quite derisive. 
Although the Tribunal had decided that Mossop and his lover 
constituted "sociologically speaking a sort of family", the 
Court held that no approach "other than the legal one" 
could lead to a proper understanding of what is meant by 
the phrase 'family status" (674) . 
14 "Family" Marceau 
continued, did not have a meaning "so uncertain, unclear 
and equivocal" that it could not be defined (673). The 
word signified a "basic concept" that had "always been" 
(673). Non-biological formations had been rendered 
"normal" through marriage and other legal mechanisms, but 
these did not affect the "core meaning" of the word (673). 
Marceau described other meanings as "Peripheral", 
"residual ... analogical uses" (673). 
14 See also Roger Cotterrell's (1986) discussion of 
the relationship between law and sociology as disciplines 
(although I do not agree that law is as "closed, and self- 
referential a system as he makes it out to be). 
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Family, according to Marceau, was not a "fluid term" 
(674). As noted above, the "sociological approach" had 
missed the "essence of the concept" (674). There was, for 
the Court,, a "generally understood meaning to the word 
, 'family"" (675). This last point was legitimated through 
the judicial strategy of 'common sense knowledget. Phrases 
such as "generally seen", "no one would want", or 
"generally understood" (673-5) were employed to persuade 
the reader of the 'normalcy, of the judgefs views. 15 This 
contrasted sharply with the Tribunal's explicit critique of 
such understandings as being potentially discriminatory. 
The Court then concluded its discussion of the meaning 
of"family status", by arguing that the "real issue 
16 
underlying the complaint" was "sexual orientation" (675) . 
For the Tribunal, the "real issue" or subject of the 
complaint began and ended with the meaning of "family'. 
The question to be decided was whether or not Mossop and 
his partner constituted a "family'. If so, they were 
15 See Goodrich (1986) for discussion of how judges 
deploy lingusitic techniques. 
16 The Court disposdd of this "real issue" by finding 
that although sexual orientation might be an analogous 
ground under S. 15, r the Charter could not be used as a "legislative amendment machine" to be read into human 
rights legislation (676). Only parliament can legislate 
the inclusion of sexual orientation in the Canadian Human 
Rights Act (675-8) (see Chapter 2 for explanation of 
various rights mechanisms). Stone,, in his concurring 
judgment in the case, stressed that he would have 
considered Charter arguments seriously if they had been 
raised. Marceaulls approach here has been explicitly 
challenged by the Ontario Court of Appealfs ruling in Haig 
(see Chapter 2). 
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clearly being discriminated against on 'f amily status, ' 
grounds as their "kind of family,, (as Marceau later put it) 
was being denied a benefit given to others. Once having 
determined they were a family "sociologically speaking", 
there was little else to adjudicate (other than to diffuse 
the Attorney-Generalfs arguments). The Tribunal was 
clearly not concerned with fhomosexuality, per se, but only 
its manifestation in a category called "same-sex couple". 
In fact,, the entire Tribunal judgment functions to render 
sexualitv itself invisible. 
On the other hand, the judges of the Federal Court of 
A -r-% Appeal refused to allow this. Their subject was indeed 
'the homosexual, who, according to their interpretation, 
was the "real issue" missed by the Tribunal. Marceau 
insisted that it was "sexual orientation" which lay at the 
root of the complaint; his strategy of conservative 
judicial restraint allowed him to maintain the status quo 
of exclusion. 
Marceaufs political conservatism was apparent in more 
than his deployment of traditional interpretive strategies. 
In his analysis of why section 15 should not be read into 
human rights enactments, Marceau clearly expressed himself 
as a protector of the private sector. 
For one thing, human rights codes impact on areas 
of the private sector of economic life which are 
not readily seen to fall within the scope of the 
Charter. It may well be that the legislatures 
who entrenched the Charter were willing to impose 
a more demanding standard of conduct on 
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themselves and on the executive than they would 
have decided to impose on the population at 
large ... the Charter [does not] purport to 
restructure the global juristic background 
against which all private ordering takes 
place. (676) 
This point was, arguably, simply one of principle, having 
no bearing on the case at hand. The Canadian Human Rights 
Act, which was, in Mossop, the statute being considered, 
applies to the federal government as employer, having 
nothing to do with the private sector (as do other codes). 
The Court was thus protecting the freedom of private 
economic ordering in a case that had nothing directly to do 
with this. Marceau was, perhaps, being strategic, hoping 
to persuade other courts, dealing with codes that do apply 
to the private sector, to follow his lead. However, the 
rhetorical use of this argument implies it was applicable 
to the case at hand. 
This passage is one of the few to explicitly reveal 
the Federal Court of Appeal's conservative politics. For 
the most part, Marceau and his colleagues refrained from 
making obviously 'partisanf arguments, such as those 
expressed by McCrae in Andrews. As I noted above, McCrae 
based his finding that a 'homosexual partner, could not be 
a "spouse" on the "fact" that homosexuals were unable to 
marry and procreate (Andrews, p. 16,193). He argued that 
the governmentfs definition of Fspousel was related to the 
important objective of "establishing and maintaining 
traditional families" (Andrews, p. 16,194). In MossoPr 
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Marceau is never quite this explicit, although these views 
are certainly implied within his search for the meaning of 
11 f C. Imi 
ly of 
0 
17 
For Marceau and McCrae , the law must maintain the 
status quo,, it must not be used as a weapon of social 
change, and it must reflect the values and morals of 
patriarchal capitalism. These judges exhibit a 'small- 
minded' world-view, and they claim this view as 
representative of the 'common folk's, 'common sense', 
availing themselves of various conservative judicial 
techniques to underpin their decisions. Liberals, on the 
other hand, show an increased willingness to approach 
"sexual orientation, with an 'equality, paradigm paramount, 
and to use expert knowledges as a means to an end. 
F51 Judges and experts 
Are there any conclusions one can reach about the role 
of "expert' evidence and the politics of judging in these 
cases? I have suggested that in only one decision, that 
of the human rights tribunal in Mossop, did professional 
expertise appear to influence the decision. However, it is 
unclear whether Atcheson was persuaded by Eichler's 
analysis, or merely used it to confirm and legitimise a 
pre-existing view of lesbian and gay relationships. As the 
17 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Egan case is 
another example of a conservative approach to gay rights. 
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federal government chose not to present its own 'expert', 
Atcheson was spared having to explicitly dispose of 
contrary 'scientific' opinion. Contrary legal opinion she 
simply ignored. In -Knodel, 
Rowles quoted from the 
psychiatric report extensively, but did not base her actual 
decision in Myers 11 arguments. Whilst in Mossolp, at the 
f ederal court,, sociology received the kind of treatment 
perhaps meted out by judges to 'new, sciences in the 17th 
century (see Kargon, 1986). 
As Chesler et al. (1988: 204-5) have noted, lawyers 
present 'expert' opinion in order to "convert" judges 
through a process of education. The research of Chesler et 
al. (1988), based on a study of American school de- 
segregation litigation, is somewhat inconclusive. Some 
judges did report having been "converted", whilst others 
used social science evidence to legitimate the imposition 
of activist remedies (Chesler et al., 1988: 208-16). 
Whilst texpertf evidence may have educational and 
reforming effects in some cases, this model of change rests 
upon the assumption that judges really are the 'neutral 
arbiters of liberal discourse,, and that, with correct' 
information, they will reach 'right" decisions-"' Several 
writers have argued, and I would agree, that in the 
majority of cases judges bring to court the politics and 
18 As I discussed in Chapter 4, this is the model 
underlying some American conceptions of rights reform (eg: 
Minow, 1990). 
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vested interests that will lead them to certain decisions 
and not others (see Sumner, 1979). 19 Expert witnesses will 
provide evidence legitimising these decisions, but are 
unlikely to cause much judicial "conversion". In Mossop, 
for example, the tribunal adjudicator was a feminist 
lawyer, one of the founders of the feminist legal action 
group LEAF (see also Atcheson, et al. 1984). Whilst 
feminist credentials by no means guarantee a pro-gay rights 
stance,, the two do, often, go together. 20 Marceau, on the 
other hand, was a Federal Court justice with a history of 
conservative decision-making. Shortly before MossOP, he 
had even dissented in an opinion giving rights to unmarried 
heterosexual couples (Re Schaap, 1988). Karen Andrews 
believes that McCrae's decision in her case was rooted in 
religious beliefs (interview). although this is not evident 
from the judgment. 
In lesbian and gay rights cases, what judges "know' 
about homosexuality is less a consequence of 'expert' 
courtroom interventions, and more the result of the sexual 
politics they bring to the decision-making process; a 
politics informed by their social location and experience, 
as well as any or all of several other sources, including: 
religion, psychiatry, biology, feminism, and sociology. 
19 See Olsen (1980) for a study of the Canadian 
judiciary as a 'state elite%, 
20 Arguably, female, especially feminist, judges are 
more likely to reach decisions favouring "untraditional' 
families. Aside from Rowles and Atcheson,, see Arbourl's 
decision in Leroux (1990) and Dawson's in Leshner (1992). 
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Indeed, one possible interpretation of current lesbian and 
gay rights litigation is to view these cases as struggles 
between the new liberal professionals (who may also be 
elite participants in social movements), often holding 
positions within the legal process somewhat low in the 
hierarchy (such as human rights adjudicators), and the 
higher courts, still largely dominated by white, middle 
class, conservative men. Should 'out, lesbians and gay men 
come to be selected for judicial appointment, perhaps they 
will bring to case law development another "new', local 
knowledge. 
All this is not to say that judges are ffreel to come 
to any decision they want. The restrictions of precedent, 
appellate review, legal technicalities , and a host of other 
factors, all play an important role. The legitimacy of law 
depends, to a large extent, on the practice of " stare 
decisis', the adherence to past decisions as legal 
'truths'. Even when judges are extremely keen to overturn 
precedent with which they do not politically agreer there 
are strong cautionary compulsions. In the summer of 1992, 
the United States Supreme Court refused to completely 
overturn the Roe abortion rights decision, despite most of 
the justices having been selected for appointment on the 
basis that they would do so. 
The Brown case (discussed in Chapter 2) is another 
such example, where the judge, despite his obvious sympathy 
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with the gay litigants, felt unable to offer them a remedy 
due to binding precedent. Although the plaintiffs were 
denied relief, Coultas, sympathy with them, and his 
implicit condemnation of the moralistic conservatism of the 
Social Credit government was apparant. 
The history of western civilisation records that 
from biblical times to our own, homosexuals have 
been subjected to discrimination because of their 
sexual orientation. As with other forms of 
discrimination, it is unjust for it fails to take 
into account individual merit, character or 
accomplishment. The form and extent of it is 
uglier, the cry more shrill since the onset of 
AIDS. I accept that those who suffer HIV or 
AIDS, often very ill, are discrimninated against 
and persecuted in various subtle ways, and some 
not so subtle at all. (Brown, p. 309) 
The comments of the B. C. Minister of Health were 
characterised as "unnecessary, inflammatory, and reflecting 
ignorance of the disease that one would not expect" (Brownr 
p. 311). Coultas' concluding comments perhaps exemplified 
the best that liberal law had to offer. 
I have found that the funding policy does not 
contravene the law. Nevertheless, I recognize 
that AIDS is one of the great tragedies of our 
age. It behoves those in private life and in 
government whose actions af f ect the well-being of 
those suffering the disease to act decently, 
fairly, compassionately. (Brown, p. 322) 
Coultas gives the impression here of someone who feels 
their hands are tied by the wording and existing 
interpretations of the Charter. His decision is thus more 
clearly an example of how judges are constrained than is 
the Tribunal ruling in Mossop where Actcheson virtually 
ignores the law that does not go her way. 
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The politics of judges, and the constraints within 
which these politics can be expressed, is key to 
understanding why they reach the decisions they do. 
However, it is also important to draw attention to the ways 
in which judges and other legal actors disqualify 
alternative accounts and interpretations (Smart, 1989), and 
also the hierarchy of 'expert, knowledges acknowledged by 
"law". By prioritising statistical and not feminist 
historical evidence, the courts in the Sears case 
indirectly demonstrated what qualifies as Itrutht and what 
was not worth even discussing. By stating that sociology 
is 'not law', the Federal Court of Appeal in Mossop both 
excluded sociology from being a valid source of knowledge 
and further created and solidified what was law itself. I 
noted in Chapter 5 that New Christian Right activists 
partly constitute their own identity through the 
vilification of lothersf. Similarly, law and its judges 
maintain their integrity only through Fknowing' what is not 
law, and who are not legal 'experts'. 
Nevertheless, Margrit Eichler's prominence wit in 
Canadian lesbian and gay rights cases reveals the extent to 
which sociological analyses have supplanted psychiatric 
understandings in the formation of legal knowledge about 
homosexuality. Whilst conservative judges continue to 
emphasise the 'reproductive function, of 'traditional 
familiest, even they are now unwilling to engage in public 
discussions of homosexuality's 'causes, and leffectst. 
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Instead, conservative judges simply rely upon well- 
established precedent denying rights to lesbians and gay 
men, whilst liberal judges, on the other hand, deploy 
sociological analyses in their attempts to make the law 
respond to 'new realities'. Legal discourse, once 
'knowing, homosexuality only through the lenses of religion 
and conservative medicine, has slowly been influenced by 
"new" ways of understanding social relations. And this, of 
course, is what evangelical Christians cannot accept. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
Sociology's increasing influence within legal 
constructions of homosexuality is on the whole,, I would 
argue, something to be cautiously welcomed. As a 
discipline sociology is ostensibly concerned with social 
relations, group interactions, and structural dynamics, and 
hence less focused on individual pathologies. As several 
cases thus far demonstrate, adjudicators have deployed 
sociological analyses to show the historical discrimination 
and prejudice lesbians and gay men have faced. In this 
way, the harm, and even the 'illness", is seen to lie 
within society, and not 
; the homosexual'. Within such an 
approach, lesbians and gay men are viewed as a legitimate 
collectivity struggling for justice within a social 
conflict paradigm, and not as "poor unfortunatesf. The 
lesbian or gay Isubjectf of sociology is thus, potentially, 
an empowered, contextualised one. 
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Furthermore, sociologyrs Potential to explain 
sexuality (and law) in terms which recognise its contingent 
and constructed character is witnessed by the fact that 
many oppositional writers have found a home in the 
discipline. In several of the cases I have described 
above,, the 'experts' appearing in favour of lesbian and gay 
rights were feminist and gay scholars, many of whom had 
been active themselves within social movement struggles. 
These appearances are, on first glance, a positive 
development. If we want public institutions to take 
oppositional analyses seriously than we must surely welcome 
the increased prestige, status, and credibility that 
attaches to the work of such scholars as a result of their 
entry into legal arenas. This is particularly true where 
Fnew, scholarship is informed by marginalised voices, ones 
emerging from the local experience and analyses of 
subordinated groups. 
At the same time, there are also troubling effects to 
these kinds of developments. In Chapter 1, for example, I 
discussed my own ambivalence around the role of 'lesbian 
legal theoristf, and in *other chapters I have questioned 
whether lesbian and gay rights movements need or want 
Ispokespeoplet, and considered issues to do with 
cooptation, institutionalisation, and de-radicalisation. 
Furthermore, in this chapter I have argued that 'expert' 
evidence seldom convinces legal f orums of anything and thus 
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we perhaps need to think more critically about the Purpose 
of these interventions. 
It is also important to note that 'sociology' is not 
a monolithic, uniform approach to understanding social 
relations. On the contrary, there are many different kinds 
of sociology; as Barry Adam (1986) has himself noted, 
mainstream sociology (eg: standard introductory textbooks, 
etc. ) remains largely conservative in its approach to 
homosexuality. In Vogel, a 1992 trial court decision in 
Manitoba, the provincial government presented to the court 
its own 'sociological expert' who argued, in contrast to 
Margrit Eichler (appearing again), that lesbian and gay 
households were not "families". According to Dr. Lyle 
Larson, 
... It has been established by social science 
scholars that the universal family may be defined 
as 'a kinship group normatively defined to carry 
out the nurturant socialization of dependent 
children ... that basic thing about a family is that it involved children. It involves children. 
it always involves children ... The basic 
characteristic of [marriage] [is] that it 
involves a male and a female and that involves 
the potential for the eligibility for 
procreation. (Larson's testimony cited in Vogel, 
1992) 
In adopting this definitýon, the judge in Vogel implicitlY 
accepted that lesbians and gay men did not and could not 
have children, and, presumably, that finfertile' 
heterosexuals could never form families either. The judge 
and his expert went even further, declaring that "a 
majority of social scientists and a majority of society do 
not as yet approve of homosexual relationships in the 
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context of marriage or as a vehicle for raising children" 
21 
(Vogel, 1992) . 
Vogel shows that 'sociology', like psychology, 
biology,, and other "expert knowledges', has its 
conservative side, and its entry into legal constructions 
of gay rights will not always be uniformly positive. 
Furthermore, I have also indicated, in cases such as mossop 
and Andrews, that oppositional analyses of sexuality may 
be watered down in order to be judicially palatable. 
Nevertheless, sociology can potentially turn law"s gaze 
away f rom " individual pathologies I, sympathetic or hostile , 
and towards the 'ills of society'. Is the binary 
opposition of heterosexual/homosexual at all brought into 
question as a result? 
21 1 am not here * concerned with questioning 
the 
reasoning in this decision, which, it seems to me, is 
obviously flawed even upon traditional standards of "-logic' 
and "'rationality'. The Vogel decision is not, for the 
purposes of Canadian lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, 
an influential one. Of far more significance is the 
Ontario Court of Appeal's judgment in Haig (1992) which, 
again, relied upon expertise presented by a %progressive' 
Sociologist. How the Supreme Court of Canada responds to 
Eichler's evidence in Mossop will also be of great interest 
in determining the extent to which feminist sociological 
understandings of %familyt are accepted within gay rights 
cases. 
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AFTERWORD 
For radical gays or lesbian feminists, one test of the 
, 'merits, of lesbian and gay rights reform might be whether 
such activities lead to the overthrow, or at least the de- 
stabilisation, of heterosexuality. When I began asking the 
questions that led to my taking on this research (see 
Chapter 1), providing some kind of response to this was 
part of my motivation. In much of this thesis, however, I 
have suggested that we cannot predict with any certainty 
the effects our actions will have. For example, long-term 
consequences of ten contradict short-term gains; engagements 
between opposing social movements may produce unexpected 
results; particular, perhaps temporary, configurations of 
power enable or constrain possibilities; and the ways in 
which social identities and practices are shaped by 
inclusion within certain kinds of legal regimes can never 
be anticipated fully. 
Nevertheless, in this afterword,, I wish to reflect 
upon what has come before, and suggest some possible ways 
of thinking about the challenge posed to heterosexuality by 
struggles for lesbian and gay rights. I do this by 
examining the potential effects of lesbian and gay rights 
reform upon two concepts at the heart of many law reform 
campaigns: 'minority', and ffamily'. In previous chapters, 
I have discussed the relationship between law reform and 
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social movement mobilisation; I have also considered when 
and how a radical sexual politics can be publicly 
communicated during legal struggle - Here, whilst I pick up 
some of these points, I am more concerned with shifts in 
the meanings of the concepts themselves, and the ef f ects of 
these shifts upon broader ideologies and practices. By 
this I mean, did the dominant understandings of 'minority, 
or "family" change through the struggles of lesbians and 
gay men to be included within their terms? Did these 
struggles entrench or undermine dominant paradigms? Or, 
are these questions posed too starkly; is it even possible 
to make such an assessment. One way of thinking about the 
challenge, if any, posed to heterosexuality is to trace the 
trajectory of 'minority, and 'family, within lesbian and 
gay campaigns for legal equality. 
mi-noriLtV 
The demand to include 'sexual orientation, within a 
list of protected grounds in human rights law often 
succeeded in entrenching a 'minority rights paradigm' with 
respect to lesbian and gay sexuality. This in turn, 
strengthened a belief in the 'immutable nature, of 
sexuality, and thus left unquestioned the inevitability, 
normalcy, and 'majority' status of heterosexual itv - In the 
Bill 7 example, the mobilisation of lesbians and gay men, 
to the extent it took place, was short-term and tended to 
exclude the expression of more radical perspectives. For 
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example, oppositional analyses of sexuality were 
marginalised, and radical activists may have been alienated 
by the campaign's embracement of liberal politics. From 
these observations, one might conclude that I see nothing 
but gloom and doom in struggles to include 'sexual 
orientation' provisions within existing human rights 
regimes. 
However, Bill 7 was but one example of such a reform 
initiative. Other similar struggles may afford different 
opportunities and achieve contradictory results. I have no 
doubt that this is the case. In this thesis, I have 
offered an analysis of only one such lobbying campaign. 
There are also, however,, other ways to complicate the 
analysis of Bill 71 have set out above. Does including 
the category 'lesbians and gay men' within the concept of 
fminorityl succeed in shifting the very meaning of 
'minority', and, as a result, challenge the 'naturalness' 
of its 'majority opposite'? The 'minority paradigm' is 
most frequently expressed within liberal discourse. The 
latter,, I have argued, often assumes a hegemony within 
struggles for lesbian and gay rights reform and it is, 
therefore, this understanding that I shall focus upon. 
The dominant liberal understanding of 'minority', 
affirmed by human rights law, is of a group of people with 
a shared culture and history. The deployment of the term 
reveals its necessary opposite - majority. Within human 
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rights regimes, fminoritiest are peoples fdifferent from, 
the majority norm, who have been afforded official 
'Protection, from bigotry towards them. As applied to 
sexuality, the minority paradigm has constructed lesbians 
and gay men as a homogenous group; one permanently 
consisting of small numbers of people with little or no 
control over the characteristic that defines them as a 
minority - sexual orientation. Within liberal approaches 
to 'minority', the 'naturalness'. inevitability (for the 
majority), and (implied) superiority of heterosexuality is 
not questioned. Furthermore, the minority paradigm does 
not tend to consider sexuality as a field of regulation 
and, hence, social construction. 
I would argue that, at first glance, these dominant 
understandings of IminorityF have not been seriously 
undermined by lesbian and gay rights ref orm in Canada. The 
inclusion of "sexual orientation" within existing human 
rights legislation has simply extended a liberal paradigm 
to lesbian and gay identities without subverting it. At 
the same time, this inclusion has facilitated the 
expression of limmutabilityf arguments within the 
mainstream lesbian and gay rights movement. Rather than 
making people question what we mean by fminorityr, 
struggles such as Bill 7 succeed in entrenching biological 
explanations, and binary oppositions. 
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Lesbian and gay rights activists are increasingly 
jettisoning "psyl discourses for those of sociology (and 
history); however, little disruption to the 
minority/majority opposition has occurred as a result. 
Although it is no longer popular to talk about the 'lesbian 
and gay minority, as sick, perverted, and/or pathetic, it 
is still considered appropriate to use uncritically the 
term 'minority'. There are simply 'new' defining 
characteristics of the minority: geographical space; social 
and cultural institutions; and a fhistory of persecutionf. 
Heterosexuality, and the forces which render it nearly 
unavoidable, are not obviously undermined as a result. 
Does this, however, have to be the case? 
I would suggest that whilst there is nothing inherent 
within anti-discriminatory legislation that necessitates 
expressing a minority paradigm, the form these kinds of 
laws take, as I noted in Chapter 3, facilitate its 
adoption. Nevertheless, lesbian and gay rights 
campaigners, rather than strategically accommodating 
liberal themes, could instead choose to articulate 
different rationales, justifications, and arguments. The 
ability, or practicality, . of doing this will vary according 
to circumstances. 
For early thomophile rights' activistst relying then 
upon the insights of liberal psychology, the demand for 
inclusion within liberal conceptual paradigms was a radical 
one (D'Emilio, 1983: 244; see also Marcus, 1992). The idea 
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of suggesting that these 'lesbian and gay rights pioneers, 
should have exhorted society to overthrow heterosexuality 
seems fatuous. Arguably, however, we have moved on from 
then. The ground paved by these earlier activists has 
enabled 1990s lesbian and gay rights reformers, perhaps, to 
contribute towards a 'paradigm shift, in our understandings 
of sexuality. This will not be appropriate for all 
societies and cultures everywhere; for some, perhaps, 
conventional reforms must come first. Indeed, that is the 
argument made in different contexts by many of the rights- 
defenders noted in Chapter 4. 
However, in countries such as Canada, where 
conventional rights reforms have had some success in 
shaping 'new, social climates, 'new, agendas may be 
desirable. A strategy to dis-articulate 'minority' from 
hegemonic liberal discourse might help to challenge 
dominant understandings of Iminorityf as a concept, 
together with the accompanying 'naturalness I of the tnorml - 
If the 'lesbian and gay minority' were represented less in 
terms of sexual difference, and more in terms of a 
political opposition, than the meaning of "minority' in 
this context might indeeý be shifted. Unfortunately, from 
my perspective, this is unlikely to happen. In North 
America, the mainstream lesbian and gay rights movement 
has, to a large extent, institutionalised a liberal 
approach to reform. Law reform tends to be an activity 
largely engaged in by professional lobbyists who advocate 
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on an "interest group' model (see Merrett, 1991). Many of 
these reformers publicly argue that lesbian and gay rights 
are exactly about "the right to be different", and not 
about 'troubling, heterosexuality or heterosexuals. 
Although I have thus far suggested that achieving a 
"right to be different" succeeds in affirming dominant 
liberal paradigms.. the extension of these paradigms to 
'new, identities may have several positive effects as well. 
There are, for example, benefits in terms of the 
distribution of resources. Given that, in countries such 
as Canada, some resources are directed towards groups which 
have officially achieved 'minority' status, lesbians and 
gay men are able to draw on these for community projects. 
Furthermore, the social identity of 'minority' may 
facilitate resistance, mobilisation, and opposition by 
fostering a certain consciousness and solidarity amongst 
identity-holders. 
If the addition of Fsexual orientation' to human 
rights laws, on whatever terms, signals an increasing 
social acceptance of homosexuality, this might, in turn, 
have an important impact upon young men and women 
contemplating their own sexual identities. In other words , 
as Brian Mossop suggested (see Chapter 4),, the official 
visibility of lesbian and gay identity might lead to more 
people coming out. If this were so, the meaning of 
'minorityf , as applied to homosexuality, might 
indeed shift 
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as heterosexuality's claims to universal truth were 
undermined. Related to this are other effects such as the 
increasing confidence and strength of those already 
claiming lesbian or gay identities, and the corresponding 
panic of conservative Christians forced to explain and 
justify "God's Plan'. In the long-term, then, it may be 
possible to argue that the fixity of the minority/majority 
opposition is in fact cracked by the extension of the 
liberal minority paradigm to lesbians and gay men (see also 
Weeks,, 1985: 195-201). 
Famil 
My comments on the positive effects of achieving 
'minority' status, are also, arguably, true for the 
official recognition of lesbian and gay families. In this 
section, then, I wish to focus upon whether, or how, 
dominant understandings of 'family, have shifted through 
lesbian and gay rights reform in this area. 
In several chapters, I argued that legal cases, such 
as Brian Mossop's, had indeed succeeded in de-stabilising 
conventional definitions of family" - Lesbians and gay 
men, by insisting that our relationships were as valid as 
heterosexual units, and as entitled to be described by the 
ideologically meaningful word 'family', had contributed to 
a social climate in which it was possible to talk about 
non-traditional family configurations. As a result, 
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conservatives were on the defensive, forced to rationalise 
what had previously been taken as inevitable, and 
"natural'. 
Brian Mossop and Ken Popertfs claim for "family 
status" has helped to open up for discussion the meanings 
and purposes of one of societyfs most fundamental concepts. 
Their legal challenge is explicitly directed at shifting 
the dominant understandings of F family , thus rendering the 
heterosexual unit less able to claim superiority. Other 
similar claims, to I spousal F pension or health benef its f or 
example,, raise the kinds of concrete issues often 
marginalised by more abstract human rights struggles. 
Demands which are perceived to implicate the distribution 
of "real' benefits and resources are often far more 
controversial than adding 'sexual orientation' to a pre- 
existing list within legislation widely recognised as 
ineffective anyway. 
At the same time, however, there are those who would 
argue, as I have done previously (Herman, 1990), that the 
'family, ' model is itself conservative, and exclusionary. 
By adopting the qualities perceived to be held by the 
idealised heterosexual family, lesbians and gay men simply 
reinforce and affirm this idealisation. if, as many 
feminists argue (eg: Barrett and McIntoshr 1982), r this 
dominant familial ideology is a key ingredient in the 
subordination of women, then such a strategy by lesbians 
and gay men is fundamentally antithetical to "women"s' 
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interests. ' In this sense, then, the meaning of 'family, 
has not really shifted; rather, it has simply, as I argued 
with respect to the concept 'minority', been extended to 
include certain 'approved off relationships within lesbian 
and gay communities. In the process, the dominance of 
fcoupledomf, and the qualities such couples exhibit that 
are akin to traditional marriage, are affirmed (see also 
Smart,, 1984). Marriage, and its foundation 
heterosexuality - are not very bothered. 
One argument against this interpretation can, however, 
be drawn from the work of Judith Butler (1990). She has 
suggested that all sexual identities are 'performances'. 
For example, gay drag, she argues, is a parody. But it is 
not as copy is to original, but rather is as copy is to 
copy. The process of performance "troubles" the 
"naturalness I of sexual/gender categories by revealing them 
to be what they are - constructed, and inherently unstable. 
.., "the original" is revealed to be a copy, and 
an inevitably failed one, an ideal that no one 
can, embody (Butler, 1990: 139). 
Within such an analysis, the legal recognition of 
lesbian and gay families is not so much the approval of a 
mimicking of the idealised Inormf so much as a 'troubling' 
of it. Certainly, the vociferous opposition of 
conservatives to lesbian and gay familial claims might 
11 recognise the problems with this phrase, see 
Chapter 1. 
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suggest this. One of the key fsecularl arguments made by 
conservatives against the legal recognition of lesbian and 
gay families is that children will not be given appropriate 
gender role models. Children, if they have two mothers or 
two fathers, rather than one of each, will grow up confused 
about their gender role in life. 2 The implication of this 
argument is that the official affirmation of lesbian and 
gay families may thus contribute to the deconstruction of 
gender itself. 
Furthermore, although I have previously suggested that 
human rights challenges tend to entrench the public/private 
divide by locating the source of problems in the state or 
" public " realms and leaving the site of "family" 
unaddressed (Chapter 4), it is also possible to view 
lesbian and gay family challenges as transcending this 
dichotomy. Brian Mossop's claim, for example, centres on 
work-related discrimination; however, in disputing the 
employer"s benefits policy, Mossop and Popert are also 
effectively highlighting 'the family, as an area of 
contestation. I think that there is much to be said for 
these more generous interpretations (see also Weston, 
1991); however, at the same time, the problematic effects 
of lesbian and gay family rights remain. 
2A version of this argument is also used against 
single, heterosexual parents. 
3 And, as Butler herself notes,, "parody by itself is 
not subversive,, (1990: 139). 
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Despite the de-stabilisation of the traditional 
f amily, it remains the case that uncoupled lesbians and gay 
men, or those whose relationships do not fulfil the 
Ifunctionsf of Margrit Eichler's 'families, (see Chapters 
2,7), are excluded from the group seeking inclusion. As 
many feminist theorists have advocated, entitlement to 
social benefits should not be based on t he degree of 
intimacy attained with a 'significant other'. Rather, the 
privileging of marriage can be challenged by policies 
which, for example, allow individuals to designate a 
person, any person, as a co-recipient or beneficiary. This 
would avoid the need to 'provef relationships were 
Ifamilialf; it would also remove from judges the power to 
issue authoritative definitions in such cases. 
I would suggest again, however, that this is, perhaps, 
a 'next stage', rather than an alternative strategy. The 
official acknowledgement that lesbians and gay men form 
important, positive, useful personal relationships may need 
to precede rights or entitlements being offered on a 
different basis. Furthermore, in areas such as immigration 
law for example, it is difficult to envision alternative 
standards coming into play in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the rights claims of lesbians and gay men, by 
undermining the dominance of traditional family formst 
assists in creating a climate where this might be possible. 
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One question somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis 
is the relationship between the lesbian and gay rights 
movement and other social movements on the left struggling 
for social change. I believe that the undermining of 
heterosexuality, and eventually the deconstruction of 
gender itsel f4' is a necessary part of any larger project of 
social transformation. I have argued, however, that 
lesbian and gay rights reforms may not achieve this, or may 
do so partially and with ambiguous effects. At the same 
time, not all such reforms inevitably challenge other set 
of social relations, such as those based on economic class 
or race. On the contrary, these hierarchies are reproduced 
within lesbian and gay communities. 
I would suggest that there is no necessary link 
between rights for lesbians and gay men, and the 
transformation of social relations not premised upon 
sexuality. Rather, I would agree with Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) that diverse social movements must build "chains of 
articulation" - create mechanisms and processes whereby the 
"other, is identified with, and the interests of individual 
groups are seen to be shared by all. For lesbians and gay 
men, this means moving beyond 'interest group' politics- 
Lesbian and gay struggle, in legal arenas and elsewhere, 
ought to be broad, encompassing, and inclusive. 
4 By this I mean dissolving male" and female' 
categories currently perceived as 'fixed'. 
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Individuals are made up of complex identities, some often 
contradictory. When we argue for rights as a fixed 
, 'minority', claiming that we were 'born this way,,, we 
simultaneously imply that our demands 'stop here'. 
In interviewing lesbians and gay men for this 
research, I was struck by how most seemed not to have 
thought about what they hoped to achieve in the long-term. 
Although 'the future' can be neither planned nor predicted, 
it may be useful to encourage debate around values and 
visions (see also Weeks,, 1991: 183). For example, do we 
want the freedom to live out an essential 'self' within 
existing frameworks of social relations? Or, are we 
fighting for substantial shifts in these relations 
themselves? 
The , lesbian and gay rights problematic", I would 
argue, is about underlying political analyses and about the 
power relations that shape the terms of equality. Rights- 
claims are neither inherently radical re-articulations nor 
dangerous and diversionary. More often than not they are 
neither, occasionally they may be both. To say that rights 
are difficult, complicated tools for social change does not 
mean that the struggle for their acquisition is doomed or 
that 'real issues, are being obscured. At the same time, 
an unreflexive seeking of rights and yet more rights may 
not bring about the changes to social relations many of us 
would like to see. 
316 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF CASES 
(all reports are Canadian unless otherwise noted) 
B. C. L. R. 
C. C. C. 
C. L. L. C. 
C. R. 
D. L. R. 
F. T. R. 
F. 2d 
F. Supp 
L. A. C. 
N. R. 
0. R. 
R. F. L. 
S. C. R. 
S. Ct. 
U. S. 
W. W. R. 
British Columbia Law Reports 
Canadian Criminal Cases 
Canadian Labour Law Cases 
Criminal Reports 
Dominion Law Reports 
Federal Trial Reports 
Federal Reports (second) (U. S. ) 
Federal Supplements (U. S. ) 
Labour Arbitration Cases 
National Reports 
Ontario Reports 
Reports on Family Law 
Supreme Court Reports 
Supreme Court Reports (U. S. ) 
United States Law Reports (U. S. ) 
Western Weekly Reports 
Action Travail des Femmes v C. N. R. C. et al. (1987), 76 N. R. 
161 (S. C. C. ) 
Andrews v Ont. (Min. of HealLU (1988), 49 D. L. R. (4th) 584 
(Ont. H. C. ) 
Bhinder v C. N. R. [1985] 
Big M Drug Mart (1985), 
2 S. C. R. 561 (S. C. C. ) 
18 D. L. R. (4th) 321 (S. C. C. ) 
Board of Governors of the Univ. of Sask. v Sask. Human 
Riqhts Commission [1976] 3 W. W. R. 385 (Sask. Q. B. ) 
Bowers and Hardwick, 196 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (U. S. S. C. ) 
Brown v B. C. (Min. of Healthj_ (1990), 42 B. C. L. R. (2d) 294 
(B. C. S. C. ) 
Brown v Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); 
349 U. S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (U. S. S. C. ) 
Dolphin Delive v R. W. D. S. U., Local 580 (1986), [1987] 2 
S. C. R. 573 (S. C. C. ) 
Edwards Books and Arts v R. (1986), 30 C. C. C. (3d) 385 
(S. C. C. ) 
317 
E. E. O. C. v Sears, Roebuck and Comp an 628 F. Supp. 1264 
(N. D. Ill. 1986), affid. 839 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) 
Egan and Nesbitt v Canada (1991), 47 F. T. R. 305 (F. C. T. D. ) 
Gay Alliance Toward Ecrualitv v Vancouver Sun [1979] 2 
S. C. R. 435 (S. C. C. ) 
Haig v Canada (Min. of Justig. 91 [1992], [not reported at 
time of writing] (Ont. C. A. ) 
Hunter v Southam (1984), 11 D. L. R. (4th) 641 (S. C. C. ) 
Klippert v The Queen, [1967] S. C. R. 822 (S. C@C. ) 
Knodel v B. C. (Medical Services Committee) (1991), 58 
B. C. L. R. (2d) 356 (B. C. S. C. ) 
Leroux v Co-Operators Insurance (1990), 71 O. R. (2d) 641 
(Ont. Ct. ), rev'd. [1991] O. J. No. 1554 (O. C. A. ) 
Leshner v Ontario (1992), [not reported at time of writing] 
(Ont. Hum. Rgts. Trib. ) 
Morin v National Special Handling Unit Review Commission 
(1985), 49 C. R. 260 (S. C. C. ) 
Mossop v Dept. of Sec. State (1989), 89 C. L. L. C. 16,041 
(C. H. R. T. ); rev'd. (1990), 71 D. L. R. (4th) 661 
(F. C. A. ) 
North v Matheson, (1974), 20 R. F. L. 112 (Man. Co. Ct. ) 
OlMallev v Simpsons-Sears [1985] 2 S. C. R. 536 (S. C. C. ) 
Oakes (1986), 26 D. L. R. (4th) 200 (S. C. C. ) 
P. B. v P. B. (1988), [unreported] (O. P. C. F. D. ) 
Plessy v FerglAson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) 
Re Carleton Universitv and C. U. P. E., Loc. 2424 (1988), 35 
L. A. C. (3d) 96 (Ont. Arb. Bd. ) 
Re Schaap et al. and Canadian Armed Forces (1988), 56 
D. L. R. (4th) 105 (F. C. A. ) 
Re Vancouver Sun and GaV Alliance Toward Equality (1977), 
77 D. L. R. (3d) 487 (B. C. C. A. ) 
Robertson v Geisinger (1991), 36 R. F. L. (3d) 261 (Sask. 
Q. B. ) 
Robichaud v Canada [1987] 2 S. C. R. 84 (S. C. C. ) 
Roe v Wade 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (U-S-S-C-) 
318 
Singh v Min. Emply. Immiq- [1985] 1 S. C. R. 177 (S. C. C. ) 
Vancouver Sun v Gay Alliance Toward Equalitv (1976), 
[unreported] (B. C. S. C. ) 
Veysev v Correctional Service of Canada (1989), 29 F. T. R. 
74 (F. T. D. ), aff'd. 
Vogel. v Manitoba (1983), 4 C. H. R. R. D/1654 (Man. Bd. Adj. ) 
Vogel v Manitoba (1992), [not reported at time of writing] 
(Man. Q. B. ) 
Watkins v U. S. , 875 F. 2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) 
319 
APPENDIX B 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982,, being Schedule B of the 
Constitution Act 1982 (U. K. ), 1982, c. 11. 
Canadian Human Rights Act, R. S. C. 1985, c. H-6. 
Health Insurance Act, R. S. O. 1980, c. 197. 
Human Rights Code, S. O. 1981, c. 53 as amended by 1986, 
c. 64. s. 18. 
320 
APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEWS 
Judy Andersoni, President,, REAL Women of Canada,, 18 December 
1991 
Karen Andrews, Litigant, 17 December 1991 
Chris Bearchell, Bill 7 Campaigner, Coalition For Lesbian 
and Gay Rights in Ontario, 19 December 1991 
Ian Binnie,, Legal Counsel to REAL Women et al., 10 December 
1991 
Gwen Brodsky, Legal Counsel to EGALE et al., 4 December 
1991 
Margrit Eichler, "Expert Witness', 20 December 1991 
Don Hutchinson, Legal Advisor,, The Salavation Army, 10 
December 1991 
Brian Mossop, Litigant, 16 December 1991 
Ken Popert, Litigant, 16 December 1992 
James Sclater,, Director of Public Policy,, Focus on the 
Family Association (Canada), 6 December 1991 
321 
APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEWEES' COMMNTS ON TEXT 
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Tt is worth considering NCR leaders' own explanations for 
the process of legalization that occurred for the coalition 
members in t2gsop-. According to Judy Anderson, Jim Sclater , and 
Don Hutchinson, there could never be any question of submitting 
an overtly Christian document to the courts ( interviews). They 
and their organisations view society as Profoundly anti- 
Christian, and hence their Political communication must be 
informed by other knowledge sources in order to be publicly 
credible. Judy Anderson, for example, argues that, 
Christianity is allowed to be lambasted at every 
opportunity.. Ahings can be said about us you can't 
even say about gays any more ... Christianity is low man on the totem pole, anybody can give a kick and get away 
with it. We're at the back of the bus now ... everywhere Christianity is derided and treated with disrespect 
(interview). 
As, I left her house following this interview, Anderson pointed 
to a Christian prayer she had hanging in her front hallway. She 
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told me tha every time someone came to interview her she 
considered whether or not to take this prayer down and hide it, 
knowing that this symbol of religion could lead journalists and 
researchers to "totally dismiss". her . She likened her feelings 
to those of closeted lesbians and gay men, who "were" ( in her 
view) once reduced to similar 'sterilisation procedures' (my 
interpretation) in their homes. Now, she feels the tables have 
turned 
- For Anderson, neither group should be in such a position 
(interview) (although she seemed unable to understand 
k 
how REAL- 
Women's Potential success could substantially reduce the 
Possibility of lesbians and gay men bein-q out). 
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"homosexual activism" with "radical feminism* - together these 
two currently pose the greatest conspiratorial threat. S7 
The view that major institutions are run by a Ocultural 
elite" is echoed by REAL Women's Judy Anderson. For this 
0, Of tLV. 
organisation the conspirators are clearly wid wArli-io identified 'A 
as "radical feminists". 
... 
feminism has a lot Of clout Politically these days, 
the media certainly supports feminism almost 10o% ... we can't even get our point of view into the media most 
of the time... CBC won't touch us with a ten-foot 
pole ... Mossop has his cheerleaders in the media, 99% 
of the media are on his side. . the CBC is just one left-wing, socialist, feminist point of view, 
newspapers are little better. (Anderson, interview) 
"Feminist ideology" (Anderson, interview) has infiltrated into 
government and the courts as well. REAL Women attributes their 
public funding difficulties to the placement of *radical 
feminists" in key governmental positions. 
.. the Secretary of State's Women 
"s Programme is mainly 
run by feminists ... LEAF gets all the money, we're 
strapped for cash always ... the radical 
feminists got 
$11 million dollars from the Secretary of State last 
year, we got $6,900 ... one 
ideology is given amazing 
amounts of government funding to promote their agenda 
through the courts and people like us are out in the 
cold. . 
Jeminists have gotten control of funding at all 
sorts of levels and they're pretty keen to hold onto 
it 
... the Prime Minist-er 
's appointments secretary is in 
a4V, 4 
3 7, Lf 
that network, his access is very ff 
. 'Wch 
cut of f to People 
like us ... 
(Anderson, interview) 
The Courts,, as well, have replaced legal analysis with 
esociological treatises' best exemplified by the "feminist 
ideologyo of Bertha Wilson (Anderson, interview). 59 
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I have to give the radical feminists credit, they saw 
all this, they were involved in bringing the Charter 
in, men lay down and put their legs in the air - said, 
okay, you can have what you want - they got section 15 
in there behind closed doors, I have to give them 
credit politically, it has changed the face of society, 
they got into the ! ýpat of power and grabbed it 
(Anderson, interview)' 
For Anderson, uradical feminists" have achieved levels of power 
REAL Women members can only dream about. The membership's 
, pe: F. &-e4-9ý experiences with 
funding applications and news coverage 
have_taken on a life of their own; "radical feminist" power is 
identif ied as the cause of the organisation's political 
marginalisation, media 'trashing' , and legal losses. The 
II radical feminists" have been constructed as the primary enemy; 
during my interview with Judy Anderson, we were ostensibly 
discussing the Mossop case, however very little of Anderson's 
anger was directed at the "lesbian and gay rights movement' For 
"fe 
her, Afemini-sm and 'gay rights' seemed one and the same. 
A number of LEAF lawyers are lesbians, they're free to 
be lesbians, but I think there's a bit of a conflict 
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of interest with their cases, getting my 
tax dollars 
to intervene in something very close to 
their own 
backyard. (Anderson, interview) 
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is called "secular humanismu, 
-adical 
feminism", or "homosexual activism", both Focus on the 
Imily and 
REAL Women clearly believe that it dominates all the 
joy. social institutions; the marginalisation of their own 
rspective leaves 
them feeling, as Anderson put it, Ndown a dark 
le' (interview). As is characteristic of those who believe 
_4in>iew 
or action which does not gre is only one Truth, 
Cýý 
)port the tenets of conservative Christianity is taken as being 
jicative of the conspiracy's power 
62 See Chapter 6. 
63 See 'Commentary: What Happened to the Family The War 
27 May 1989, p. 2. 
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qrtating the REAL Women et. al. Coalition 
The impetus to form a Christian intervention coalition in 
Mossg2 came initially from Jim Sclater and Focus on the Family. 14 
Following the publication of the Tribunal decision in Mossop, and 
the indication that the Government would appeal, Focus decided 
the issue was significant, and that they, and others, should get 
involved in some way. Jim Sclater called the Justice Department 
and spoke to Barbara McIsaac, senior counsel on Mossop, who 
indicated, he states, that the *government didnot have much of 
a case" (interview). Focus,, who believed that a strong argument 
a gainst the re-definition of 'family' to include gay couples 
could surely be made, began to contact fellow Christian 
activists. 
14 The following account is based upon interviews with Jim 
Sclater, Don Hutchinson, and Ian Binnie, coalition lawyer (with 
McCarthy Tetreault). 
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After discovering that a number of other organisa"tions were 
already involved in legal interventions, and thus could not play 
a leading role in Mossop, Sclater, who had been referred to the .0 
prestigious Bay Street firm McCarthy Tetreault, decided that 
Focus's resources permitted them to act as instigator - Focus and 
REAL women had worked together in the past, and were at that time 
involved in setting up the Legal Defense Fund; RW was thus a 
natural partner for Focus to contact. The Salvation Army became 
involved through McCarthy Tetreault; the firm was the Army's 
general counsel, and had relayed to them Focus's interest in 
Mossop. Eventually, the other two members, The Pentecostal 
Assemblies of Canada and the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, 
cc az4vo both with active histories in opposing lesbian and gax equality XA 
joined up as well. As various interviewees expressed it, 
activists wished to have a mix of organisations 'known' to the 
courts as intervenors (eq: REAL Women) but also with long, 
respectable histories (eq: Salvation Army). 
The intervening organisations never met as a group, although 
there was some phone contact bptween individual leaderships, and 
a. Focus and REAL Women met at their pro-family conference in the 
spring of 1991. Judy Anderson asked me to tell her with whom bd 
s K, REAL Women was interveningy as she had no idea (interview). 
Whilst Don Hutchinson of the Army stated he was "aware of the 
doctrinal beliefs of the other organisations" (interview), it wa: s 
clear to me, in conversation, that his knowledge of Focus on thee 
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Despite not being able to meet and discuss the case, both 
Don Hutchinson and Jim Sclater expressed satisfaction with how 
McCarthy's was handling the matter. Hutchinson and Ian Binnie, 
counsel from McCarthy"s, had worked together to ensure that the 
legal submissions did not engage in "gay bashing"; each took 
great pains to insist that the case had "nothing to do with gay 
rights" (Hutchinson, interview). Of all the organisations, 
then, it is the Salvation Army that played the most instrumental 
role vis a vis the legal submissions. Don Hutchinson felt that 
the factum was "a good reflection of our (eq: the Army's] 
position" (interview). Jim Sclater , on the other hand, 
acknowledged having very little input into the drafting of the 
factum, and Judy Anderson bad never read it, Imuch less influenced 
its content (although neither expressed dissatisfaction). 16 
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15 Interestingly, Ian Binnie, McCarthy's lawyer on the 
case, similarly knew very little about Focus on the Family. He 
noted, however , that the participation of the Salvation Army gave the entire coalition credibility with the courts which they might 
not otherwise have had (interview). 
, -' 16 It should be noted that Anderson responded to all 
specific questions on Mossop by referring me to Gwen Landolt, a lawyer, and founder and Vice-'President of Realwomen. For someont2 
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More than the other organisations, REAL Women has identified 
participation 
in Charter litigation as key. Judy Anderson, 
president of REAL Women, argues that "Courts are now the main 
avenue for social change, since the Charter" (interview). 
However for Anderson, participation in litigation is hindered by 
the "radical feminists" who control the funding sources 
(interview). For examplet the Court Challenges Programme, a 
federally-funded, arms-length body that awarded Charter 
- litigation funds to applicant groups, refused REAL Women funding 
on the basis that the organisation sought to restrict, rather 
than enhance, equality. The Programme was, for Anderson, part 
of the "radical feminist" conspiracy: "all the people who 
4 
administer the funds are quite partisan" ( interview). 8 71 1 
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(1988) research, referred to above, indicates that conservative 
Christianity is the common bond of REAL Women supporters. 
Consider also, the words of Judy Anderson, current president of 
the organisation. 
... 
(for] those of us who are ChristianS927 religious 
faith is very important ... 
(but] one of the last things 
I'm going to do unless asked about it is talk about my 
faith ... Christianit); 
is low man on the totem pole, 
anyone can give a kick at Christianity and get away 
with it.... an amazing amount of people would totally 
dismiss me, oh, she's just a Christian, she's 
just a 
fundamentalist, so, I don't go out there and talk about 
my faith - why would I? It's the whipping 
boy 
now ... we're pretty careful about 
putting our faith on 
the front burner ... we're all going 
to be pretty careful 
about whert and when we talk 
in those terms. 
(interview)" 
M) 
jnul(olv )ý-)(esident of REAL Women, has similar views. 
I'd like to see a Charter of responsibilities rather 
than a Charter of Rights.. the Charter of Rights pits 
group against group, ideology against ideology ... rights have become paramount to everybody ... the Charter 
creates a more selfish society, [it's] win/lose and 
makes society more polarised, makes People less willing 
to compromise (interview) 
00 - Ca luk 
Anderson's opinion of otherA human rights legislation is also 
largely negative. Whilst she believes in the idea of having 
human rights laws, she characterises the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission as "social engineers" and "Big Brother" 9 telling me 
-Jr 
a story about a friend who has been, unjustly in her view, 
charged with race discrimination under the Code and "intimidated" 
(interview). 
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God's design. Judy Anderson argues that "sexual orientation" and 
"lifestyle" are two separate issues (interview). Thus, while 
there may be people unfortunately born with a proclivity towards 
the 'wrong' practices (this would be a sign of the Fall), they 
can always choose to try and overcome their 'disability', rather 
than exploit and celebrate it. 
I'm married, I "ve been attracted to other people in my 
seventeen years of marriage, I made a choice, I'm 
either true to my husband, and my vows -I make a 
choice ... we'retalking 
lifestyle (Anderson, interview). 
For(jýý activists, it must be difficult to imagine that 
their own children could possibly be born homosexual - that is 
not God's plan. God created male and female, to complement each 
other, and created heterosexual union through marriage as the 
69 1 discuss in chapter 4 the problems around defining what is meant by 'rights' . 
49 
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Partially as a result of this perceived bias, REAL Women 
views the Charter as an unqualified evil 
[-ý 
hich they only argue w 
about because they have to: "instead, we say, get rid of the 
Charter" (Anderson, interview). For Anderson, the Charter is 
OW undemocratic, providing "five peoplem (a majority of the Supreme 
0 
Court) with "no accountability to the Public" the OPPOrtunity to 
"in one fell swoop change the whole force of Canadian 
jurisprudence and social norms" (interview). Echoing many of the 
Charter criticisms made by marxist legal academics (discussed in 
Chapter 4), Judy Anderson argues for "more grassroots 
participation" (interview). Anderson's comments are based upon 
her perception that the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted the 
"radical feminist" agenda. When asked whether , should the Court 
be staffed by judges more to her liking, she would still have the 
same views about the Charter she replied, whilst the process 
would continue to be undemocratic, "if things were going our way 
we might not be saying it quite so loudly" (interview). 
Nevertheless, were it not for the funding problems, REAL Women 
would happily make litigation "one of our primary strategies" 
(Anderson, interview). % *'61 " ad 
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to audience is reiterated by Judy Anderson. 4j 
I can write from a religious point of view, my 
own 
faith, or I can take the same thing and say 
it not 
using the code words for religion ... 
if I'm going to 
talk to the Catholic Women's League, sure, I'll 
talk 6" PW- 
about faith there because we all understand 
it, but if it" 
I'm tal king to the Royal Canadian Yacht Club, 
I can say 
the same thing, but without using my own particular 
vi ew 
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The 
British Columbia 
Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre 
701 - 744 West Hastings Street 
Vancouver, B. C. V13C 1A5 
Tel: (604) 687-3063 Fax: (6041682-7896 
September 1.1992 
Yf AAAXI 
Ms Didi Herman 
OXZ 6RW 
united Kingdom 
Dear Didi: 
Re: Draft Thesis Received on Auggst 7,1992 
Thank you for sending me a draft of your thesis. I focussed mainly on the pages to 
which you- directed me, but also found other parts of it to be of interest. I have some 
comments about the parts that relate directly to me. I am dashing this off quite quickly 
so that you get some feedback from me as soon as possible. 
Initially, I thou&ht I would have all my comments typed out,, but I have decided it is 
' ckest to send my handwritten comments on the relevant pages of your draft, except Zrua 
lengthy insert for p. 15 of c. 4.1 hope this is OK with you. 
I was sorry to miss you when you were in town. I would still like to have a chance to 
talk to you about the hearin ), in the Supreme Court of Canada. It was really exciting, 
and I think I can safely say 
Et 
for the scores of lesbians and py Ten who sat in the 
courtroom it was an "empowering" experience. To end our inquiry prior to the 
so V 
c 
Supreme Court of Canada hearing is premature. I al , 
Qe 
that you ht have a 
chance to interview my clients. They are in a good position to say whamtte importance 
of this litigation is. I commend you for conducting some interviews to try and assess 
the broader impact of the Mossop litigation, but I do not think you have talked to 
enough people (from our camp) to accurately answer your questions. 
Your draft has helped me advance in rn thinkin& about movement litigation. I have 
come to realize that I perceive a major 
Yffference 
in the litigation that I ao on behalf of 
social movement groups and the litigation that usually gets done, mainly on behalf of individuals rather than groups, and mainli along very traditional lines, with the lawyer in charge. 
Insert -4, p. 15 
Brodsky is critical of Charter litiption that is divorced from the equality rights 
movement, and is generally critical of the Charter,. to the extent that liberal ideolog 
combined with disparities in resources for litigation encoura e individual rather tKan 
community-based Charter litigation. However, Brodsky has 
fittle 
time for'rights critics' 
who, from positions of privilege and inaction, stand in eloquent and hostile judgement 
331f 
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of the strate ie employed by disadvantaged groups to try and overcome their 
inequality. 
Ces 
points out that the ever-present challenge for disadvantaged groups 
whose concerns are marginal to mainstream politics is to find a way, sometimes any 
way, to have their protests heard and taken seriously. A familiar refrain of some rights 
critics is that the interests of disadvantaged groups can be better served by elected 
representatives in the political arena than by an unelected, elite judiciary. However, for 
members of disadvantaged groups such as lesbians and §ay men this assertion 
fteýýently rings hollow. The reality is that there is very . ttle difference between the 
legislatures and the courts. Their respective composi. ition is mainly white and male, and 
liberal ideology is no less hegemonic in the legislatures than it is in the courts. 
For more than a decade lesbians and &ay men have soli_ght legal protections against 
sexual orientation discrimination, under the Canadian Human Rights Act. Mainly., they 
have pursued non-judicial strategies. The have confronted politicians and. pleaded 
with them, written lobbying letters, signeYpetitions, walked in parades, given media 
interviews, and spoken about lesbian and py rights issues at conferences. Still, the 
federal politicians do not respond by enactin& the remedial legislation that is needed. 
What are lesbians and gay men s posed to do in a circumstance such as this, when the 
political process does not work? 
We 
Charter at least gives people an alternative forum, 
and a means of achieving leýitimacy and a public profile for their issues. It so happens 
that on the issue of human rights protections against sexual orientation discrimination, 
the courts have been moreyrogressive than the federal government (for example Haig 
and Birch, August 6,1992, Ontario Court of A )peal). However, it is not only the Courts' 
ruNs in cases such as Haig týat persuades 
Trodsky 
that the Charter is worthwhile, 
notwithstanding its shortcon-angs. She also points out that there remains the possibility 
that the federal government will exercise its override power and effectivel circumvent 
the Court's ruling in Haig. She says there is another test of the Charter's vle which is 
whether it romotes solidarity, hope, confidence, lively discourse, and diverse political 
actions witM the equally nghts movement. Brodsky believes that there are signs that 
the Charter has begur o, aI of these things: 
the possibility of increasing rights, 
Would you like me to send you the text of my oral argument, presented in the SCC? 
Best wishes. Good luck! 
Yours sincerely, 
Gwen Brodsk 
Barrister & 
Uicitor 
GB: ca 
Enclosure 
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E3rian Mossop argues that when he and Popert appeared on 
radio shows about 
their case, callers wanted to talk about 
-homosexuaUt-, -X-",, 
not rights, or law, or litigation. The ability 
to do this, gain access to the media to talk about homosexuality, 
was the whole point of the action. 
The main audience is the youngest generation of people 
who are listening, people who maybe have not come out 
yet... who are worried about what life holds in store 
for them. We go on the radio and say - here we are, 
welre a gay couple ... it doesn't have to be all that bad.. maybe you could consider telling -one of your 
parents ... the whole point is for people to come out 
earlier and earlier and earlier ... 
(Mossop, interview) 
For these gay litigants, a case which they have lost on appeal 
(ýýsoý, 1990) has been an unqualified success. They find the 
concerns of academics completely irrelevant. In response to a 
question about how rad. ical analyses of sexuality are excluded 
from legal processes, Ken Popert. stated that he doesn't 
"particularly care what is said -Ln factums, or in court" 
r KVeAV LA-P_4W--Vý a_, bgtj 
(intervi w). 4'Da 
ly, this is not true for all those invo ed in 
lesbian and ! gay legal struggle. Karen Andrews, whil§,, ý critical 
of academic endeavours, nevertheless expressed soo interest in 
legal arguments made on her behalf ( intervietýiX. The coalition 
of progressive organisations intervening iyr'the Mossop case (see 
Chapter 2) are taking great care with e writing of their legal h 
t submissions. For Gwen Brodsky, the lawyer acting for the he 
coalition, getting the right //fanguagie, tone, and politics 
is 
crucial ( interview). I ýý 
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... the possibility of 
increasing rights, to take steps 
to secure more rights, has helped the community-based 
organisations to mature, and has given them a focus 
that they didn't have before. It has created both the 
opportunity and the necessity to try and figure out 
what's being talked about in any given circumstance 
where equality is the essential objective. Ten years 
ago, I don't think there were conversations in 
community organisations about what equality meant. The 
lobbying was more ad hoc, there was not much 
opportunity to f igure out unif ying 
themes .... 
(interview) 
Interestingly, Brodsky closely ties these developments to -the 
Court Challenges Prog-ramme which, until 1992 (subsequent to the 
interview), provided public funding to groups seeking to 
challenge discriminatory laws. 
'f here hadn't been any money available through the (Lurt 
eallenges 
programme to allow groups to undertake 
litigation, and to have national consultations to 
formulate their positions in the litigation, the 
Charter would not have had the effect I'm talýing about 
at all '. . 
to the extent those funds exist, they have 
fuelled an interest among the community organisations 
to better understand their own positions ... and that's 
empowering, to even have the sense that there's a 
chance of success in an effort to secure increased 
rights. (interview) - 
In contrast to Ken Popert, Brodsky believes the factum-writ-ing 
process to be an important one for the social movement 
organisations involved. What the judges think of it, whilst 
imPortant, is not the only issue . Preparing a 
legal submission 
Is 
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on behalf of 
diverse interests has been, according to Brodskys 
a growing and 
learning experience for all participants. 
1ý_ý 
It's a very different experie e to t, eý0 
litigation that is respectful 0 tý 
7Y a0 
empowerlng -4perience 
for them, 
)Fd the Clients, 
Rs 
an 
Ian '9ý " 
oes Place control in han their t Sy t*fdtV-ýs a very different thing from the 
r 
traditiona of litigation ... really listening for 
t ir 
pp OPI w0 
hour hours, going away and re-drafting a factum 
c MM tte S --- t 
15,20 times, sending it out to 10,15, maybe 20 1m 
eople, who then send it out to their boards, sub- 
ommittees ... lit grows and advances as we work, in the 
process of talking about what our Position ought to be, 
how to express it, the different co-intervenors have 
heard one and other-the factum really will be a 
collective effort. In a situation like this, you just 
don't release it until you have something that people 
are prepared to say is theirs. All of them. To claim 
it. (interview) 
For these groups and their legal counsel , the goal is not 'to get 
on the radio' , but to collectively share knowledge and 
experience, and, eventually, write a document that all can feel 
is Otheirs" -that does not advocate equality for some, at the 
expense of others (Brodsky, interview). 
`j 
Brodsky's comments suggest that critical scholars have 
Perhaps devoted insufficient attention to the posvive7role of 
? twý. funTing programmes in facilitating social movement 
I A, pv, u('Cý, 
networking. Progressive writers often focus on how state funding 
constrains and co-opts actors and movements (eq: Findlay, 1987p 
1988; Schraeder, 1990); however , E3rodsky argues that this was not 
the case with the Court Challenges Programme. Administrators 
usually acted in an arms-length fashion, and did not attempt to 
control or police the organisations they funded. However, at the 
time I interviewed her - prior to the can cellation of the 
Programme - Gwen E3rodsky also noted that Ministry bureaucrats 
were increasingly attempting to assert control over the 
16 
1ý_ý 
IA! V It's a very different experie ý/e to try a do litigation that 
. 
is respectful o the clientsqlýis an 
-4perience 
for them, empower 1 nq 9ý 
Fdco6es 
Place control in 
0 
their hann t*fqtV-ýs a very different thing from the 
w0 
traditiona of litigation ... really listening for hr our hours, going away and re-drafting a factum 
15,20 times,, sending it out to 10,15, maybe 20 0 
ours,, 
t1m 
t 
peoples who then send it out to their boards, sub- 
committees-it grows and advances as we work, in the 
process of talking about what our Position ought to be, 
how to express it, the different co-intervenors have 
heard one and other-the factum really will be a 
collective effort. In a situation like this, you just 
don't release it until you have something that people 
are prepared to say is theirs. All of them. To claim 
it. (interview) 
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C, 4ý-- labou, r activities, such as secondary picketing, by not Protecting 
them under Charter grounds. Various writers have noted and been 
cy-itical of the capacity of. the C-harter to effect any positive 
change in the social conditions of working life (see Glasbeek and 
Mandel, 1984; Glasbeek, 1989; Fudge and Glasbeek, 1992). 
Aside from cas 
.e 
results, it would be difficult to argue that 
Charter litigation, and its attendant rights rhetoric, have 
- assisted in the mobilisation of the working class, or in 
communicating class analyses to the wider public. At the same 
time, the courts have used the Charter to fill out the legal 
personality of corpo-rations, giving them rights, religions, and 
so on . In very 
few ways, has the Charter effected any erosion 
of corporate power or profit. Hence, the almost universal 
Charter denunciation by marxist, le'gal theorists. 
On the other hand, a majority of feminist lawyers clearly 
view the Charter's advent as a good thing for women. Whilst, some 
academics, notably those writing within a marxist tradition, 
remain critical in this area as well, most others, particularly 
since he Law Society 198 decision rejecting reverse 
discrimination complaints, are pleased and hopeful. Not only 
with results, but, as Gwen Brodsky argued above, with the 
capacity of Charter litigation to mobilise social movements, and 
open up avenues of communication, not only between movements and 
'the Public'. but between movements themselves. Many activists 
within lesbian and gay movements agree. 10/ 91 
-=: j- V- / 44 
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1-72At 01,17A. AýA 
C 
--q- No doubt, if cases involving complaints of sex 
opýdjscr imi nation were decided differently, if feminists felt they 
were not getting anywhere with Charter litigat 
. 
ion, the overall 
assessment would be quite different. Conversely, as Judy 
Anderson of REAL Women remarked, under different circumstances, 
should REAL Women perceive cases to be going its way, they might 
not be offering criticisms "so loudlya (interview). 
to 
As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the 
=deis 
not so much about rights, or charters, or codes, b)dt about 
underlying political analyses and visions and about wyo has power 
to def ine the terms of equality. For socialists. /it is not the 
Charter that is the problem, but the Prevailing libe-al i< g eral ideology 
wt poir of courts and legislatures. This is how I ead the point made 
I 
by Joel Bakan ( 1991 ) in his reply to /tho e who write about how 
erl I 
cumenj 1 
the Charter could potentially be i erpreted. Certainly, 
socialists could give rights d cuments any number of 
interpretations - unfortunately, he Charter is in different 
hands (see also Chapter 7). 
31 
However, it could be arg ed that feminism, at least certain 
'brands' of feminism, have colonised liberal ideology with much 
ýv 
c pi 
greater success than have marxist class perspectives. This would 
v 
not be the case for al capitalist democracies, but it may well 
m 
be true for Canada, wýere the state has for some years been, at 
31 As I exp ain in Chapter 6, however, the New Christian 
Right would vehe ently disagree with this statement. They argue 
'0 the courts ar controlled by socialist feminist gay rights 
advocates. (P/V CA44,1z' 
37 
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cannot as easily get away with saying now. This is important, 
and not something to be derided or dismissed. 
Shifts in meaning over time (Gusfield, 1981), are also 
evident in other areas . Law initially offered 'homosexuals' no 
tprivate' realm whatsoever The Wolfenden reforms, won through 
the campaigning of early 'homophile rights" organisations. 
constructed a narrow arena in which homosexual (usually male) sex 
was to be de-criminalised. More recently, demands for lesbian 
and gay rights in the areas of adoption and fostering, 
reproductive technologies, and a whole host of other 'family 
sphere' areas, have confronted the liberal Wolfenden consensus 
(Cooper and Herman, 1992). The 'public/private' distinction is 
no longer tenable; hence, the OPPosition such "rights claims' 
meet. 
on the other hand, there is other evidence to support the 
position that not all equality struggles offer the same 
opportunities. For example, Chris Bearchell argued in Chapter 
3 that the Bill 7 campaign successfully mobilised and politicised 
lesbians and gay men. Both Brian Mossop and Ken PoPert agree 
that their litigation has not done this, and that individual 
legal cases are not good mobilisers (interview). However, the 
Bill 7 campaign, in contrast to Mossop's liti ation experience, 
exhibited almost no public discussionZof sexuality, homo or 
hetero. Prevailing rhetoric, engag din by amendment supporters, 
simply re-enforced elements liberal ideology - tolerance, 
privacy, minority protecýrfon, and so on. As I argued in the 
42 
Ve- o5 
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previous chapter this was as much a 
deliberate, pragmatic 
decisiOn On the part of amendment Campaigners as it was an 
exClusionary quality of a particular 
1. Y Powerful discourse. 
This last point is worth pursuing. To what extent do 
p, rogressive forces even attempt to introduce Oppositional 
analyses into their political, including legal, struggles? Do 
ocial. movements assume they must work through dominant 
frameworks of meaning, even as they consciously dispute their 
authority? To what extent do opposing social movements, such as 
those of feminism and conservative Christianity, share a 
rejection of liberalism, whilst maintaining a pragmatic, 
instrumental approach to achieving liberalism's overthrow? 
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The 
British Columbia 
Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre 
701 - 744 West Hastings Street 
Vancouver. B. C. V6C 1A5 
Tel: (604) 6B7-3063 Fax: (604) 682-7896 
September 3,1992 
Ms Didi Herman 
United Kingdom 
B. Your Paper 
When I read your paper (which I think is excellent) I understand that you are concerned 
with the relationship between law and social change., in a major way. Yours is a 
valuable inquiry, to be sure. I don't think I understood well enough what you were 
working on, at the time of our interview. I may have become more reflective, of late. In 
any case, when I read your paper I think I come off sounding naive and much more 
Positional than I actually am, with respect to the rights debates-'The fact is that I think 
you are absolutely correct when you say "the relationship between law and social 
Inovernents is complex. Our understandings are not helped by historical, abstract, 
343 
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prescriptive contributions -- whether they be those of the rights critics or rights 
defend ers. " I do not want to be guilty of these sins nor do I want to be perceived as 
r*lty of them. Therefore: being gui 
I retract the following statement contained in my September 1,1992 letter to you, 
concerning the August 7,, 1992 draft of your thesis: "However, Brodsky has little 
time for 'rights critics' who., from positions of privilege and inaction, stand in 
eloquent and hostile judgement of the strategies employed by disadvantaged 
groups to try and overcome their inequality. " Some other time I may write 
someti-ting about the work of particular rights critics, and meanwhile I should 
refrain from making inflammatory generalizations about them. . 
2. "Beyond the Rights Debate" p. 11: 1 am astonished and not comfortable to be 
labelled a "Charter-enthusiast". I do not regard myself as a "Charter-enthusiast", 
particularly. Where the Charter is concerned, I prefer to think of myself as a 
thoughtful realist. I believe that the Charter can have a positive role in struggles 
for progressive social change, but that in order for its potential to be achieved 
Charter litigation needs to be: rooted in community-based politics, combined 
//, 
'M' 
with other political strategies, and regarded critically by its users. The Charter 
has the power to effect change, whether that change be regressive or progressive; 
that is why I have devoted energy to arguing in favour of progressive 
interpretations, public funding for access to Charter rights by members of 
disadvantaged groups, and increased accountability on the part of government 
respondents in Charter cases. I also believe in the value of allowing the voices of 
marginalized groups to be heard. This is what I try to do, through Charter 
litigation. I am not of the school of people who "think that with the Charter in 
place all we have to do is cook up imaginative legal arguments and go to court 
for the realization of an egalitarian and just society" (Joel Bakan, Canadian Bar 
Review, 1991 Vol. 7, p. 328. ) Does anyone belong to this school? 
In the same vein, I wonder what you intend to quote from me, if anything, on p. 
12 of your paper? 
In closing, Didi, as you can probably tell I am finding your work helpful to me. I hope 
that I am being helpful to you in some way, too, and not just a nuisance. 
Yours sin5ýp4ely, 
Gwen Brodsky 
Barrister & Solicitor 
GB: ca 
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Didi Herman 
Department of Law 
Keele University 
Keele, Staffordshire 
ST5 5BG 
ENGLAND 
Dear Didi: 
Thank you for sending me the excerpt of your 
thesis which refers to your interview with me. I like 
the way you used it. Upon reflecting back on my last 
experience (the Vogel case) I would strengthen my 
expressed dismay even more. In that case, I felt that 
scholarly definitions were misused in a serious manner 
by the other side, and there was no way in which I 
could make this statement. I actually tried doing it, 
and was told that my business was to answer questions, 
not to ask them. Yet questions always rest on certain 
assumptions, and if one cannot challenge these 
assumptions, a very important aspect of truthfinding 
has been eliminated. 
In any case, I am glad you are writing your 
thesis. Good luck! 
Yours sincerely, 
Margri Eichler 
ow Nancy owell Jackman Chair in Women's Studies 
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The Salvation Army 
Territorial Headquarters 
Canada and Bermuda 
20 Salvation Square 
(P. O. Box 4021, Postal Station A) 
Toronto, Ontario N15W 2BI 
Telephone: (416) 598-2071 
November 26,1992 
Ms. Didi Herman 
Keele Univeristy 
Staffordshire 
Keele, Staffordshire 
ST5 5BG 
Dear Didi: 
MOSSOP 
FAX NUMBERS: 
Chief Secre(ar) 
Editorial (416) 598-5063 
Property (416) 845-1966 
Public Relations (416) 340-2166 
Receptionist's Desk (Finance) 
(416) 598-1672 
Supplies and Purchasing 
(416) 340-2207 
Addictions and Rehabilitation 
(416) 391-5296 
(416) 866-8934 Corrections and Justice Health Services/ýk omen' S i l 
(416) 340-2204 
s oc a (416) 369-"49 
I have reviewed the excerpts from your draft thesis which were sent to my attention 
in October. I have numbered them 1-11-1-17 and commented on them accordingly. 
Enclosed are the originals which were sent to me. 
HI 
You comment: 
"However, for the Army, litigation is increasingly being seen as another way 
of expressing a political message. " 
The Salvation Army does not see litigation as a way of expressing a political 
message. Our involvement in litigation of a nature involving social responsibility is in 
order to ensure a full presentation on the issues being addressed by the courts. In 
the case this was necessary. In other cases it has not been required. 
You state: 
'The Army now 'budgets' for litigation and Hutchinson insists that no other 
area of Army service suffers as a result... " 
Of necessity, the Army budgets for litigaiion. With 12,000 employees and over 1,800 
properties including churches, social service institutions and residences, it is 
necessary to have a litigation budget. Part of the litigation budget may be accessed for intervention in social policy issue cases where there is a clear understanding of a Biblical issue which we feel requires presentation. 
The quote you use should read (as per the transcript which was forwarded to you): 
Law is one of may ways to communicate your concern. of course our 
primary concern is to share the Gospel in our word and deeds. That 
sharing and coming to positional statements on a number of issues on 
which there is a Biblical perspective takes place in a number of 
"Haveyou read The War Cry? " 34 6 
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different ways. One of those ways is lobbying the government. One 
of those ways is appearing before the courts. One of those ways is the Sunday morning Holiness meeting or the Sunday night Salvation 
meeting or midweek Bible Study. One of those ways is providing soup to people commonly referred to as street people. One of those ways is having a van that travels downtown Toronto looking for teenagers in 
need and specifically ministering to teenagers. There are a number of 
varieties and a number of ways which we try to minister. Law is one of them. 
In this instance the full quote displays the separation of these various ways of 
ministering in a way that does not reflect any sense of primacy. 
H2 
The editing of the quote in this instance leaves out a crucial component of the 
statement. I will pick up with your editing and indicate the portion concerned in bold 
type: 
... the Christian faith has worked hand in hand with the societal development to recognize the need and the granting of certain 
rights for people. 
H4 
It is probably not appropriate to indicate that certain individuals who were 
interviewed by you would represent the organizations who selected them to do the 
interview and others would not. The sentence worded: 
"Having said this however, it should be remembered that Hutchinson's 
comments to me in an interview do not necessarily represent the views of 
the Army's membership. " 
Might more properly state: 
11 may not necessarily represent H. 
I suspect the "newsletter" you referred to is The War Cry which might more properly be referred to as a 11newspaper" or "weekly paper'l. 
H5 
H6 
H7 
I am not certain that it is accurate to say: 
347 
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IrThe Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada and Evangelical Fellowship of 
Canada have "active histories in opposing lesbian and gay equality. If 
it might be more accurate to state that both have had active histories in promoting 
the evangelical position on social issues. Your statement is so broad and general as 
to be necessarily inaccurate. 
I note the asterisk beside comments attributed to me in regard to REAL Women. I 
believe my comments were in regard to the overt political nature of REAL Women 
and the fact that The Salvation Army is apolitical. The "problems" were in regard to 
associating ourselves with a highly political organization. In any case, these 
comments were made clearly off the record and I suppose that is why you 
asterisked them. I would prefer that the statement"that they were the ones we have 
the most problems with'not be in your final thesis. 
It should be noted that primary funding came from: 
"Focus on the Family and The Salvation Army with the Pentecostals and the 
Evangelical Fellowship... " 
Further it should be noted that The Salvation Army's "property and investments" 
financial sources are sources who's originating funds come from internal Salvation 
Army collections, i. e. Sunday offerings from Salvation Army Corps. Your choice of 
wording conveys the impression that these funds may have been diverted from the 
purposes for which they were raised. Within The Salvation Army there is a 
procedure whereby each Salvation Army Corps (Church) tithes (sends 10% of 
internally generated funds) to its Divisional Headquarters and Divisional 
Headquarters tithes to Territorial Headquarters. This provides funding for 
administrative oversight, including such matters as legal expenses. 
Trust the above to address any concerns which you might t 
portions of your draft thesis to me. The Salvation Army is 
underwriting the cost of your thesis to the extend of paying 
mailing, of one copy of the final thesis to my attention. 
God bless. 
DH/kh 
, in ADVISOR 
iave had in forwarding 
prepared to assist in 
the full cost, including 
3149 
5 October 1992 
Toronto Ont M4K I H4 
Canada 
Didi Herman 
Oxford OX2 6RW 
UK 
Dear Didi - 
Thanks for the chance to amend our words - no changes needed. 
I took the time to read your paper and was (pleasantly) surprised to discover 
there's been so much published discussion on the meaning of equality rights 
movements. That just shows how little communication there's been between 
activists and intellectuals (or academics at any rate). 
Two points that came to mind as I read: 
,PI find it frustrating that so many leftists (intellectuals and activists) are locked 
into an "either/or" way of looking at the world when, if they paid any attention to 
the intellectual foundations and history of the left, they would know that 
"both/and" should be their approach. 
* On page 25 you pose the question "Is the minority model of homosexuality ... 
necessarily a positive, progressive one? " You might be interested to know that 
this has all been argued before. In the '70s there was debate as to the right path to 
take to gay and lesbian liberation: to reify homosexuality as a group of people (a 
sexual minority) or to "liberate the homosexual in everyone. " Roughly speaking, North America chose the first route, while Europe took the second. The results 
speak for themselves: one approach produced mass mobilization and a dramatic improvement in the lives of gay men and lesbians, the other produced books and 
pamphlets from small groups of intellectuals and changed little or nothing. Few 
ordinary people, it seems, could be interested in the abstract project of liberating homosexuality. The fact is that, in order to abolish social categories (such as homosexual and heterosexual), we first have to fully construct them so that there 
7 ) Liq 
is a potentially powerful human agency with an interest in their abolition. And 
unless a political theory points to practical and achievable goals which a 
significant number of people see as worth fighting for, it will be of no 
consequence. 
Thanks for checking the quotes with us. 
Regards, 
Ken Popert. 
S90 
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